Hutto, D., Myin, E., (2017), Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
Hutto, D., Myin, E., (2013), Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
Hutto, D., (2008), Folk psychological narratives: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
Hutto, D., Ratcliffe, M., eds. (2007), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Dordrecht: Springer.
Hutto, D., (2003), Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hutto, D., (2000), Beyond Physicalism, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Hutto, D., (1999), The Presence of Mind, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Journal articles and chapters of books:
Hutto, D. (2020), The cost of over-intellectualizing the free-energy principle, The Behavioral and brain sciences, 43, e105: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002851.
Segundo Ortin, M., Hutto, D. (2019), Similarity-based cognition: radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience. Synthese, 198: 5-23.
Hutto, D., Robertson, I., Kirchhoff, M. D. (2018), A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory, Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1217: 1-12.
Hutto, D. (2018), Getting into predictive processing's great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell?, Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, 195 (6): 2445-2458.
Hutto, D., Ilundain-Agurruza, J. (2018), Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness, Topoi: an International Review of Philosophy(2020), 39: 509-520.
Hutto, D. (2018), Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and the Embodied Mind, by Andy Clark, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96 (1): 186-189.
Hutto, D., Myin, E., Peeters, A., Zahnoun, F. (2018), The cognitive basis of computation: Putting computation in its place. In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, eds. Sprevak, M., Colombo, M. (2018), London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 272-282.
Hutto, D., Peeters, A. (2018), The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting. In New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, eds. Michaelian, K., Debus, D., Perrin, D. (2018), New York: Routledge, 97-118.
Hutto, D. (2017), Basic social cognition without mindreading: minding minds without attributing contents, Synthese, 194 (3): 827-846.
Hutto, D. D., Brancazio, N. M., Aubourg, J. (2017). Narrative practices in medicine and therapy: Philosophical reflections, Style, 51 (3): 300-317.
Hutto, D. (2017), Memory and narrativity. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, eds. Bernecker, S., Michaelian, K. (2017), London: Routledge, 192-204.
Hutto, D. (2016), Narrative Understanding. In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature, eds. Carroll, N., Gibson, J. (2016), New York: Routledge, 281-301.
Kirchhoff, M. D., Hutto, D. D. (2016), Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciosuness, Constructivist Foundations, 11 (2): 346-353.
Hutto, D., McGivern, P. (2016), Updating the story of mental time travel: narrating and engaging with our possible pasts and futures. In Time and the Philosophy of Action, eds. Altshuler, R., Sigrist, M. J. (2016), New York: Routledge, 167-185.
Hutto, D., Kirchhoff, M. D. (2015), Looking beyond the brain: social neuroscience meets narrative practice, Cognitive Systems Research, 34-35: 5-17.
Hutto, D. (2015), Overly enactive imagination? Radically re-imagining imagining, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53 (Supplement S1): 68-89.
Myin, E., Hutto, D. (2015), REC: Just radical enough, Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 41 (54): 61-71.
Hutto, D., Satne, G. L. (2015), The natural origins of content, Philosophia (United States), 43 (3): 521-536.
Hutto, D. (2015), REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification, Topoi, 36 (3): 377-391.
Hutto, D. (2015), Contentless perceiving: the very idea. In Wittgenstein and Perception, eds. Campbell, M., O'Sullivan, M. (2015), New York: Routledge, 63-83.
Hutto, D. (2015), Enactive aesthestics: philosophical reflections on artful minds. In Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy, ed. Scarinzi, A. (2015) Leiden: Springer, 211-227.
Hutto, D., Kirchhoff, M. D., Myin, E. (2014), Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8 (Article 706): 1-11.
Hutto, D., Myin, E. (2014), Neural representations not needed - no more please, please, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13 (2): 241-256.
Hutto, D. (2013), Emotions and consciousness. In Encyclopedia of the Mind, ed. Pashler, H. (2013), Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc, 320-321.
Hutto, D. (2013), Intersubjective engagements without theory of mind: a cross-species comparison. In Apes and Humans: Rethinking the Species Interface, eds. Lanjouw, A., Corbey, R. (2013), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 126-140.
Hutto, D. (2013), Doing without concepts, Philosophy in Review, 33 (2): 142-145.
Hutto, D. (2013), Exorcising action oriented representations: ridding cognitive science of its Nazgûl, Adaptive Behavior: animals, animats, software agents, robots, adaptive systems, 21 (3): 142-150.
Hutto, D. (2013), Psychology unified: From folk psychology to radical enactivism, Review of General Psychology, 17 (2): 174-178.
Hutto, D. (2013), Radically enactive cognition in our grasp. In The Hand, an Organ of the Mind - What the Manual Tells the Mental (ebook), ed. Radman, Z., Cambridge: MIT Press, 227-252.
Gallagher, S., Hutto, D., Slaby, J., Cole, J. (2013), The brain as part of an enactive system, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36 (4): 421-422.
Hutto, D. (2013), Why believe in contentless beliefs?. In New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, ed. Nottelmann, N., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 55-74.
Hutto, D. (2012), Narrative, emotion, and insight, Mind: a quarterly review of philosophy, 121 (484): 1052-1055.
Hutto, D. (2012), Exposing the background: deep and local. In Knowing Without Thinking: Mind, Action, Cognition and the Phenomenon of the Background, ed. Radman, Z. (2012), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 37-56.
Hutto, D. (2011), Philosophy of mind's new lease on life: Autopoietic enactivism meets teleosemiotics, Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science and the humanities, 18 (5/6): 44-64.
Hutto, D. (2011), The extended mind, Analysis, 71 (4): 785-787.
Hutto, D. (2011), Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind!, Style (DeKalb), 45 (2): 276-282.
Hutto, D. (2011), Consciousness. In The Continuum companion to philosophy of mind, ed. Garvey, J. (2011), London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 35-53.
Hutto, D. (2011), Elementary mind minding, enactivist-style. In Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience, ed. Seemann, A. Cambridge: MIT Press, 307-341.
Hutto, D. (2010), Predicative minds: the social ontogeny of propositional thinking, Mind, 119 (476): 1141-1145.
Hutto, D. (2010), Radical enactivism and narrative practice: implications for psychopathology. In The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence and Disorders, eds. Fuchs, T., Sattel, H. C., Henningsen, P. Stuttgart: Schattauer, 43-66.
Hutto, D. (2009), Folk psychology as narrative practice, Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science and the humanities, 16 (6-8): 9-39.
Hutto, D. (2009), Interacting? Yes. But, of what kind and on what basis?, Consciousness and Cognition, 18 (2): 543-546.
Hutto, D. (2009), Mental representation and consciousness. In Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. Banks. W. P. (2009), Oxford: Academic Press, 19-32.
Hutto, D. (2009), ToM Rules, but it is not OK!. In Against Theory of Mind, eds. Leudar, I., Costall, A. (2009), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 221-238.
Hutto, D. (2008), The narrative practice hypothesis: clarifications and implications, Philosophical Explorations: an international journal for the philosophy of mind and action, 11 (3): 175-192.
Hutto, D. (2008), First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind. In The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, eds. Zlatev, J., Racine, T. P., Sinha, C., Itkonen, E. (2008), Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 245-276.
Gallagher, S., Hutto, D. (2008), Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice. In The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, eds. Zlatev, J., Racine, T. P., Sinha, C., Itkonen, E. (2008), Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 17-38.
Hutto, D. (2007), Mind and supermind, Mind, 116 (461): 170-173.
Hutto, D. (2007), The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology, Philosophy, 60 (May): 43-68.
Hutto, D. (2007), Narrative and understanding persons, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 60 (May): 1-16.
Hutto, D. (2007), Folk psychology without theory or simulation. In Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, eds. Hutto, D., Ratcliffe, M. (2007), Dordrecht: Springer, 115-135.
Hutto, D. (2006), Both Bradley and biology. In Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, ed. Menary, R. A. (2006), Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co, 81-105.
Hutto, D. (2006), Narrative practice and understanding reasons: reply to Gallagher. In Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, ed. Menary, R. A. (2006), Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co, 231-247.
Hutto, D., (2006), Embodied expections and extended possibilities: reply to Goldie. In Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, ed. Menary, R. A. (2006), Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co,157-177.
Hutto, D. (2006), Unprincipled engagements: emotional experience, expression and response. In Radical Enactivism Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, ed. Menary, R. A. (2006), Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co, 13-38.
Hutto, D. (2006), Turning hard problems on their heads, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5 (1): 75-88.
Hutto, D. (2005), Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4 (4): 389-405.
Hutto, D. (2005), Starting without theory: confronting the paradox of conceptual development. In Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Divide Between Self and Others, eds. Malle, B. F., Hodges, S. D. (2005), New York: The Guilford Press, 56-72.
Hutto, D. (2004), The limits of spectatorial folk psychology, Mind and Language, 19 (5): 548-573.
Hutto, D. (2003), Folk psychological narratives and the case of autism, Philosophical Papers, 32 (3): 345-361.
Hutto, D. (2002), The world is not enough: shared emotions and other minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals, ed. Goldie, P. Aldershot: Ashgate, 37-53.
Hutto, D. (2001), Consciousness and conceptual schema. In Dimensions of Conscious Experience, eds. Pylkkanen, P., Vaden, T. (2001), Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 15-43.
Hutto, D. (1999), A cause for concern: reasons, causes and explanations, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2): 381-401.
Hutto, D. (1999), Cognition without representation?. In Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does Representation Need Reality?, eds. Riegler, A., Peschl, M., Von Stein, A. (1999), New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum, 57-74.
Hutto, D. (1998), An ideal solution to the problems of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5 (3): 328-343.
Hutto, D. (1997), The story of the self: the narrative basis of self-development. In Ethics and the Subject, ed. Simms, K. (1997). Amsterdam: Rodopi, 61-75.
