Selected publications of Professor Shaun Gallagher

Authored and edited books:

  • Gallagher, S. (2020), Action and Interaction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Newen, A., De Bruin, L., Gallagher, S., eds. (2018), Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Gallagher, S. (2017), Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • S. Gallagher, B. Janz, L. Reinerman, P. Bockelman, and J. Trempler, eds. (2015), A Neurophenomenology of Awe and Wonder: Towards a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science,  London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  • Gallagher, S. (2012), Phenomenology, London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  • Gallagher, S., ed. (2011), Oxford Handbook of the Self, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Gallagher, S., Schmicking. D., eds (2010), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science,  Dordrecht: Springer.
  • Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. (2008), The Phenomenological Mind, London: Routledge.
  • Gallagher, S. (2008), Brainstorming: Views and Interviews on the Mind, Exeter: Imprint Academic
  • Banks, W., Pockett, S., Gallagher, S., eds. (2006), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition, Cambridge: MIT Press.
  • Gallagher, S. (2005), How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Gallagher, S., Watson, S., eds. (2004), Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity, Rouen: Publications de l'Université de Rouen.
  • Gallagher, S. (1998), The Inordinance of Time, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
  • Gallagher, S. (1992), Hermeneutics and Education, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Journal articles and chapters of books:

  • Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. (2020), The meshed architecture of performance as a model of situated cognition, Frontiers in Psychology, 11: 2140.  DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02140.
  • Miyahara, K., Ransom, T. and Gallagher, S. (2020), What the situation affords: Habit and heedful interrelations in skilled performance. In Habits: Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Neurosciences to Social Sciences, eds. Testa, I., and Caruana, F. (2020), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 120-136.
  • Gallagher, S. (2020), Mindful performance. In The Extended Theory of Cognitive Creativity - Interdisciplinary Approaches to Performativity, eds. Pennisi, A. and Falzone, A. (2020), Berlin: Springer, 43-58.
  • Gallagher, S. and Tollefsen, D. (2019), Advancing the ‘we’ through narrative, Topoi, 38 (1): 211-219. DOI: 10.1007/s11245-017-9452-1.
  • Gallagher, S. and Hutto, D. (2019), Narrative in embodied therapeutic practice: Getting the story straight. In The Routledge International Handbook of Embodied Perspectives in Psychotherapy, eds. Payne, H., Tantia, J., Koch, S., and Fuchs, T. (2019), London: Routledge, 28-39.
  • Gallagher, S. and Allen, M. (2018), Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition, Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8.
  • Gallagher, S. (2018), Situating interaction in peripersonal and extrapersonal space: Empirical and theoretical perspectives. In Situatedness and Place: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the Spatio-Temporal Contingency of Human Life, eds. Hünefeldt, T. and Schlitte, A. (2018), Berlin: Springer, 67-79.
  • Gallagher, S. (2018), Consciousness and action. In Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, ed. Gennaro, R. (2018), London: Routledge, 298-309.
  • Gallagher, S. (2017), The narrative sense of others, Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 7 (2): 467-473.
  • Gallagher, S. (2017), Empathy and theories of direct perception. In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, ed. Maibom (2017), H., London: Routledge, 158-168.
  • Tollefsen, D. and Gallagher, S. (2016), We-narratives and the stability and depth of shared agency, Journal of Philosophy of the Social Sciences, DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831
  • Gallagher, S. and Ransom, T. (2016), Artifacting minds: Material engagement theory and joint action. In Embodiment in Evolution and Culture, eds. Tewes, C., Etzelmüller, G. (2016), Berlin: de Gruyter, 337-351.
  • Gallagher, S. (2016), Do we (or our brains) actively represent or enactively engage with the world? In The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science, eds. Engel, A. K., Friston, K. J., and Kragic, D. (2015), Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 18. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 285-296.
  • Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. (2015), Social cognition and psychopathology: a critical overview, World Psychiatry, 14 (1): 5-14. DOI: 10.1002/wps.20173.
  • Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. (2015), Conceptual issues in autism spectrum disorders, Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 28 (2): 127-32, DOI: 10.1097/YCO.0000000000000142.
  • Gallagher, S. (2014), Pragmatic interventions into enactive and extended conceptions of cognition, Nous – Philosophical Issues, 24: 110-126.
  • Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. (2014), Social constraints on the direct perception of emotions and intentions, Topoi, 33 (1): 185-199 DOI 10.1007/s11245-013-9203-x.
  • Gallagher, S. (2013), Intersubjectivity and psychopathology. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry, eds. Fulford, B., Davies, M., Graham, G., Sadler, J., and Stanghellini, G. (2013), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 258-274.
  • Gallagher, S. (2013), A pattern theory of self, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7 (443): 1-7. DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00443.
  • Gallagher, S. (2013), The socially extended mind, Cognitive Systems Research, 25-26: 4-12.
  • Gallagher, S. (2013), Ambiguity in the sense of agency.  In Decomposing the Will, eds. Clark, A., Kiverstein, J., and Vierkant, T. (2013), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 118-135.
  • Gallagher, S. (2012), Empathy, simulation and narrative, Science in Context, 25 (3), 301–327.
  • Froese, T. and Gallagher, S. (2012), Getting IT together: Integrating developmental, phenomenological, enactive and dynamical approaches to social interaction, Interaction Studies, 13 (3): 434-66.
  • Gallagher, S. and Povinelli, D. (2012), Enactive and behavioral abstraction accounts of social understanding in chimpanzees, infants, and adults, Review of Philosophy and Psychology,  (DOI) 10.1007/s13164-012-0093-4.
  • Gallagher, S. (2012), Interactive coordination in joint attention.  In Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience, ed. Seeman, A. (2011), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Gallagher, S. (2012), Neurons, neonates and narrative: From embodied resonance to empathic understanding.  In Moving Ourselves, Moving Others, eds. Foolen, A., Lüdtke, U., Zlatev, J., and Racine, T., (2012), Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 167-196.
  • Gallagher, S. (2011), The overextended mind, Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici, 113-115: 55-66.
  • Gallagher, S. and Cole, J. (2011), Dissociation in self-narrative, Consciousness and Cognition, 20: 149-155.
  • Gallagher, S. (2011), Time in action. In Oxford Handbook on Time, ed. Callender, C. (2011) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 419-437.
  • Gallagher, S. (2011), Phenomenology, neural simulation, and the enactive approach to intersubjectivity.  In Phenomenology, Cognition and Neuroscience, ed. McCurry, J. (2011), Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press/Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, 18-39.
  • Elias, J., Morrow, P.B., Streater, J., Gallagher, S., and Fiore, S.M. (2011), Towards Triadic Interactions in Autism and Beyond: Transitional Objects, Joint Attention, and Social Robotics, Proceedings of the 55th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 55 (1): 1486-1490.
  • Gallagher, S. (2010), Joint attention, joint action, and participatory sense making, Alter: Revue de Phénoménologie, 18: 111-124.
  • De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E. and Gallagher, S. (2010), Does social interaction constitute social cognition?, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14 (10): 441-447.
  • Froese, T. and Gallagher, S. (2010), Phenomenology and artificial life: Toward a technological supplementation of phenomenological methodology, Husserl Studies, 26 (2): 83-107.
  • Gallagher, S. (2010), Phenomenology and non-reductionist cognitive science. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, eds. Gallagher, S., and Schmicking, D. (2010), Dordrecht: Springer, 21-34.
  • Gallagher, S. (2009), Two problems of intersubjectivity, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16 (6-8): 289-308.
  • Gallagher, S. (2009), Neurophenomenology. In Oxford Companion to Consciousness, eds. Bayne, T., Cleeremans, A., and Wilken, P. (2009), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 470-472.
  • Gallagher, S. (2009), Body image/body schema. In Oxford Companion to Consciousness, eds. Bayne, T., Cleeremans, A., and Wilken, P. (2009), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 117-119.
  • Gallagher, S. (2009) Delusional realities. In Psychiatry as Cognitive Science, eds. Bortolotti, L., and Broome, M. (2009), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 245-266.
  • Gallagher, S. (2009), Consciousness of time and the time of consciousness. In Elsevier Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. Banks, W. (2009), London: Elsevier, 193-204.
  • Gallagher, S. (2008), Philosophical antecedents to situated cognition. In Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, eds. Robbins, P. and Aydede, M. (2008), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 35-51.
  • Gallagher, S. (2008), Intersubjectivity in perception, Continental Philosophy Review, 41 (2): 163-178.
  • Gallagher, S. (2008), Are minimal representations still representations?, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16 (3): 351-69.
  • Gallagher, S. (2008), Direct perception in the intersubjective context, Consciousness and Cognition, 17: 535-543.
  • Gallagher, S., and Zahavi, D. (2008), Précis: The Phenomenological Mind. Abstracta, 2: 4-9.
  • Gallagher, S. (2008), Understanding others: Embodied social cognition. In Elsevier Handbook of Embodied Cognitive Science, ed. Garzón, P. C. (2008), London: Elsevier, 439-52.
  • Gallagher, S. and Hutto, D. (2008), Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice. In The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, eds. Zlatev, J., Racine, T. P., Sinha, C., and Itkonen, E. (2008), Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 17-38.
  • Tsakiris, M. Bosbach S. and Gallagher, S. (2007), On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological and neuroscientific reflections, Consciousness and Cognition, 16 (3): 645-60.
  • Gallagher, S. (2007), Social cognition and social robots, Pragmatics and Cognition, 15 (3):  435-54.
  • Gallagher, S. (2007), Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory. In Folk Psychology Re-assessed, eds. Hutto, D., and Ratcliffe, M. (2007), Dordrecht: Springer Publishers, 63-78.
  • Gallagher, S. (2007), Sense of agency and higher-order cognition: Levels of explanation for schizophrenia, Cognitive Semiotics, 0: 32-48.
  • Gallagher, S. (2007), Neurophilosophy and neurophenomenology. In Phenomenology (2005), Embree, L., and Nenon, T., Bucharest: Zeta Press, 293-316.
  • Gallagher, S. (2007), Pathologies in narrative structure, Philosophy (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement), 60: 203-224. Reprinted in Narrative and Understanding Persons, ed. Hutto, D. (2007), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Gallagher, S. (2007), Phenomenological approaches to consciousness. In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ed. Velmanns, M. (2007), Oxford: Blackwells, 686-696.
  • Gallagher, S. (2006), The narrative alternative to theory of mind. In Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative, ed. Menary, R. (2006), Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 223-229.
  • Gallagher, S. (2005), Phenomenological contributions to a theory of social cognition (The Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, 2003), Husserl Studies, 21: 95-110.
  • Gallagher, S. (2004), Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11 (10-11): 162-74.
  • Gallagher, S. (2004.), Ways of knowing the self and the other. In Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity, eds. Gallagher, S., and Watson, S. (2004), Rouen: Publications de l'Université de Rouen, 7-29.
  • Gallagher, S. (2004), Agency, ownership, and alien control in schizophrenia. In The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. Interdisciplinary perspectives, eds. Zahavi, D., T. Grünbaum and J. Parnas (2004), Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers, 89-104.
  • Gallagher, S. (2004), Understanding interpersonal problems in autism: Interaction theory as an alternative to theory of mind, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11 (3): 199-217.
  • Gallagher, S., and Vaever, M. (2004), Disorders of embodiment. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, ed. Radden, J. (2004), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 118-132.
  • Gallagher, S. (2004), Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: A neurophenomenological critique, Psychopathology 37: 8-19. Invited paper with response by Christopher Frith. Comments on Shaun Gallagher. Psychopathology, 37 (2004): 20-22.
  • Gallagher, S. and Varela, F. (2003), Redrawing the map and resetting the time: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 29, 93-132.
  • Gallagher, S. (2003), Phenomenology and experimental design, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10 (9-10), 85-99.
  • Gallagher, S. (2003), Bodily self-awareness and object-perception, Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies (Poland), 7 (1), 53-68.
  • Gallagher, S. (2003), Self-narrative, embodied action, and social context. In Between Suspicion and Sympathy: Paul Ricoeur's Unstable Equilibrium (Festschrift for Paul Ricoeur), ed. Wiercinski. A. (2003), Toronto: The Hermeneutic Press, 409-423.
  • Gallagher, S. (2003), Self-narrative in schizophrenia. In The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective, eds. A. S., David and T., Kircher (2003), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 336-357.
  • Gallagher, S. and Varela, F. (2001), Redrawing the map and resetting the time: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. In The Reach of Reflection: The Future of Phenomenology, eds. Crowell, S., Embree, L., and Julian, S. S. (2001), Electronpress, Electronic Publication, 18-45.
  • Gallagher, S. (2001), The practice of mind: Theory, simulation, or interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8 (5-7), 83-107.
  • Gallagher, S. (2000), Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error through Misidentification. In Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience, ed. Zahavi, D. (2000), Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 203-239.
  • Gallagher, S., Butterworth, G., Lew, D., and Cole, J. (1998), Hand-Mouth Coordination, Congenital Absence of Limb, and Evidence for Innate Body Schemas, Brain and Cognition, 38, 53-65.
  • Gallagher, S. (1997), Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4 (3), 195-214.
  • Gallagher, S. and Meltzoff, A. (1996), The Earliest Sense of Self and Others: Merleau-Ponty and Recent Developmental Studies, Philosophical Psychology, 9 (2), 213-236.
  • Gallagher, S. (1995), Body schema and intentionality. In The Body and the Self, eds. Bermúdez, J., Eilan, N., and Marcel, A. (1995), Cambridge: MIT/Bradford Press, 225-244.
  • Gallagher, S. and Cole, J. (1995), Body schema and body image in a deafferented subject, Journal of Mind and Behavior, 16: 369-390.