







00 | Contents



1

Introduction

2

Research questions

3

EU Approach

4

US Approach

Comparative Synthesis

6

Case Studies

7

Conclusion



01 | Introduction



- Trade–labour nexus → long-debated in global governance
- Countries rejected labour clauses in ITO and WTO
- Global South countries in 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore:
 labour clauses = disguised protectionism + way to undermine their national sovereignty and economic competitiveness
- ILO as the international organization to deal with labour matters
- EU & US pursue labour trade nexus in FTAs

1948	1986	1994	1996	2011	2023
 LAC countries wanted link labour standards to industrial protection Provisions rejected but included a Fair Labour Standards clause. 	 US raised "workers rights" at GATT preparatory meeting. Not included in the Min. Declaration Uruguay Round. EP endorsed the concept of a GATT "social clause" 	1 st inclusion of labour provisions in an FTA: NAFTA	WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference	EU included TSD chapter in FTA with Korea	1/3 FTA's has a Labour Clause (113 out of 357)



01 | Introduction

LAC EU

US trade agreements





02 | Research questions



- 1. How do EU (SEP) and US (RRM) mechanisms differ in their legal frameworks and procedural accessibility to enforce FTA labour clauses?
- 2. How have the EU and US mechanisms operated in practice in relation to Latin American trade partners?

03 | EU Approach



- Philosophy: Cooperative, "European social model", EU normative power
- Mechanisms:
 - Substantive: ILO standards, Decent Work Agenda
 - Procedural: dialogue, transparency, review
 - Institutional: Committees, DAGs, Civil Society Forums, Panels of Experts
- New Tool (2020): Single Entry Point (SEP)
 - Centralized complaint mechanism
 - Only EU-based stakeholders can file
 - Commission reviews the complaint and decides how to move forward

04 | US Approach



- Philosophy: Coercive, sanctions-backed
- Tools:
 - Pre-ratification reforms (Colombia, Peru)
 - Binding dispute settlement → fines, sanctions
 - USMCA Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) (2019, entry into force 2020):
 - Facility-specific
 - Covers Freedom Of Association & collective bargaining
 - Trade penalties → denial of tariff preferences
 - "Any person" of a Party can file BUT de iuris and de facto restricted to complaints against Mexico (Footnote 2 of Annex 31-A)

05 | Comparative Synthesis



Criterion	EU (SEP)	US (RRM)
Legal basis	Admin. tool (not treaty-based)	Treaty-based (USMCA)
Access	EU stakeholders only	Open to any person of a Party*
Scope	 System-wide (TSD, GSP, labour) Market access Non-compliance with TSD (incl. labour provisions) GSP matters. 	Facility-specific denial of Rights: 1. Freedom Of Association 2. Collective Bargain
Enforcement	Soft law, dialogue	Hard sanctions, tariff suspensions
Time limits (early stage)	No fixed deadlines. Commission commits to follow-up/feedback.	10 days for respondent to say if it will review;45 days to attempt remediation;Complainant may delay customs liquidation during review.
Escalation	Referral to DAGs, Civil Society Forum, TSD Committee, or a Panel of Experts.	If disagreement, panel verification within 30 days after receipt of the request for determination.
Remedies	Recommendations	Monetary penalties, denial of entry
Cases since its creation	1* (published)	27



06 | Case Studies



Case Study 1: Colombia-Peru Complaint (SEP, 2022)

- Filed by CNV Internationaal (NL) on behalf of local unions
- Mining sector (Peru public company I Colombia multinational company)
- Allegations: subcontracting, unequal pay, refusal to bargain
- Follow-up: technical cooperation programs (Peru); no resolution in Colombia (3+ years)
- Critiques:
 - Slow
 - Diffuse outcomes, no concrete solution for the trade union that complaint
 - Limited access (EU-based filer only)
 - No inclusion of workers on the procedure after filing was done.



Con huelga mineros de Andaychagua exigen a empresa Volcan diálogo para aumento salarial y otros beneficios

La minera Volcan incumple una sentencia judicial que a inicios de diciembre de 2023 le ordenó iniciar el trato directo con un sindicato de trabajadores de su unidad Andaychagua, para la negociación colectiva.





06 | Case Studies



List of technical cooperation activities to implement the labour rights commitments taken by Peru under the FTA

- **1. Labour Formalization** (economic incentives, review & systematize policies, coordinate with regional governments, workshops, reports & conclusions to guide implementation)
- **2. Labour Inspection** (policy tools to strengthen inspection system (SIT), diagnostic report: identify gaps (management, finance, HR, regulations)
- 3. Child Labour (protocol, monitoring platform, specialized survey)
- **4. Forced Labour** (study barriers faced by public institutions in applying the Intersectoral Protocol against Forced Labour (PICTF), Interviews with key actors and deliver report with findings and recommendations.)
- **5. Freedom of Association** (Diagnostic, review laws, data, and regional/international best practices. Coordinate with unions, ILO, EU, and public institutions. Develop & launch an App with tools for union organization and leadership.)
- **6. Social Dialogue** (Strengthen Peru's National Council for Labour and Employment Promotion, workshops, proposal for modernization + new internal regulation.

Funded by the European Union

06 | Case Studies



Case Study 2: GM Silao, Mexico (RRM 2021)

- Facility: General Motors (GM) facility in Silao,
 Guanajuato, one of the largest automotive plants in Mexico.
- **Issue:** Workers faced intimidation, irregular voting to endorse collective bargain agreement
- US Trade Representative filed complaint → RRM triggered
- Remediation: new supervised vote, independent union elected
- Outcome: tangible + rapid improvements in 6 months (April 2021 – August 2021)
- Critiques: sovereignty, bypass of national institutions





Grant number: 101120060 11

07 | Conclusion



- US model: Quick results, but intrusive & sovereignty concerns
- **EU model:** Inclusive, but slow and limited effectiveness
- Shared problems:
 - Workers' voices marginal in procedures
 - Responsibility shifted to Latin American states, not multinationals
 - Both reinforce asymmetries in global trade governance
- Hybrid model?
 - EU's dialogue + US's credible enforcement
 - Include workers' voices systematically
 - Extend accountability to multinational corporations
- How to shift Latin American countries role as actors not subjects of enforcement of labour rights in FTAs?



Understanding Latin American Challenges in the 21st Century

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Doctoral Networks

