Ecdotica

10

(2013)

Alma Mater Studiorum. Università di Bologna
Dipartimento di Filologia Classica e Italianistica

Centro para la Edición
de los Clásicos Españoles

Carocci editore

Ecdotica is a Peer reviewed Journal

Ecdotica garantisce e risponde del valore e del rigore dei contributi che si pubblicano sulla rivista, pur non condividendone sempre e necessariamente prospettive e punti di vista.

On line:

http://ecdotica.org

Alma Mater Studiorum. Università di Bologna,
Dipartimento di Filologia Classica e Italianistica,
Via Zamboni 32, 40126 Bologna
ecdotica.dipital@unibo.it

Centro para la Edición de los Clásicos Españoles
Don Ramón de la Cruz, 26 (6 B)
Madrid 28001
cece@cece.edu.es
www.cece.edu.es

Con il contributo straordinario dell'Ateneo di Bologna, con il contributo della Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio in Bologna e della Fundación Aquae

ALMA MATER STUDIORUM UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA

CCEE CENTRO PARA LA EDICIÓN DE LOS CLÁSICOS ESPAÑOLES

FONDAZIONE CASSA DI RISPARMIO IN BOLOGNA

AQUAE FUNDACIÓN

Carocci editore · Corso Vittorio Emanuele II, 229 00186 Roma · tel. 06.42818417, fax 06.42747931

INDICE

Questioni

Rassegne

Cronaca

Saggi

WORK AND DOCUMENT

A CURA DI BÁRBARA BORDALEJO

Introduzione

I saggi che seguono costituiscono una serie di approfondimenti critici sui concetti di «opera» (*work*) e di «testimone documentale» (*document*) in uso nel contesto della critica testuale e della teoria editoriale angloamericane.[1]

Nell'estate del 2012, Peter Robinson preparava un articolo per *Variants*, la rivista della European Society for Textual Scholarship, dal titolo «Towards a Theory of digital Editions»[2]. Nella fase di redazione, Robinson diede inizio a una serie di confronti con Paul Eggert e Hans Gabler sul concetto di «opera». Robinson aveva ricevuto una recensione, firmata da Gabler, del libro di Eggert, *Securing the Past*.[3] Nel libro, Eggert esamina il concetto di «opera» in cui la nozione proposta da G. Thomas Tanselle si mette da parte affinché l'«opera» abbia una funzione regolatrice (*regulative name*). I lettori di Ecdotica conoscono la critica di Gabler e la recensione, molto detagliata, di Paola Italia,[4] ma qui è conveniente fare una breve sintesi dell'argomento del decimo capitolo, che affronta in modo più diretto il tema.

Il capitolo 10 di *Securing the Past*, «The Editorial Gaze and the Nature of the Work», inizia con la distinzione che solo in inglese la parola «work» si usa come sostantivo e come verbo. In italiano, ad esempio, le due acce-

[1] In questa introduzione, la parola «opera» fa sempre riferimento alla parola «work», utilizzata in genere dagli editori anglofoni.

[2] P. Robinson, «Towards a Theory of Digital Editions», *Variants*, 10 (2013): 105-131.

[3] P. Eggert, *Securing the Past*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. H.W. Gabler, «Thoughts on Scholarly Editing», *Ecdotica*, 7 (2010), 105-137, e in *Journal of literary Theory* 2011: http://www.jltonline.de/index.php/reviews/article/view/307/891.

[4] *Ecdotica*, 6 (2009), 459-477.

zioni si esprimono con le parole «opera» e «lavoro». Poi spiega le difficoltà di definizione nei diversi campi (specialmente nell'arte e in letteratura) che arrivano al paradosso di Bateson: «Se la Gioconda è al Louvre, dove sono Amleto e Lycidas?». L'esempio iniziale di Eggert si basa sul restauro dell'opera di Rembrant «Lezione di anatomia del dottor Tulp». Le lastre ai raggi X effettuate durante gli studi precedenti al restauro dimostrarono che la mano destra del corpo era stata aggiunta su un bozzetto in cui non era presente[5]. Dopo aver considerato questo caso, Eggert formula la domanda: «Cos'è, allora, ciò che vediamo? Che effetto produce un intervento come questo [il restauro] nel nostro concetto dell'opera?»(p. 216). Da qui in avanti, Eggert fa un'analisi storica delle varie posizioni filosofiche, letterarie e artistiche delle scuole di pensiero che hanno considerato il concetto di «opera». La posizione personale di Eggert deriva da Teodoro W. Adorno e la dialettica negativa (lo studioso segnala che la teoria estetica di Adorno non gli viene particolarmente in aiuto). Adorno, spiega, argomentava che il soggetto, dentro il contesto storico, non può continuare ad essere identico a sé stesso attraverso il tempo. Neppure l'oggetto può restare o essere identico a sé stesso e può solo essere conosciuto da un soggetto attraverso il tempo. All'interno di questi ed altri concetti, Eggert vede possibilità che invece Adorno non avvertì. In particolare, si tratta dell'opportunità di concettualizzare la forma in cui autori, editori e lettori «concretano» il testo letterario. Il concetto centrale dell'argomento si trova a pagina 235:

> Una conseguenza è che, se le dimensioni documentali e testuali sono, ciascuna, il principio negativo che costituisce l'altra, allora nessuna delle due ha un'identità fissa in sé stessa. In altri termini, abbiamo bisogno di testi potenzialmente leggibili prima che carta e inchiostro possano costituire un documento. Per avere testo ci serve un documento materiale (in qualsiasi mezzo, sia stampato, sia una schermata al computer, o le onde sonore in un atto di vocalizzazione). Le due dimensioni sono concettualmente separabili, ma sono vincolate nella pratica; legandosi tra loro, popolano lo spettro di produzione-consumo affrontato nei capitoli precedenti. L'*opera* scaturisce solamente come un'idea regolatrice, il nome o il contenitore, per così dire, di una continuità dialettica. L'esistenza attuale o testimoniale del documento è sufficiente per vincolare tutti i processi testuali che si portano a termine con il nome di opera. La bibliografia analitica è una tecnologica per descrivere e collegare documenti vincolati.

[5] Il modello del dipinto era stato un famoso delinquente che, prima della sua esecuzione, aveva perso la mano per qualche crimine.

Le idee sviluppate in questi saggi prendono spunto da *Securing the Past* e si intrecciano anche con la teorizzazione prodotta negli ultimi anni sul tema dei documenti. In particolare, Gabler ha messo in scena il primato dei testimoni documentali, tralasciando il recupero del testo autoriale come obiettivo dell'edizione.[6] La discussione tra Eggert, Gabler e Robinson continuò in modo intermittente nel corso dell'anno, a volte coinvolgendo altri nomi, Peter Shillingsburg o la sottoscritta, altre volte solo tra i partecipanti originali. Quando si presentò l'opportunità di preparare una sezione speciale per Ecdotica, mi sembrò che fosse il luogo ideale per riunire questi contributi. Da una parte, rende pubblica una conversazione di grande importanza per la teoria della critica testuale; dall'altra, i saggi hanno lo scopo di chiarire la prospettiva con cui ciascuno di questi teorici si avvicina a concetti fondamentali e la modalità in cui questi ultimi influiscono sulla pratica editoriale. Considerato che i saggi sono pubblicati in inglese, la lingua nella quale sono stati scritti in originale, di seguito, presento una sintesi di ognuno di essi, ponendo l'accento sugli aspetti più importanti e specialmente sul concetto di «opera».

Peter Robinson, *Il concetto di opera nell'era digitale*. Robinson argomenta che invece di accettare che la rivoluzione digitale sta accelerando la sparizione del concetto di «opera» dalla critica testuale, dobbiamo farlo divenire il concetto centrale negli studi testuali. Le capacità del mezzo digitale richiedono e consentono di comprendere il concetto di «opera» in modo tale da fargli occupare, ancora una volta, un posto primario nella critica testuale. Questo articolo esamina lo studio e la concettualizzazione di «opera» secondo Foucault, Goodman, Wollheim, Grigely, Tanselle e Eggert, valutata nel contesto digitale. Allo stesso tempo, presenta il proprio concetto, rivisto, e lo definisce così:

> L'«opera» è l'insieme di testi che ipoteticamente sono collegati in modo organico, per quanto riguarda gli atti comunicativi che si presentano. Una serie di libri prodotti da una stamperia, o manoscritti di uno scriptorium, non è un'«opera», salvo che siano (ad esempio) varie edizioni, edizioni e copie dello stesso atto comunicativo.

Più avanti, spiega in che modo si discosta da Tanselle, che vede l'«opera» come separata dai testimoni documentali; invece Robinson afferma che

[6] Cfr. H.W. Gabler, «The Primacy of the Document in Editing», *Ecdotica*, 4 (2007), pp. 197-207; e «Theorizing the Digital Edition», *Literature Compass*, 7 (2010), pp. 43-56.

l'«opera» è formata dai testimoni documentali, dalle ricostruzioni editoriali, dai legami scoperti tra testimoni e collegati alla sua creazione, trasmissione e ricezione, così come dagli atti comunicativi estratti da essi.

Hans Walther Gabler, *Fare edizione di testi – fare edizione di opere*. Gabler pone l'accento sulla materialità dei testimoni documentali e sul fatto che i testi possono esistere solo in questi testimoni: si tratta di una «doppia materialità». È questa condizione materiale che fa sì che i testi siano instabili poiché sono suscettibili ai cambi che avvengono nel corso del tempo. Certamente, nonostante la permanenza materiale dei testimoni, la principale caratteristica dei testi è la loro mutabilità, la loro variazione.

Per lui, l'«opera» in linguaggio è immateriale, invece i testi che la rappresentano sono materiali. Questa realtà è ciò che Gabler considera la grande divisione tra opere d'arte realizzate in linguaggio, opere letterarie, dalle opere d'arte su tela, pietra, metallo ecc. (che considera come «arti dello spazio»). In esse «la manifestazione materiale è "l'opera stessa"».

Nel xx secolo, gli editori si sono concentrati a fare edizioni di testi, perlopiù perché si è generata una confusione tra l'edizione di testi e l'edizione di «opere» (*works*). L'unico modo per poter avanzare è quello di proporci, in qualità di editori, di essere «mediatori» dell'«opera».

Paul Eggert, *Ciò che editiamo e come editiamo; o perché non dobbiamo accerchiare il testo.* Di tutti i saggi, questo è quello che risponde più direttamente agli argomenti trattati da Hans Gabler in articoli precedenti. Eggert parte dallo stabilire che Gabler considera che l'atto di fare edizioni si riassume nell'atto di fare edizioni di testi. Il disaccordo con Gabler trova origine in questa idea di definire con precisione l'attività editoriale come quella che ha come fulcro l'edizione di testi. In particolare, per Eggert l'idea dell'esistenza di una «funzione di autore» (che Gabler adotta da Foucault) ostacola la situazione perché solo i concetti di «discorso» e di «esteriorità del testo» dovrebbero essere necessari per il sistema di Gabler. Per Eggert, l'edizione di testi non può separarsi dall'«opera», che definisce come un'idea regolatrice che comprende tutti gli atti di edizione e tutti gli atti di scrittura, copia e lettura. Pertanto, gli editori stanno lavorando sempre all'interno dell'«opera». Considerato che l'«opera» si sviluppa nel tempo, non si può mai cogliere nella sua totalità. Secondo Robinson, l'importante è non perdere di vista considerazioni esogene come «intenzioni, agenti, autorità e significato».

Eggert giunge alla conclusione che il suo modello e quello di Gabler sono incompatibili perché nascono da attitudini diversi per quanto riguarda la risoluzione di problemi complessi. La soluzione che propone l'autore è di sostituire la discorsività foucaultiana con il pragmatismo di Peirce. Con quest'ultimo, appaiono le idee di agente e tempo, che sono richieste dal sistema di Eggert, così come la nozione del lettore come destinatario dell'edizione. Con le parole di Eggert: «Non importa che l'editore si concentri con intensità sui documenti testuali di un'opera: l'edizione, in ultima analisi, si prepara per i lettori.[7] Le edizioni critiche compiono il loro destino nell'atto della lettura. Trovano il loro obiettivo in un futuro anticipato. Se formano un argomento, questo è un invito alla risposta dei lettori».

Bárbara Bordalejo, *I testi che vediamo e le opere che immaginiamo: il cambio di orientamento della critica testuale nell'era digitale*. In questo lavoro definisco i concetti di «testo del documento» e degli «stadi varianti del testo». Il testo del documento è la totalità del testo che si conserva nel supporto fisico. Include i segni significativi che non sono lettere o segni di punteggiatura, ovvero, segni che indicano che parte del testo si deve emendare o che altro testo deve essere inserito. Gli stadi varianti del testo sono i diversi testi che un lettore può interpretare in presenza di segni che indicano modificazione o correzione.

L'«opera» si definisce come «...un concetto nella mente di un autore in un momento particolare nel tempo che serve come minimo denominatore per identificare le sue peculiari manifestazioni fisiche». Queste ultime implicano sia il testo del documento, sia gli stadi varianti del testo.

La mia conclusione è che la produzione di edizioni digitali non ha generato una teoria specifica che le difenda, semplicemente perché gli obiettivi della critica testuale e dell'edizione di testi non sono cambiati dall'introduzione di metodi digitali per l'elaborazione di testi. La differenza tra le edizioni digitali e quelle a stampa ha a che fare con la gestione dei diritti di riproduzione e diritti d'autore:

Per quanto riguarda le edizioni digitali e qualsiasi lavoro digitale, perché continuino e progrediscano è necessario promuovere nuove forme di licenze che superino le idee ottocentesche di diritti d'autore. L'intero lavoro editoriale (ma anche altri tipi di lavoro digitale) deve avere la licenza di Creative Commons

[7] Questo è un punto sottolineato anche da Francisco Rico, «Texto y textos en tiempos de crisis», *Medioevo romanzo*, 35 (2011), 58-65, nel situare edizioni critiche ed archivi digitale nella prospettiva continentale della controversia Bédier vs. Lachmann.

Attribution 3.0 Unported. Questa è l'unica differenza, fondamentale, tra le edizioni digitali e le loro controparti a stampa. Le prime richiedono la libertà che Creative Commons concede: la libertà di modificare e riutilizzare.

Peter Shillingsburg, *Documenti letterari, testi e opere rappresentate in forma digitale*. Shillingsburg sostiene che le nuove tecnologie sono una complicazione nel campo della critica testuale e dell'edizione di testi. Si tratta più di convenienza che d'innovazione, senza cambi fondamentali negli obiettivi. Shillingsburg descrive quattro tappe nella «tappa incunabolare» della informatica umanistica e ritiene che l'obiettivo editoriale è quello di fare edizioni del testo di testimoni documentali. In questo processo, gli editori hanno il diritto e l'obbligo di emendare i testi dei testimoni per realizzare «la deduzione logica e scientifica in considerazione di ciò che, per loro, il testo era destinato a essere in accordo con una nozione ben articolata di autorità».

Io definirei il termine «opera» – spiega – in due modi: in primo luogo, come una categoria in cui mettiamo tutti i testi che sembrano essere versioni della stessa unità artistica, incluse tutte le edizioni e stampe, indipendentemente dall'esattezza o autorità. In secondo luogo, «opera» è concettualmente ciò che è insinuato nei testi autorizzati. La seconda definizione lascia aperta la questione su che cosa si intende per autorità, ma ogni archivista o editore deve articolare questo concetto allo scopo di limitare il rango dei documenti da collezionare o rappresentare. Queste definizioni scartano l'idea che la parola «opera» vada bene per riferirsi al rango di oggetti estetici estratti da testi fisici.

Ispirato dai concetti di Eggert di «impulso editoriale» e «impulso archivistico», Shillingsburg chiarisce che l'archivista digitale edita documenti, invece l'editore edita «opere».

A modo di conclusione. Le differenze a volte sottili, a volte evidenti, tra i distinti concetti di «opera», ci aiutano a delucidare le diverse posizioni editoriali degli autori dei saggi di questa collezione. Ci si chiede fino a che punto tali differenze ideologiche possono modificare i risultati di una edizione. Se si decidesse di creare un esperimento testuale, quanto diverse sarebbero le edizioni prodotte da questi critici?

È chiaro che c'è molta strada da fare, ma anche terreno e terminologia comune che facilitano la prosecuzione di questo dialogo critico. Un tema ricorrente nei saggi è quello del modello. Paul Eggert e la sottoscritta abbiamo presentato modelli di lettura. Hans Gabler propone un modello di testi come funzioni di documenti. Tutti presentano modelli editoriali. Il

tema del «modellato», ricorrente all'interno dell'Informatica umanistica, forse potrà ampliarsi fino a inglobare le forme di creazione di significato che sono parte dei processi di lettura, interpretazione ed edizione.[8]

Peter Robinson
The Concept of the Work in the Digital Age

In recent decades, the term «work» – so central to textual scholarship for so long – has fallen out of favour.[1] In 1996, Katherine Sutherland (then reader and now Professor in Bibliography and Textual Criticism at the University of Oxford, the post previously held by Donald McKenzie) described the term «work» as a «manifestly relegated term».[2] She elaborated this view in her introduction to *Electronic Text: Investigations in Method and Theory*, where the «work» in the context of the electronic medium is characterized as «outmoded» and «a deception»:

> To invoke a now outmoded set of terms and values, we have in the electronic medium the disassembled «texts» but not the reassembled «work». The clear outlines of the «work», a deception though we now accept them to have been, become blurred as its textual and extratextual boundaries expand.[3]

One may also point to a series of publications in the last decades which appear to confirm Sutherland's view: editors and commentators have focussed on individual documents, with special attention to the material characteristics of each document. As more and more documents are brought to our computer screens, the material document and the text within it occupies the foreground and the work recedes from view (thus the papers by McGann, McLeod, Gabler, Kiernan and Pierazzo discussed later in this article).

[8] Vorrei ringraziare Paul, Peter S., Peter R. e Hans per avermi dato l'opportunità di editare i loro testi che, in questa introduzione, ho cercato di riprodurre tanto obiettivamente come me lo consentono il linguaggio e il mio modo di comprenderli. Li ringrazio anche per la loro pazienza e amicizia.

[1] As with all my recent articles on the theory of textual scholarship, I owe a special debt to all my co-contributors to this volume – Barbara Bordalejo, Hans Gabler, Paul Eggert and Peter Shillingsburg – for all that I have learnt from the continuing discussion we have had, now extending over more than a decade, on the issues addressed in this article. I am particularly grateful to Peter Shillingsburg for his comments on earlier drafts of this article. As always, the errors and misinterpretations in this article are mine alone.

In this paper, I argue that rather than accepting that the digital revolution is accelerating the disappearance of the concept of the work from textual scholarship, we need to return the concept of the «work» in the digital age to the centre of what we do. Further, the affordances of the digital medium both require and enable an understanding of «work» which will permit it to take up, once more, its central place in textual scholarship. This article seeks to build this understanding on a review of explorations of the «work» by Foucault, Goodman, Wollheim, Grigely, Tanselle and Eggert, assessed within the digital context.

Foucault and material texts

One may trace the decline of the «work» in textual scholarship to various factors. One is the influence in the humanities of the revolution in thinking brought about, and associated with, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Maurice Blanchot, Roland Barthes, and others. Foucault declared, in the course of his demolition of the concept of authorship, that «A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory.»[4] Although Foucault's focus is on the author rather than the work, in his account the work is a projection of the author, and so is subject to the same strictures as the «author-function». It is the product of a series of ideological moves, and hence must be stripped of its «transcendental» status and subjected to intense questioning. For Foucault neither «author» nor «work» are to be taken as having any existence apart from that given them by ourselves. Question that existence and they disappear:

> We could go even further. Does The Thousand and One Nights constitute a work? What about Clement of Alexandria's Miscellanies or Diogenes Laërtes' Lives? A multitude of questions arises with regard to this notion of the work. Consequently, it is not enough to declare that we should do without the

[2] K. Sutherland, «Looking and Knowing: Textual Encounters of a Postponed Kind», in W. Chernaik, M. Deegan, and A. Gibson, eds., *Beyond the Book: Theory, Culture and the Politics of Cyberspace*, Oxford, Office for Humanities Communication, 1996, pp. 11-22: 16.

[3] K. Sutherland, *Electronic Text: Investigations in Method and Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 9.

[4] M. Foucault, «What Is an Author?» (1969, English translation 1979), in P. Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 101-20: 104.

writer (the author) and study the work itself. The word work and the unity that it designates are probably as problematic as the status of the author's individuality.[5]

For Foucault, as Eggert observes, in place of «works» we have «texts», an infinity of them, containing an infinity of discourses.[6] Greetham, in his discussion of the ontology of texts and works in the first chapter of his *Theories of the Text,* makes a useful distinction between the «essentialist» and «physical» positions.[7] In the essentialist view, the «work» is ideal, Platonic, and immaterial – «transcendent», as Foucault would put it. It follows from this that all the texts we have in all the documents are imperfect representations of the perfect work. Against this, the physical view asserts that all we have are the documents, the texts they contain, and our own reactions to them: in Foucault's terms, the discourses we make from them. For Barthes, this leads to a complete inversion of the millennia-long work and document relation, where the work is the immaterial ideal and the text in a book its flawed occasion: rather, for him, the physical book is the «work» while the «text» is immaterial, the meanings we construct from the «work».[8]

Over the same period as Foucault and others were attacking «essentialist» views of authorship and the work, several textual scholars were moving towards the «physical» position. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the writings of Jerome McGann and Donald McKenzie stressed the importance of the study of specific documents and the material texts they contain: as objects in their own right, as the products of a series of processes involving many people, as keys to understanding the cultures in which they are embedded.[9] From another direction, the rise of the history of the book as an academic discipline validated and reinforced this approach. One can locate the beginnings of this shift of focus, from work to document, to well before Foucault. From the mid-nineteenth century new printing technologies made possible the publication of

[5] *Ibid*.

[6] P. Eggert, «Brought to Book: Bibliography, Book History and the Study of Literature», *The Library*, 13 (2012), pp. 3-32: 3-4.

[7] D.C. Greetham, *Theories of the Text*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 26-63.

[8] R. Barthes, «From Work to Text», in Ph. Rice and P. Waugh, eds., *Modern Literary Theory: a Reader*, London, Edward Arnold, 1989, pp. 166-171.

[9] Thus: D.F. McKenzie, *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts* (The Panizzi Lectures, 1985), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, and J.J. McGann, *A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1983.

high-quality facsimiles of individual documents, both in photographic and type-facsimile, so making rare and valuable documents available in forms close to their original.[10] In manuscript studies, the rise of «best-text» editing, following Bédier's advocacy, in parallel with the «copy-text» methodology which came to dominate Anglo-American editing through the twentieth century, concentrated the editorial gaze on individual documents. Thus, when F.W. Bateson asked «if Monna Lisa Lisa is in the Louvre, where are Hamlet and Lycidas?» McLaverty was able to give a concrete answer: we should look in the physical documents which present them.[11]

Attempts to reclaim «the work»: Goodman, Wollheim, Tanselle, Grigely

Over the same period as «the work» was disappearing from textual scholarship, several thinkers approached the subject from different perspectives, with the aim of providing a sound base for the concept of the «work». Both Nelson Goodman and Richard Wollheim consider the «work» as an artistic object across many arts: painting, sculpture, music, dance as well as literature.[12] Thus, while both maintain that the concept of the «artistic work» holds across all artistic domains, yet it is expressed differently in different domains. For Goodman, a key distinction is between what he terms «autographic» and «allographic» art forms. He defines an «autographic» work of art as follows:

[10] The first extended photographic facsimile appears to have been of sixteen photographs of a Turin manuscript by Francisco Filelfo on rhetoric, published as the *Manuscript Sforza*. This facsimile, along with earlier and contemporary attempts at manuscript photography, is discussed by D. McKitterick, *Old Books, New Technologies: The Representation, Conservation and Transformation of Books Since 1700*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 114-138 (especially pp. 119-120).

[11] F.W. Bateson, «Modern Bibliography and the Literary Artifact», in G.A. Bonnard, ed., *English Studies Today*, Bern, Francke Verlag, 1961², pp. 67-77: 70; Id., «The Literary Artefact», *The Journal of General Education* , 15 (1963), n. 2, pp. 79-92; J. McLaverty, «The Mode of Existence of Literary Works of Art: The Case of the Dunciad Variorum», *Studies in Bibliography,* 37 (1984), pp. 82-105: 105.

[12] N. Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1976²; R. Wollheim, «The Work of Art as an Object», in Id., *On Art and the Mind*, London, Allen Lane, pp. 112-129; Id., *Art and Its Objects*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992².

[A] work of art is autographic if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine.[13]

Accordingly, only the actual canvas painted by Leonardi counts as the Monna Lisa Lisa: anything else is a copy, and not the work itself. Further, Goodman argues that our knowledge of the history of the production of the Monna Lisa Lisa, affirming that indeed this was the canvas that Leonardo painted, is essential to our affirmation, that this canvas, and no other object whatsoever, is Leonardo's Monna Lisa Lisa. Goodman contrasts these «autographic» works with what he calls «allographic» works: music, all kinds of performance art, and literature. For these art forms, the instance of the work we encounter, for example in concert performance, is independent of the history of its production. For us to appreciate a Beethoven symphony, for example, we do not have to have the original orchestra performing it with Beethoven actually conducting it. Whereas the «autographic» work is certified by its history affirming that it is the work, Goodman introduces the concept of «notation» to certify that a performance is an instance of the «work»: such a work, so affirmed, is an «allographic» work. This, if a musical performance of a Beethoven symphony is faithfully performed according to a score, in a notation which acts to «specify the essential properties a performance must have to belong to the work», then that performance is indeed an instance of the work.[14] To put it another way: our experience of an «autographic» work can only be mediated by encountering the work itself (the Monna Lisa Lisa, in the Louvre), while our experience of an «allographic» work can be mediated by any instantiation of it which correctly follows an adequate notational system.

There is much which is very attractive in Goodman's account. The explanation of the difference between forms of art which centre upon the object itself and those which require performance feels intuitively right, and Goodman's discussion – weaving aesthetic and emotional experience with historical circumstance, across a wealth of examples – is rich and subtle. However, problems arise when we attempt to apply his perceptions to works of literature (or indeed, to any works dependent on language). Consider the term «score»: one might accept that a musical performance, enacted from a particular score, might create the

[13] Goodman, *Languages*, p. 113.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

work for our experience, and one might accept that in the course of that performance, we are as surely in the presence of that work as we are in the presence of Monna Lisa Lisa when we stand before it in the Louvre.[15] But what, exactly, do the terms «score» and «performance» mean for Joyce's *Ulysses*, or for any textual object? MacLaverty shows that for Pope's *Dunciad* at least, that the literary work can not be completely constituted from the characters written on the page (their «score»): one has to reckon also with the layout of text and annotations, and with their deliberate echoes of the books Pope is mocking. None of this can be described as «notation»; but it is essential to the work.

From a different direction, Danto points out the fallacy in Goodman's assertion that identical sets of notation must yield one and the same work, through analysis of the Borges' story «Pierre Menard autor del Quijote».[16] Borges imagines an author «Pierre Menard» writing around 1900 who sets himself to write a few pages of a work with exactly the same text as Miguel de Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, written some three hundred years earlier. Menard succeeds, and his text is character for character, word for word, identical with that of Cervantes. Yet, as Danto shows, the reader experiences the two texts as decisively different works: Menard's work is archaic in style, where Cervantes is fluent in the idiom of his time; to the reader, Menard's assertion around 1900 that history is the mother of truth means something quite different to the import of the same statement, made by Cervantes around 1600. While Goodman wants to free allographic forms of art from the history of their production, Danto (and following him, Grigely) shows that for «allographic» art, as for «autographic» art, history is crucial. From yet another direction: Subacius points out that, in the case of nineteenth-century Lithuanian poem *The Forest of Anykščiai* the complex representation devised by its author, Antanas Baranauskas, a single notation can support as

[15] In fact, commentators have questioned whether this holds even in music: B. Boertz, «Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art from a musical point of view», *Journal of Philosophy*, 67:16 (1970), pp. 540-552 and D. Pearce, «Musical expression: Some remarks on Goodman's theory», in E. Rantala, L.v Rowell and E. Tarasti, eds., *Essays in the philosophy of music*, 43, Helsinki, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1988, pp. 228-243 (cited in M. Winget, «Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art, Notation, and Artistic Representation: An Analysis of Music Notation», at http://www.unc.edu/~winget/research/Winget_Notation.pdf, 2005, accessed 13 September 2013, point out that Goodman's formulation does not allow for expression in the performance, and is metaphoric rather than literal. See too the criticisms by musicologists reported in Greetham, «Theories», pp. 41-43.

[16] A. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1981, pp. 35-36.

many as twelve different phonetic realizations – and hence, twelve different texts, and as many works.[17] A yet further problem is that in Goodman's system, altering a single note in a musical performance, or a single character in a text, creates a new work. Instances of an «allographic» work must be completely identical – or they are distinct works. Thus, Goodman argues:

> If we allow the least deviation, all assurance of work-preservation and score-preservation is lost; for by a series of one-note errors of omission, addition and modification, we can go all the way from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony to Three Blind Mice.[18]

Despite these flaws, Goodman's thinking is notable for the promise it holds, that one might be able to speak of works not as mysterious, unknowable abstractions (the «essentialist» position, as Greetham puts it) but as describable and particular objects. This is also the aim of Richard Wollheim in several writings exploring the topic from a philosophical standpoint.[19] For Wollheim, the relationship between the work of art and an individual instance of it is that between «type» and «token»:

> *Ulysses* and *Der Rosenkavalier* are types, my copy of *Ulysses* and tonight's peformance of *Der Rosenkavalier* are tokens of those types.[20]

Wollheim goes on to ask: «The question now arises, what is a type?» Not surprisingly, given the debates over type and token within philosophy (is a type a «set», a «kind», a «law»? see for example the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/), there is no simple answer to this question. Wollheim's key argument is that while a «type» has no material existence, yet we may speak of the physical properties of a «type»:

> There is nothing which prevents us from saying that Donne's *Satires* are harsh on the ear, or that Dürer's engraving of St Anthony has a very differentiated texture, or that the conclusion of «Celeste Aida» is *pianissimo*.[21]

[17] P. Subacius, «The Problem of Polytext», *Litteratūra,* 49 (2007), pp. 133-137.
[18] Goodman, *Languages*, pp. 186-187.
[19] Wollheim, *Work of Art*; *Art and its Objects*.
[20] Wollheim, *Art and its Objects*, p. 75.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 80.

This is possible because, in Wollheim's account, any properties of the token (the individual instance of the type) which is not purely an aspect of the token's physical manifestation may be «transmitted» to the type.[22] Thus, one may infer a physical property of the type from its presence in the token: a Donne Satire strikes us as harsh on our ears as we read it in particular copy; we conclude that this harshness is present in the «type» – the work itself – and hence in all tokens derived from the type. For scholars familiar with the business of inferring the texts we have lost from those which survives, Wollheim's argument strikes a reassuring chord. One is reminded of Lachmann's great demonstration that the lost exemplar of three surviving ninth-century manuscripts of Lucretius *De Rerum Naturae* had precisely 302 folios, with 26 lines of writing on each page.[23] Even the term «type» recalls the language of textual scholarship: we commonly speak of ancestral texts as «archetypes» as «hyparchetypes», and the relationship between extant texts/hypothesized ancestors as between text and archetype, and infer the physical qualities of these ancestors in a manner which parallels Wollheim's type/token relationship. However, it might be argued that the cases are not parallel, and that an «archetype» is not «the work»: this will be discussed further later. A second element that makes Wollheim's formulation attractive is that he explicitly allows for imperfect transmission of properties between types and tokens. Thus a token may not contain all the properties of its type, and may add some additional properties, yet still remain a token of that type. This offers a way past Goodman's rigid insistence that a change of just one note, one character, creates a different work, and again resonates with the experience of textual scholars used to trace the minute variations from one textual instance to another.

[22] M.J. Kidnie, *Shakespeare and the Problem of Adaptation*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 18.

[23] K. Lachmann, ed., *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura. Libri sex,* Berlin, Georg Reimer (online at http://archive.org/details/dererumnaturali00lucr), 1850, gives the text of the edition, and presents his reconstruction of the lost exemplar in the commentary published the same year, *In T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libros Commentarius,* Berlin, Georg Reimer (online at http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10241879_00001.html. See S. Timpanaro, *The Genesis of Lachmann's Method*, ed. and transl. by G.W. Most, Chicago, University of Chicago Press (Italian edition first published as *Genesi del metodo del Lachmann*, Padova, Liviana ed., 1981), 2005, pp. 102-115, for a critical assessment of Lachmann's originality, and G.P. Goold, «A Lost Manuscript of Lucretius», *Acta Classica* 1 (1958), pp. 21-30, for a confirmation of the main outlines of Lachmann's conclusions.

In contrast to these two philosophers, both seeking a material base for statements about works of art, Bateson restates and emphasises an «essentialist» view of the work. For Bateson, the «work» of literature (Shakespeare's Hamlet) stands quite apart from the physical objects which now instance it: the original *Hamlet*, the work which Shakespeare composed, existed only «in a substratum of articulated sound»: articulated by Shakespeare himself, presumably, in the act of composition.[24] Indeed, Bateson argues that the work is not even located in this «articulated sound», but rather in the «sound-image», the «inner psychological imprint of a sound» «as tested orally, though not necessarily aloud, in Shakespeare's head».[25] This position aligns him with Collingwood's aesthetics, which centres the work in its first imaginative expression by its creator.[26] All subsequent physical instances are (he argues) imperfect translations or reproductions derived from this original work, and he goes so far as to argue that the preoccupation of bibliographers and textual scholars with physical texts has it the wrong way around: the task of textual scholars is to seek the original and authoritative work, and not to busy themselves with minutiae of spelling and punctuation.[27]

G. Thomas Tanselle similarly locates the work outside the existing physical texts, and follows Goodman and Bateson in distinguishing sharply between works which can be identified with physical objects (thus, Leonardo's *Monna Lisa Lisa* in the Louvre) and literary works which cannot be identified with physical objects, and further follows Goodman in locating the distinction as being between works which survive as physical artefacts (thus, paintings and sculpture) and «works that can survive only through the instructions for their reconstitution».[28] The assertion that texts are to be viewed as «instructions» for the «reconstitution» of the works which they instance aligns Tanselle with Goodman's concept of the importance of «notation» in non-artefactual works. However, Tanselle diverges from Goodman (whom he nowhere cites) in that he does not seek, as Goodman does, to define the work as what is created from these «instructions». Rather, like Bateson, he argues that the work is apart from all physical instances of it, including the notation:

[24] Bateson, «Modern Bibliography», pp. 7-8.

[25] Bateson, «The Literary Artefact», pp. 81, 88.

[26] R.G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, pp. 109-110.

[27] Bateson, «Modern Bibliography», p. 8.

[28] G.Th. Tanselle, *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989, p. 25.

[A] piece of paper with a text of a poem written on it does not constitute a work of literature ... the work can only be reconstituted through the application of critical judgment to each element of every surviving text.[29]

Like Bateson, Tanselle locates the «work» in the intentions of its creator («the work that we think the document is telling us to create matches the one that its producer had in mind», but without the specificity («substratum of articulated sound») Bateson attempts.[30] Unlike Bateson, on the other hand, he gives full weight to the documents themselves:

The recognition, however, that reading entails the active recreation of the texts of works, not the passive acceptance of the texts of documents, makes the physical evidence in those documents more, not less, central.[31]

Tanselle's scrupulous insistence that understanding of the work must be rooted in historical understanding of physical documents appears «physical": but his insistence on locating the work in the moment of its creation, apart from all documents – «the goal is what once existed in the author's mind» – appears «essentialist».[32] For Tanselle, there is no conflict between these two: one uses the physical documents as a route (the only route we have, indeed) to the best apprehension we can gain of the work, as it once existed in the author's mind. Greetham suggests that Tanselle's language (for example, «we have reason to persist in the effort to define the flowerings of previous human thought, which in their inhuman tranquillity have overcome the torture of their birth») evinces a «deep Platonic suspicion» of the physical texts, and so comes close to Bateson's prioritization of the «text that never was» over the texts we actually have.[33] However, Greetham's characterisation of Tanselle as an «essentialist», even a «Platonist», is incorrect. Tanselle is careful, at every point, to specify that the work did exist in the mind of the author at a particular time, in a particular form. Shillingsburg also rejects the «essentialist» view: «It is dangerous to think that the work is a platonic ideal which the author strove to represent in some final or best version», while agreeing with Tanselle both that «the work existed for the author

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[30] «The work that we think», *ibid.*, pp. 40-14.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[32] «[T]he goal is what once existed in the author's mind», *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[33] «Greetham suggests»; «deep Platonic suspicion»: Greetham, *Theories*, pp. 48-49; «inhuman tranquillity», Tanselle, *Rationale*, p. 93.

in the process of making it» and that the documents are imperfect in their representation of the work.[34] However, as McLaverty points out, locating the work in the mind of the author at the moment of its creation cannot account for works such as Pope's *Dunciad*, where the page layout is integral to the work; nor does it work well for *Hamlet*, where we may presume that what Shakespeare imagined (not just the words but the staging and individual performances) was much more than text.[35]

Against Tanselle, Grigely argues a resolutely «physical» approach to «the work», specifically untethering texts as they exist from the «burden of intentionality» which, for Tanselle, is the signpost to the work.[36] Grigely stresses eloquently the uniqueness of every text, of every utterance, arguing that rather than a work being (somehow) outside the texts which instance it, «a work of literature is ontologized by its texts».[37] A strength of his analysis is that it concentrates (as Goodman and Wollheim do not) on works of literature and their special characteristics.

[34] «It is dangerous», P.L. Shillingsburg, *Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age*, Athens and London, University of Georgia Press, 1986, p. 46. «[T]he work existed for the author in the process of making it», quoted from an email message to the author, 12 September 2013. The passage in the email summarizes Tanselle and Shillingsburg's position succinctly and precisely: «I think the work existed for the author in the process of making it. I think whatever that work to have been to be represented (imperfectly) by the documents that survive. I further think that the documents are not the work because they are inert. It may be implied by the documents, but it cannot be the sum of them because they are both inert and contradictory. If the work is to be a work again a reader has to use skill and imagination to construct the work from the existing documents. I think that this temporal vanishing conceptual and experienced work created by the reader is influenced by the conditions of the document(s) being read» (edited, incorporating changes suggested by Shillingsburg).

[35] McLaverty, «Mode of Existence». Tanselle acknowledges the difficulty plays present his formulation, and accepts that scholars must also take account of the forms the play takes after it leaves the author's desk. However, he asserts that the original form of the play, as it was in the author's mind before performance or rehearsal, is still valuable: «even if a playwright does make a reading text conform with a performance text, there is still reason to be interested in the text as it stood before rehearsals began» (*Rationale,* p. 85). He goes on to acknowledge that for other types of work, the forms in which it reaches the public may be significant, even though they do not reflect the author's intention. However, he distinguishes this variety of textual study from textual scholarship as he practices it: «This brand of textual study is concerned with the public life of texts, with the way texts affect, and are affected by, the stream of history» (*Rationale,* p. 86).

[36] J. Grigely, «The Textual Event», in Ph.G. Cohen, ed., *Devils and Angels: Textual Editing and Literary Theory*, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1991, pp. 167-194; Id., *Textualterity: Art, Theory, and Textual Criticism*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995.

[37] Grigely, *Textualterity*, p. 110.

Thus, he is able to distinguish between «inscription» and «utterance», remarks that «literature is not mere spellings», and illustrates this by elaborating Danto's discussion of the Borges story «Pierre Menard autor del Quijote» referred to above:

> The works are ontologized – that is to say, contextualized semantically – by the temporal history that surrounds their composition[38]

However, there is a circularity in this argument. The work may be «ontologized» by its texts: but how do we decide which texts are doing the ontologizing, unless we have already decided, in advance, that these texts evidence a particular work? Grigely does not offer a way past this.

The digital revolution: the flight from the work

The previous sections outline a questioning of the concept of the «work» over some forty years, up to around 1999 (the date of Greetham's *Theories of the Text*), and overlapping the first years of the digital revolution. Even when scholars wish to assert the centrality of the «work», they are at pains to stress the importance of material documents: compare the emphasis on physical documents by Tanselle, writing in the late 1980s, with the dismissal of documents as «secondary» by Bateson, writing in the early 1960s.[39]

This move towards the document away from the work has accelerated in the first decades of the digital revolution. From 1990 on, it became possible to create high-quality, full-colour facsimiles of individual documents and to distribute these over the web at a fraction of the costs for print. Indeed, digital advances made possible print facsimiles of far higher quality, and far cheaper. Two decades ago, one could have counted document facsimile publications in the thousands: now they are in the hundreds of thousands, even millions.[40] As we have seen, Sutherland

[38] «[L]iterature is not mere spellings», Grigely, «The Textual Event», p. 179; «The works are ontologized", p. 180.

[39] Thus «the act of interpreting the work is inseparable from the act of questioning the text» (Tanselle, *Rationale*, p. 32).

[40] For example: e-Codices, the «Virtual Manuscript Library of Switzerland», contains full images of 981 manuscripts as of 15 August 2013; the Bavarian State Library listed 3672 manuscripts and 11303 'rare printings' digitized as of the same date (http://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/index.html?c=faecher_index&browsingindex=0&l=en); the Center

refers, ironically, to this flood of online texts as «disassembled texts», blurring yet further our sense of the «work». This proliferation of digital texts has created its own scholarly literature, as scholars ponder quite what we are creating. Are these «archives», «thematic research collections», «databases» – or, perhaps, «editions»?[41]

With so many material texts, so many documents, one may ask: why do we need works? A series of writings from 2000 on indeed suggested that textual scholars might concentrate purely on documents.[42] Kevin Kiernan, following his work on a digital edition of *Beowulf*, developed a theory of the «image-based scholarly edition», based on high-quality digital images of particular documents.[43] A series of writings by Hans Walter, from 2002 on, argue for editing to be based on the closest study of individual documents.[44] In his formulation, editors should put «the horse of the document properly before the cart of its eventually emerging text».[45] The word «work» is notably absent from this prescription: not that he is unaware (far from it) of the concept of the «work», but he considers that discussion of the «work» belongs in the commentary and

for the Study of New Testament Manuscripts listed 530 manuscripts as viewable in digital image form (http://www.csntm.org/manuscript/); the British Library lists 2618 digitized manuscripts (http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Browse.aspx). Other large collections can be found in http://www.manuscriptorium.com/, in the New York Public Library (http://www.nypl.org/online_projects) and the Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/ammem.html).

[41] K. Price, «Edition, Project, Database, Archive, Thematic Research Collection: What's in a Name?», *Digital Humanities Quarterly*, 3.3 (2009), at http://digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/3/3/000053/000053.html, accessed 13 September 2013; J. Unsworth, «Thematic Research Collections», Paper presented at Modern Language Association Annual Conference, December 28, Washington, DC., 2000, at http://www.iath.virginia.edu/~jmu2m/MLA.00/, accessed August 15, 2013.

[42] For a fuller account and critique of the arguments advanced by Kiernan, Gabler and Pierazzo see P. Robinson, «Towards A Theory of Digital Editions», *Variants*, 10 (2013), pp. 105-132.

[43] K. Kiernan, «Digital facsimiles in Editing», in L. Burnard, K. O'Brien O'Keeffe and J. Unsworth, eds., *Electronic Textual Editing*, New York, Modern Language Association of America, 2006, pp. 262-268.

[44] H.W. Gabler, «For *Ulysses*: a Once and Future Edition», in H.T.M. Van Vliet and P.M.W. Robinson, eds., *Variants. The Journal of the European Society for Textual Scholarship*, Brepohls, Turnhout, 1 (2002), pp. 85-102; Id., «The Primacy of the Document in Editing», *Ecdotica,* 4 (2007), pp. 197-207; Id., «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», *Literature Compass*, 7 (2010), pp. 43-56; Id., «Beyond Author-Centricity in Scholarly Editing», *Journal of Early Modern Studies*, 1 (2012), pp. 15-35, at http://www.fupress.net/index.php/bsfm-jems/article/view/10691, accessed 30 March 2012.

[45] Gabler, «Primacy», p. 201.

other discursive areas of the edition.[46] He argues that the editor's primary task is to establish the text of the document, by rigorous reference to that document alone and what is «endogenous» to it. In this formulation even our knowledge of the author who wrote the words on this page (let alone, our knowledge of other documents) is «exogenous», and should not be part of this initial and critical act of understanding. Examination of other texts of the work and use of these towards analysis and hypothesis concerning the work, as also «exogenous». In accordance with these arguments, and extending Kiernan's concept of «image-based» editions, Elena Pierazzo argues for the «digital documentary edition», supplementing images with information-rich transcriptions which enact the intense scrutiny of document and the text it contains which Gabler advocates.[47] Where Gabler does declare that an edition should take account of the work (as a part of the discourse «exogenous» to the establishment of the text or particular documents) Pierazzo dispenses with the work altogether. The only mention of «work» in her article is a citation of Michael Sperberg-McQueen (p. 464). Indeed, the Jane Austen manuscripts online edition, constructed according to the criteria advocated by Pierazzo and in which she was deeply involved, concentrates to such a degree on the documents, transcribed page by page in extraordinary detail, that it nowhere lists exactly what works by Austen are contained in those documents – a detail that renders the edition near-unusable for many readers who might (for example) want to know just what is contained in the three Oxford «juvenilia» manuscripts.[48]

Yet, the concept of the «work» has not completely disappeared – or at least, not yet. As observed above, Gabler accepts that an edition must represent not just texts, but the work:

> It is the purpose, and I believe the duty, of editions to mediate the work.[49]

However, Gabler does not specify how this «mediation» is to occur, nor how it relates to the establishment of the texts of documents which he sees as the core editorial concern. Whereas Gabler's gaze is fixed on the microscopic examination of text in particular documents, Paul Eggert

[46] Gabler, «Theorizing».

[47] E. Pierazzo, «A Rationale of Digital Documentary Editions», *Literary and Linguistic Computing,* 26 (2011) , pp. 463-477.

[48] K. Sutherland, ed., *Jane Austen's Fiction Manuscripts: A Digital Edition,* Kings College London, 2010, at http://www.janeausten.ac.uk, accessed 13 September 2013.

[49] Email from Hans Gabler to the author, 17 December 2012.

has approached texts from the point of view of their historic transformations over time, examining not just how the texts themselves change but (even more) how they are seen to change. Further, Eggert resists the oppositions between «work as artefact» and «work as performance» set up by Goodman and others: for Eggert, all works of art are subject to the same processes of change in themselves and in how they are perceived over time. His *Securing the Past* shows how the same issues of authenticity, originality, versions and restoration, are at play in architecture, art and literature, while his *The Biography of a Book: Henry Lawson's While the Billy Boils* demonstrates how responses over a century to a single literary work (the Henry Lawson collection of stories of that name) mirror the social and cultural changes of the time.[50] To adapt Grigely's terminology, and his and Danto's use of the Borges story: the text of (for example) Lawson's «The Drover's Wife» might be identical in its publication in *The Bulletin* in 1890 and its publication in the 1950s New South Wales Department of Education pamphlet in which I first read it: but the meanings generated by each publication and readership are very different.[51] One may see this as an extension of Grigely's argument, that a work is «contextualized semantically» by the historical moment of its composition; for Eggert, it is contextualized also by the moment of its readership.

Accordingly, the concept of the «work» is a fundamental enabling principle in Eggert's scholarship. It is the work which unites all these restorations of the Sistine Chapel, the rebuilding of Uppark, and the texts of Lawson. For him, as for Grigely, these «works» are «ontologized» in these historic instances; for him, as for Grigely, the works are not simply bricks and mortar, paint on canvas, or spellings on a page: they are aesthetic objects. However, he goes beyond Grigely in drawing the reader (and indeed, everyone involved in the making and transmission of a text) into the equation, adapting Adorno's «negative dialectic» so that, for literature, we are not dealing just with document and text, but with document, text, author, editor, copyist and typesetter implicated together through an intricately unfolding process in a continuing generation of meaning:

[50] P. Eggert, *Securing the Past*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009; Id., *The Biography of a Book: Henry Lawson's While the Billy Boils*, Philadelphia and Sydney, Penn State University Press and University of Sydney Press, 2013.

[51] Eggert points out that, indeed, the two texts would have been different (personal communication).

The document, whether hand-written or printed, is the textual site where the agents of textuality meet: author, copyist, editor, typesetter and reader. In the acts of writing, copying or reading, the work's documentary and textual dimensions dynamically interrelate: they can be seen as a translation or performance of one another... Any new manifestation of the negative dialectic necessarily generates new sets of meanings.[52]

One notices the absence of the term «work» from this formulation. Indeed, though «work» is essential to Eggert's analysis, the definition he offers of work is heuristic, intended to serve his purposes: it is «a regulative idea that immediately dissolves, in reading, into the negative dialectic of document and text.»[53]

Thus, Eggert argues, «the work» is a means of grouping documents and texts, according to some useful categorization, that then allows those documents and texts to be examined productively. The language here – «dissolves» – suggests that «the work» is a convenient label which allows us to focus on the real subject of our enquiry, the individual documents, the texts they contain, and the many acts of readership they invoke. In less than fifty years we have come right around the circle from Bateson, who saw documents as «secondary» to the «work» they instance, to Eggert, who sees the «work» as a route to the documents – a route which disappears when no longer needed. Thus, even though Eggert's analysis requires the work, his definition of the «work» is minimalist.

Why the «work» may remain relevant and necessary

One could take the narrative to now as pointing to the demise of the «work» as a useful concept in textual scholarship. However, in one context at least, one may rue the disappearance of the work. This context is the rise in the digital era of online collections of objects: images, texts, and also music, film, and every kind of digital material. Where collections in the pre-digital world had to exist (usually) in a single place to be a «collection», this is not true of the digital world, which can draw together everything related to Walt Whitman, or William Blake, or Dante Gabriel Rossetti, into a single website. With opportunity comes anxiety: what principles should guide the collection; how and to what end should they be organized; are these editions, archives, projects, databases, or some-

[52] Eggert, *Securing the Past*, pp. 234-235.
[53] *Ibid*., p. 235.

thing else? A considerable literature, and a new vocabulary («thematic research collection») has grown up around these issues.[54] One notes that very few of these collections call themselves «editions»: even though the Blake Archive won the Modern Language Association «Distinguished Scholarly Edition» prize, yet its website declares itself an archive. Price, writing of the Whitman archive, proposes the term «arsenal», as suitably invoking both multifarious resources and a «public place of making».[55]

In the first flush of possibility of the digital age, the urge was to make as much available as possible: hence, in Price's account, the prioritization of gathering previously unedited materials, and therefore an «archive» (or an «arsenal») and not an «edition». One might expect that as these enterprises mature, the emphasis will shift to understanding what has been gathered, to offering pathways through it: indeed, to creating editions within these public places of making. But, there are worrying signs that this may not happen. All these materials may be gathered, and that will be that. Instead of become lively factories of continuing making, these sites will become museums of inert objects. One reason for this is historical. Almost all these sites are, for all except their creators (and often, not even for them), «read-only»: you can look, but you cannot change. You cannot contribute, correct, rearrange, or even comment. Indeed, in all but a very few cases, you cannot take the materials from the site and repurpose them, to make your own edition.[56] Museums nowadays come in many kinds. There are those which remove barriers between their visitors and the objects, inviting us to touch, feel, and play, and there are those which place thick panes of glass in front of their exhibits. Digital archives, up to now, are the thick pane of glass type.

A second reason that digital archives so far are museum-like repositories is, I argue, the result of the decades-long deprecation of «the work»,

[54] Price, «Edition».

[55] *Ibid*., p. 50.

[56] For example: in the week of March 5 2013 a survey of seventy-seven projects listed at the Department of Digital Humanities at Kings College London as having produced some output revealed that just three (all from one group of scholars) made their data freely available for reuse (P. Robinson, «Digital Humanities: Is Bigger, Better?», in P. Arthur and K. Bode, eds., *Repurposing the Digital Humanities: Research, Methods, Theories*, forthcoming, Palgrave Macmillan, footnote 18). The situation is not helped by the tendency of most digital humanities projects to apply restrictive copyright licences to what they create. See http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2005/9/11/16331/0655 (Creative Commons-NC Licenses Considered Harmful for an excellent summary of the problems with the «non-commercial» Creative Commons license, widely used within the digital humanities.

as the focus of our activity. Remove the work, and we have – texts and documents; scores, hundreds, millions of them, exactly as we have on these sites. It is extraordinary, and revealing, that one of the leading editorial theorists in the last decades has chosen to eschew the word «edition» in his own digital work. Although Jerome McGann describes his Rossetti Archive as a «social text edition» in various places, the site declares itself an «archive» and nowhere describes itself as an edition, even though its contents look very like a traditional scholarly edition, with careful and rich commentaries on the materials it presents.[57]

We could, indeed, gather and make available all these materials, as these sites do, and then rest from our labours, leaving others to browse them and wonder. Or, we could attempt to animate these sites: to try to trace all the connections between the many texts; to invite others to help us. Here is where the concept of the work, made new for the digital age, might help us.

Text in the digital age: five challenges

The attempts to define the work outlined earlier were all, with the exception of Eggert, composed before the digital revolution. A definition of the work for the digital age must be able to cope with the different forms digital texts take, as well (of course) as those of the print and manuscript eras. This section surveys briefly five challenges offered by digital texts.

First: there are many more digital texts – countlessly many more. One can generate a new text at the press of a button. Indeed, you can write a computer program to press the button for you, and one sees routinely on the web pages made programmatically and combining materials drawn from databases alongside familiar single-author writings: thus a typical online newspaper page, or the results of a search engine query.

[57] J.J. McGann, «From Text to Work: Digital Tools and the Emergence of the Social Text», in M. Eberle-Sinatra, ed., *Romanticism on the Net 1996-2006: Celebrating Ten Years of the Social Text*. University of Montreal, 2006, at http://www.erudit.org/revue/ron/2006/v/n41-42/013153ar.html, accessed 13 September 2013; J.J. McGann and D. Buzzetti, «Electronic Textual Editing: Critical Editing in a Digital Horizon», in L. Burnard and K. O'Brien O'Keefe, eds., *Electronic Text Editing*, New York, Modern Language Association, 2006, at http://www.tei-c.org/About/Archive_new/ETE/Preview/mcgann.xml, accessed 13 September 2013. Similarly, P. Shillingsburg, in his *From Gutenberg to Google* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), advocates what he calls «knowledge sites». However, he argues that scholarly editions and critical texts should be included in these sites (p. 157).

And these texts can be staggeringly evanescent: no two Google searches returns quite the same results; your newspaper page, and the text of the writings themselves, will change in a moment. As we have seen, Sutherland sees this proliferation alone as a «blurring» of the once-clear outlines of the work. An example is the *Canterbury Tales*, for which we have some eighty-four manuscripts and incunables extant from before 1500. As we transcribe these within the Canterbury Tales Project, we are generating electronic versions of each: another 84 texts. But this is only a fraction of the texts we are making: each page of the around 30,000 pages transcribed may go through as many as ten transcripts and checks, each generating a unique text. Combine all these together, in all the ways they can be combined, and we have millions of texts, for just one work.

Second: many of these many texts have characteristics which challenge our traditional senses of a work which might be edited. Consider Nick Montfort's *Tarako Gorge*.[58] Where Wordsworth was inspired by his passage through the Simplon Pass to write his poem of that name, Montfort, after a visit to *Tarako Gorge* in Taiwan, wrote not a poem, but a computer program to generate poems. This program takes various sets of words, classified (for example) as «above», «below», «trans» (for transitive) and «imper» (for imperative); in its first formulation, «above» is «brow, mist, shape ,layer, the crag, stone, forest, height», «trans» is «command, pace, roam, trail, frame, sweep, exercise, range». The program then selects words from these sets and puts them together into poetic lines, thus generating, for example:

> Heights exercise the stones.
> Stones dream.
> Stones roam the rocks.

In a neat inversion of the topos of an infinity of monkeys generating the text of *Hamlet*, this brief program generates an infinity of texts, all different, many with not a single word in common. Furthermore, the text generated scrolls down the browser window, as long as the window stays open – and once it has scrolled out of sight, it is gone. As if there were not enough variation, it is a simple matter to change the words in each set, and so generate a completely different set of poems. Several people have done just that, and the poem's site lists some twenty-one adapta-

[58] *Tarako Gorge*, http://nickm.com/poems/taroko_gorge.html, accessed 13 September 2013.

tions (at http://nickm.com/poems/taroko_gorge.html). Typical of these is Scott Rettberg's *Tokyo Garage*, generating lines such as:

> Aristocrat detests the routines.
> Driver frightens the sushi joints.

One may ask: are all these texts of a single work, as Montfort seems to imply when he lists them all together at his website? If so, we are inverting the import of Borges Menard parable: there, we have different works though the text is identical; here, we have one work, although not a word is in common among many of the texts. How can this be? And what Montfort does is far from untypical. At Pentametron.com, one finds sonnets created by harvesting tweets from twitter, identifying by program tweets which scan as iambic pentameter and which rhyme, and fitting them into sonnets, according to the Pentametron motto:

> With algorithms subtle and discrete
> *I seek iambic writings to retweet.*[59]

One could multiply examples; but this is enough.

Third: to be made digital, so that they go on the web or are read in a word processing or other program, texts must be changed. Specifically, this requires the introduction into the text of encoding, as in the familiar HTML mark-up. What, in terms of the work, is the status of this encoding? Is a text with mark-up different from the same text, without markup? What are the implications of different mark-up styles?

Fourth: the interfaces (commonly, web browsers) through which we view texts are a form of materiality, and as such – following McGann and McKenzie – are proper and necessary objects for our contemplation as editors. But it is one thing to survey the «bibliographic codes» of a fixed printed text, with each page following a set pattern; quite another, to make sense of the browser environment, where the same text in the same encoding can look quite different in different browsers, or within

[59] An example, as of midday on August 28, 2013: i am addicted to the whisper song / Cries of the broken, lesson for the strong. / up early trying figure somethings out... / Some many little shitty bugs about / I'm not a very patient person hey... / @Real_Liam_Payne tomorrow is the day. / Love Is A Tricky Ass Emotion Moe / I'm so excited for the future whoa. / Woke up and for a second I forgot / McDonald's cookies always hit the spot / A wishing well, a War, A guarantee / this conversation is confusing me / Could y'all imagine Johnny doing that? / It's open interviews tomorrow at.

the one browser depending on which version you are using, what settings you have chosen, what screen resolution you have available. How is an editor to represent all this?

Fifth: over thousands of years of the making and reading of texts, we are used to a sharp distinction between the few who make texts and the many who read them. In the web where every reader is also a writer, this distinction is disappearing. Any reader can become an editor: what are the implications of this for editors?

Opportunities: new tools and new thinking in the digital medium

Faced with such challenges, one can understand the attraction of straightforward «digital collections»: just gather all the materials together, provide minimally-encoded texts where texts are desirable, and leave it to the reader to make what sense he or she can of all this.

However, we can do much better than this. Alongside the challenges outlined in the last section as presented by the digital medium, are many new tools, and new ways of thinking about and exploring texts. By taking these up, and by building on the definitions of the work made by others, we may develop concepts and techniques which can lead to the making of better editions, better editors and better readers. In this section, I explain how each of the five challenges presented in the last section brings opportunities and possibilities too.

First, as well as the digital revolution bringing a near-infinite multiplication of texts, it brings too a wealth of tools for the analysis, comparison, and visualisation of texts. Many of these tools can be seen (for example) in Shaw's edition of Dante's *Commedia* or my edition of *The Miller's Tale*.[60] We can, with remarkable ease, take any two of the many versions we have made of the *Canterbury Tales*; we can see graphic visualizations of the comparison; we can see how words are distributed across the whole length of the texts; using Google n-grams, or similar, one can trace co-concurrences of words against other texts. With more effort, we can compare multiple texts; we can create records of their comparison; we can use an array of techniques (including some drawn from evolutionary biology) to create hypothetical trees of fami-

[60] P. Shaw, ed., *Dante Alighieri. Commedia. A Digital Edition*, Birmingham and Florence, Scholarly Digital Editions and SISMEL-Edizioni del Galuzzo, 2010; P. Robinson, *The Miller's Tale on CD-ROM*. Leicester, Scholarly Digital Editions, 2004.

lies of texts; we can hypothesize ancestors for the families, and specify just what readings are likely to have been present in these. Of course, one could do some of these things with pre-digital texts, as Lachmann did for Lucretius: but it would take far longer for far fewer texts, would be limited by what one could do with pencil and basic maths, and be constrained in its presentation possibilities. One might use these tools to create far richer narratives of the relationship between far more texts than ever before possible.

Second, in the case of textual objects such as Montfort's *Tarako Gorge*: here the concept of paratext, developed by Gérard Genette, may come to our aid. Bordalejo argues that in this instance, the computer program may be considered as paratext: as part of the whole of Montfort's initial composition, standing in similar relation to the text which appears in the browser as does the familiar paratext (headers, annotations, title, preface) of a printed book, though going beyond these as it determines the actual text we read and not just how we read it.[61] One may then trace lineally the relations between Montfort's original and all the derived versions, showing how the sets of words generating the text are altered, and thus chaining the texts together as links in a single sequence. This requires that we look past the text we see on screen to what is behind it, and then further to the historical transformations of both text and paratext: but this looking-past the immediately visible is exactly what scholarly editors have done for centuries.

Third, the case of encoding: this is the most powerful single enabling factor for our editorial work in the digital medium. Consider the following encoding (somewhat simplified) of the transcription of Geoffrey Chaucer's General Prologue of the *Canterbury Tales*, in XML (eXtended Markup Language) and using the conventions of the Text Encoding Initiative:

```
<div n="General Prologue">
   <l n="1">WHan that Aueryll with his shoures soote</l>
   ...more lines...
   <l n="858"> His tale anoon / and seyde as ye may heere</l>
</div>
```

Note, first, that the whole text of the General Prologue is placed within

[61] B. Bordalejo, «Get Out of my Sandbox: Web Publication, Authority and Originality», in D. Apollon and N. Desrochers, eds., *Examining Paratextual Authority and its Implications in Digital Culture*, forthcoming.

a single (for «division») element. By this mechanism, the editor is asserting that the whole of this text is a single act of communication, a communicative act, which he labels as the «General Prologue». This is more consequential than it might seem. By this encoding, the editor asserts – to adopt Grigely's phrasing – that what is being encoded is not just letters on a page. We are encoding a communicative act, which we recognize as a version of something we name the General Prologue. Note too that this statement about the communicative act is independent of the disposition of this text in this document. It does not matter how many folios in this manuscript are taken up by this text, or where those page breaks fall, or how many lines are written on each: the communicative act will still be encoded as a single . Furthermore, within that each poetic line is identified as a single <l> element (858 of them altogether), with the first line of the Prologue («WHan that aueryll...») encoded within <l n="1">. Again, this encoding of the communicative act is independent of the document: this line might be the first on the first page, or might appear at the base of a page deep within the manuscript, it will still be <l n="1">.

Not only this. Here is the encoding of the text of the General Prologue in the Ellesmere manuscript:

```
<div n="General Prologue">
   <l n="1"> WHan that Aprille with hise shoures soote</l>
   ...more lines...
   <l n="858"> His tale anon / and seyde in this manere</l>
</div>
```

Thus: we may use exactly the same encoding to structure this communicative act as we use for the Hengwrt transcription. Accordingly, we are declaring, again, that this is a single communicative act, that this communicative act is of something we call the General Prologue, and that this communicative act is composed of individual lines of verse, which we label from 1 to 858.

We can begin to appreciate the power of this encoding to transform our sense of what is a work and our editorial practice. Grigely declares that a literary work is more than marks on paper: here we give that assertion flesh. We see that in each of these documents, we have a single communicative act, and that the single communicative act may be divided into 858 poetic lines. Further, we explicitly declare that the two communicative acts are of a single object, which we label the «General Prologue",

and thus we have two versions of the General Prologue, one in Hengwrt, one in Ellesmere, each divided into a sequence of lines labelled from 1 to 858, and so capable of precise comparison, line by line. Accordingly, we can say exactly how each of these two texts ontologize (to use Grigely's term again) the work we call the General Prologue.

In an earlier essay I described this as encoding the «text-as-work».[62] While a useful shorthand, this is not strictly correct. In each document, the encoding (and <l>) is of the communicative act, which the editor identifies first as singular and complete (hence, within a single) and then as composed of a sequence of poetic lines (<l> elements). Exactly the same encoding, with the exception of the declaration 'n="General Prologue"', might be applied quite independently to any of the transcriptions of the fifty-four fifteenth-century witnesses to the Prologue. In the next section, I will discuss the implications of the statement that each of these communicative acts, in each of these documents, is of something we label the General Prologue.

The fourth challenge presented by the digital medium was that of the near-infinity (again) of interfaces in which digital texts appear. Again, there are numerous ways in which editors might represent these interfaces, to some degree or other, ranging from discursive commentary (as in Matthew Kirschenbaum's writings) to emulation tools. For the fifth challenge, the multiple and shifting roles of editor and reader: we now have a wealth of new tools, many derived from social media, which both enable these roles and record exactly what was read and done, by whom and when. In turn, these may enable new conversations among readers and editors.

Defining the work in the digital age

[F]or anyone approaching a verbal statement ... as a communication from the past, its location in space and time is the most basic of considerations.[63]

[A]ny confrontation with a pre-existing object – any response to an external stimulus – has a historical dimension, since the thing responded to comes from the past. [64]

These quotations exemplify the core of Tanselle's argument, that textual scholarship is an explicitly historical enterprise. Before we can approach

[62] Robinson, «Theory», pp. 124-125.
[63] Tanselle, *Rationale*, p. 13.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

the work – however we define it – we must identify every document which bears upon it, locating it as precisely as we can in «space and time». However, for me as an editor, dealing with large textual traditions from the medieval and earlier periods, it is important not just to identify and locate each document: one must discover, as far as possible, the exact relations of each document of a work with every other document. Indeed, the time and place of each document are only important in so far as they help us understand how that document relates to other documents. One is reminded of the axiom in manuscript studies: «recentiores non sunt detiores»: a later manuscript can hold an early form of the text.[65]

Identification of the time and place of each document (and indeed, all we can deduce about each document, in itself) is the task of bibliography. The task of textual scholarship is to explain how each document relates to every other document. I use «relate» here in the broadest sense. A document might be a copy of another existing document, or might be a copy of the same original as another (which might or might not still exist), or it might be a version of a text present in another document, or it might be a draft or proofs of a text presented in another document. Our task is to determine, so far as we can, the exact status of each document, how and why it differs from other documents, and what it tells us – not just what text it contains, but how this document was read, and who read it and when.

The transformation wrought upon our work as textual scholars by the digital revolution is this: digital methods give us the resources and tools to explore the relations among the documents as never before possible, to make editions of a precision and richness never before possible. An exemplary instance of such an edition is Shaw's edition of seven key manuscripts of Dante's *Commedia*, which both explains how these seven manuscripts (and the layers of scribal writing within them) relate to each other and provides the reader with the tools and materials to test her conclusions. One may use (as this edition does) the tools outlined in the last section to present the documents, to show how they differ, to analyze the differences, and to explain how the documents and their differences bear upon our reading of the work we are editing.

I suggested earlier that the third of the challenges and opportunities presented by the encoding of digital texts, the encodings we use in

[65] Apparently, first formulated in this wording by Giorgio Pasquali, who uses «Recentiores non detiores» as the title of the fourth chapter (pp. 41-108) of his masterly *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo* (Firenze, F. Le Monnier, 1934).

our expression of the documents in digital form, is key to the digital transformation of textual scholarship. Consider what is meant when I choose to label a sequence of lines in the Hengwrt manuscript as the General Prologue of the *Canterbury Tales* (' '), and then proceed to label sequences of lines in the Ellesmere and other manuscripts as also being of the General Prologue. This declaration is a hypothesis: I am asserting that these lines, in each witness, are linked together as different instances of something which I call the General Prologue. I make this hypothesis in full awareness that what is here called the General Prologue is part of a larger set of texts, known collectively as the *Canterbury Tales*, for which we have historical evidence that this is a work of poetry and prose composed by Geoffrey Chaucer, whose life is documented from 1340 and 1400, who we believe composed other poems, and who we think composed the *Tales* between around 1385 and 1400.

What, exactly, is the status of this hypothesis? Firstly: by framing this as a hypothesis, to be tested and confirmed or denied as far as the evidence allows, we escape the problem of circularity noted as a weakness in Grigely's analysis. If it turns out that these texts appear to have no relationship, so that the utterances they contain are distant from one another, then we will try a different hypothesis. Note too the arbitrary element of this naming: in fact, it appears that no manuscript and no edition of Chaucer before Furnivall's publications for the Chaucer Society in the nineteenth century called it the «General Prologue» rather than just the «Prologue». This arbitrary naming recalls Eggert's definition of the «work» as a «regulative idea». However, while the name may be arbitrary, the assertion – that these texts are organically connected – is not. It is a deliberate editorial act, arguing that a particular set of texts are meaningfully linked.

We are now in a position to offer a definition of the «work». The «work», I suggest, is the set of texts which is hypothesized as organically related, in terms of the communicative acts which they present. A series of books produced by a printer, or manuscripts by a scriptorium, is not a «work» – unless they are (say) multiple printings, editions and copies of the same communicative act. In this definition, the task of an editor is to identify the documents which witness the communicative act, in all its parts; to identify the communicative act present in those documents and its parts; and then to define exactly how all the documents are related to each other and what each tells us of the communicative act. In fact, this is precisely what Eggert does in his study of the differ-

ent expressions of Lawson's short stories; his practice, if not his theory, accords with this definition.

This formulation is very close to Grigely's argument, that a work is «ontologized» by its texts, with two modifications. I have already indicated the first modification, that the «ontology» of the work so derived from any given set of documents is offered as a testable hypothesis of relationships, not as a declaration of identity. The second modification is that the set of documents which «ontologize» the work will include not just extant documents, but those which the editor hypothesizes, on the basis of historical evidence and analysis, as having existed at some point. The instance of the lost Lucretius manuscript hypothesized by Lachmann is one example; the manuscript «O», hypothesized by members of the Canterbury Tales project as carrying Chaucer's working draft of the whole *Tales*, is another.[66] This reconstruction of lost documents, as practiced for medieval and earlier texts, is not an attempt to imagine what might have been in the author's mind at the moment of creation, or what might have been the author's «final intentions»: rather, it is a deduction from material evidence. However, we are not dealing only with marks on paper: we are dealing with communicative acts. If, as editors, we believe that a certain reading is more in conformity with the style of the author, on the basis of what we find in the documents and their relations with each other, we are entitled to suggest that reading, rather than another, might have been present in a particular lost document.[67] For some editions one could use this method, and this theory, to underpin an effort to re-create the work as Tanselle and Shillingsburg define it: what was in the author's mind in the process of its making. I will discuss this further later.

We can see, further, the multiple relations between the documents of a work as instances of type/token relations, and we can hypothesize the properties of a type from those of a token, as Wollheim argues. Again, we need to modify Wollheim's arguments. Where Wollheim identifies the work with a single type, in textual traditions any document can be the source of any other, and hence those two documents will stand in type/token relationship. Hence too any document can be both type and token: it can be a derivative of another, and the source of yet another.

[66] P. Robinson, «The History, Discoveries and Aims of the Canterbury Tales Project», *Chaucer Review,* 38 (2003), pp. 126-39.

[67] As is hypothesized for the «O» readings in the Canterbury Tales manuscripts, Robinson, *Miller's Tale*: Witness Relations.

Further, the relations between documents may be far more complex than simple source/copy. One document may be copied from several, as in contamination and shift of exemplar in manuscript traditions. Documents may exchange text with one another, there may be multiple acts of revision, partial or complete, by scribes or editors or authors. Stemma, tree, network, directed graph, rhizome – every and any kind of relationship is possible among the documents which constitute a work. Indeed, one can go within a single set of documents all the way from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony to Three Blind Mice: and if this were to happen, as textual scholars we would be able to trace through the documents of each communicative act, and of all those between, exactly how this transformation occurred. That is our business.

Many consequences flow from this definition of the «work». First, it accords with the emphasis in the last decades on the documents, on the material instances of the work. Indeed, the documents, both extant and hypothesized, are not simply «instances» of the work: they are the physical traces of the work. Second, it imposes a duty on editors not just to present documents, asserting (say) that these are manuscripts of Dante's *Commedia*. The editor must explain exactly why a set of documents are to be seen as presenting a particular work, showing how the documents are connected and what they each have to contribute. Third, an account of the documents must take in the paratext as well as the text: and not just the visible text, but what lies behind it, as in the interfaces and the programs determining what the reader reads. Fourth, the digital forms we make of documents must be presented and encoded both so that others can use them, and so that they represent effectively the communicative acts they embody.[68] This is a vast set of tasks, even for just a few documents of a comparatively short text. For something like the 5000 plus manuscripts of the Greek New Testament, it is far beyond what could be achieved even by a well-funded single group of scholars. Here is where the fifth challenge and potential of the computer revolution may be even more transformational than those we have seen so far. To extend Price's metaphor: the sites on which our editions appear may be «public places of making», where editors and readers alike contribute to the making.

[68] See Robinson, «Theory», pp. 125-126, for criticism of the current recommendations of the Text Encoding Initiative guidelines for transcription of primary sources, which enable very precise encoding of the text as document but offer no encoding whatever of the text as communicative act.

Although this definition follows Tanselle, in giving full weight to the material documents and their history in our practice as editors, there is a significant difference between his definition of the work and that offered here. Tanselle (and, following him, Shillingsburg) identifies the work as located in a finite moment: as it was in the author's mind, in the time of its making. This moment is past, and cannot be recovered. What we have are the documents which carry traces of the work, originating from the author's first attempts to put what was in his or her mind into physical form:

> [O]ne must be able to distinguish the work itself from attempts to reproduce it.[69]

For Tanselle, the «work» is apart from any and every document. In my formulation, the work is not apart from the documents. The extant documents, the documents we reconstruct, the relations we uncover among the documents and all involved in their creation, transmission and reception, and the acts of communication we extract from them, are the work. In practice, as I have suggested above, the edition I might make on the basis of my definition, and the edition a Tansellian scholar might make, could be identical. For a modern text, where we have ample documentary evidence of authorial intention, an editor might follow the trail of communicative acts (as prescribed in my formulation) towards that editor's recreation of what was in the author's mind (as prescribed in Tanselle's formulation).

Two consequences flow from the definition of the work I offer, as opposed to that offered by Tanselle. The first is that Tanselle's definition of the work functions very well for textual situations where there is an author, a literary work created by that author, and clear documentary evidence of that author's intentions in the making of that work. Bordalejo's essay in this collection («The texts we see and the works we imagine») sets out many cases where we do not have this knowledge, and will never acquire it, so rendering Tanselle's prescription unhelpful. These texts – of the Bible, of almost all literary works before 1800 (and many after), of historical documents from every period, of collaborative performance texts, of anonymous literature of every kind – are the foundations of our culture. We need editions of these works, and we need a theory of editing on which we can build these editions. The second is that Tanselle's definition separates, sharply, scholarship

[69] Tanselle, *Rationale*, p. 13.

concerning the work as created by the author and the work as the locus of cultural history. Because he declares that the task of an editor is to recreate the work as it was in the author's mind, the editor can ignore all documents which do not bear on the author's original creation (later printings, etc.): thus his assertion (cited in footnote 35) that study of the «public life of texts» belongs to a different «brand of textual study». For the cultural historian, however, these same documents may be of decisive importance. The broader definition of work I give licenses study of these documents too, within the context of a scholarly edition, and so enables enquiry into the whole history of the work such as that carried out by Eggert.

Despite these differences, Tanselle's view of the work and that presented in this paper are both grounded in a fundamental agreement: the material documents are the starting point of our understanding, but only the starting point. Tanselle's arguments have haunted and illuminated this essay, and it is fitting to give him the last word:

> [T]he reconstructed texts created by scholarly editors represent exemplary acts of reading by persons with specialized historical knowledge.[70]

We should all be such readers, and such editors.

Hans Walter Gabler
Editing Text – Editing Work

Manifestations to posterity of our social and cultural heritage have since times immemorial been recorded in writing. Prerequisite for writing are writing supports – documents in every material variety we care to imagine: stone, or clay, or bark, or papyrus, or well-prepared animal skins, or paper, if not (most evanescent) even sand on the sea-shore. That documents support writing means that our heritage manifests itself in a double order of materiality: primarily in that of the document, and secondarily in that of the material properties of the inscriptions on the document surfaces. We register these orders separately: the documents by their primary materiality; the inscriptions according to the implements (chisel, quill, pen, pencil) as well as the substances (ink, coal, lead,

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

crayon) with which they were effected.[1] Provided we even stop to think in, and to analyze by, these categories. For it is also true that, even in its doubling, we tend to take the materiality for granted, as «transparent» because a *conditio sin[a]e qua non*, a *pre-condition*, instead of appreciating it as a necessary *condition* of material recording. In common awareness, the document recedes as a mere «witness», we short-cut instead by classifying mainly the generic nature of what is written on the supports, and in whatever manner of signifying notation. Be the notation hieroglyphic or otherwise pictorial, or cuneiform, or alphabetic, or otherwise semiotic, such as for music: once mastered in perception, the system of notation becomes «transparent», too, and what we privilege is the content the document archives hold. Generically, they will comprise laws and contracts, administrative ordinances and records, accounts of history as annals, chronicles, narratives, myth, or (say) performance instructions for theatrical performance, or music. What furthermore, too, we generally do not reflect upon and distinguish is that, in their wide variety, documents and inscriptions carry content that is no less, but also no more than record – a vast historical protocol, one might say, of the every-day. As an adjunct thereto, one might say, what is equally comprised as content in our written heritage are transformations into art of all that the systems of notation are capable of recording and expressing. What brackets all signification of content in writing on documents is its tangible and palpable material presence. All content is there for us to encounter and grasp because it stands materially before us. Encountering every record materially, as we do, we encounter it as text. A main characteristic, in fact a necessary constituent of text is its materiality, even its material doubling, on support and as inscription.

Its material condition in turn renders text mutable, indeed doubly mutable: both perishable and changeable. Inks fade, documents decay and dissolve. Texts get copied, and in the process undergo alteration, from document to document. Their so accomplished preservation through transmission always also involves a measure of corruption, natural and inevitable on account both of the grounding of the transmission in materiality, and of the human agency involved in the acts of copying. The processes of change have over the millennia been largely attributed to human

[1] Jūratė Levina, to whom I am grateful for her perceptive pre-reading of part of this contribution, has in private communication suggested the phenomenological terms «ground» (stone or skin or paper) vs «figure» (inscription) to distinguish and indicate the relation of the two orders of materiality I posit.

fallibility. Copyists have been blamed for corrupting texts in transmission, and critical human (counter-)agency has consequently been instituted to edit them. What has been required of editorial scholarship from its early inceptions has been to identify (and eliminate) textual error and thus to stabilize texts. It is only in recent times that changeability has been recognized as natural to texts themselves. This has importantly refocused our perception of writing, texts, and transmissions. What can be observed with particular clarity from, say, the patterns of inscription in draft documents is that texts originate from out of a constant interplay of writing and reading and continued writing. That interplay does not end with fair-copying, nor at any stage of subsequent staying of the transmission or (reading) reception. On however many identifiable supports texts have found material permanence, changeability – variation – remains a prime characteristic of «text». Texts, being forged out of language, do not shed the dynamic dialogicity which is the basic ontological condition of language – without it, language, as the discursive human faculty it is, could not exist; nor could texts. Texts harbor a double energy: they strive towards closure, but simultaneously retain an open potential for change.[2] This makes them amenable to variation and revision in genetic terms. It equally allows for, if not indeed permits, considered alterations in copying (that is, changes not subsumable as «error»), or even large-scale adaptation responding to altered circumstances of situation, context and times. The basis, however, on which alone it is possible to make these distinctions is and remains that texts be materially manifest, nor cannot be encountered and dealt with in any other way than out of their material presence.

This, moreover, is true of any kind and mode of text, and almost goes without saying for the multiform range of utility texts – the vast historical protocol of the every-day of our cultural heritage. What needs to be carefully understood, however, is that it is also unremittingly true of all extant records that evidence the transforming of language into (materially speaking) texts of art – the section of our heritage (say) where the texts encountered are customarily called «works of literature». Yet so to call them is a market-place foreshortening; it is distinctly misconceived under scholarly auspices in terms of textual criticism and editing. Alas,

[2] This was emphasized by Gunter Martens, the German textual scholar, in the wake of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, in: «Was ist - aus editorischer Sicht - ein Text? Überlegungen zur Bestimmung eines Zentralbegriffs der Editionsphilologie», in S. Scheibe and C. Laufer, eds., *Zu Werk und Text. Beiträge zur Textologie,* Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1991, pp. 135-156.

though, it is a naming, even a conceptualizing, that the discipline tends unreflectedly to adopt. Quite categorically, on the contrary, neither is any materially extant text as inherited, nor is any edited text as critically constituted, coequal with a work. While it is simplistically often claimed that a material text «presents a work», or even «is the work», what properly it is and does is that it represents the work in one manifestation from out of an in principle endless series of material instantiations.

Conceptually, however, the work in language is immaterial. Its representations are texts: they are manifestly material. Herein lies a division that distinguishes works of art in language, and foremost perhaps among them works of literature, fundamentally from works of art on canvas, or of stone, or metal, or wood. In such «space arts», the material manifestation is «the thing itself», the work of art as tangible object. The materiality expressing the art does in itself not possess the dynamic discursivity and therefore essential changeability of language – that immaterial stuff yet formable, too, into works of art. Works of art in language – and much the same goes for works of art in music: both are «time arts» – retain the immateriality of the human faculty, language (or thinking and feeling in the abstraction of music), out of which they are given shape, processual logic and meaning, even while, by grace of the cultural technique of writing – that late invention of human culture – it has become possible to give immaterial works their representation in material texts, or scores.

A cultural technique corresponding, and as it were reciprocal, to writing is that of editing. It answers to two generally opposed, but on occasion even mutually re-enforcing vectors inherent in the creative processes of shaping language into works of art and materializing these processes in the writing-out of texts. Texts, as they materialize through being written out in compositional as well as revisional and transmissional processes, retain, on the one hand (as said), the dynamic dialogicity constitutive of language out of which they are made. On the other hand, they are, as texts, always also endangered by «corruption» – even while at times errors and textual faults may be found to be generative of fresh contextualization integrable into the text. To assess the given instance is a task of textual criticism; to act upon the assessment – or not to act upon it, as the case may be – is the ensuing duty inherent in editing. Importantly, recognizing the forms that the dialogic dynamics of texting have taken in the successive courses of writing and progressive revision, as well as applying textual criticism and editorial decisions to textual records, constitutes editorial scholarship brought to bear on texts, that is on the material rep-

resentations of works. Textual criticism and editing are never exercisable on works. To equal «editing a text» with «editing a work» is simply to commit a category error. Yet both, editing texts and editing works, are either separately or in variously graded admixtures genuine options of textual and editorial scholarship.

The 20th century has been a phase in the history of editorial scholarship focused on the editing of texts. Three main factors contributing to this development have been the enormous increase in sophistication of text-critical and editorial methodology generally; the shift in (mainly) bibliography-based procedures from copy-text editing predicated on text and transmission to copy-text editing aimed at realizing authorial intention; and the dwindling or outright disappearance in critical editions of discursive commentary. The misconception that «editing the text» be coequal to «editing the work» was, needless to say, prominently strengthened by singling out the author's (final) intention as guiding principle for establishing edited texts. Not only does this precept epitomize an author orientation in scholarly editing on the level of text; it also constitutes the final outcrop of that author-centricity in the discipline, as such historically contingent, which still harbors a notion that the editor be, and act as, the author's executor.[3] Yet this is at bottom legalistic, not historical or humanities' thinking. From the author's perspective, to be sure, there is often (if by no means invariably) one text definable as «the work» (a first-edition publication text, for instance). Yet so to focus on one material text, coming as it does at the price of suppressing work-in-progress dynamics, as well as post-publication modification to the textual body of the work as a whole, cannot be the overriding determinant for text-critical understanding and editorial procedure. The author of course has every right to un-historicize, but the textual critic and editor would (and does), in following suit, fail in historical obligation. Not that the historical dimension of works and their texts hasn't always also been understood as constitutive of editorial scholarship. The conceptual stance however that editing a text means essentially to edit the work drastically minimizes shouldering the inherent professional obligation. For one thing, what it phases out is that the edited text is in actual fact uniquely new, and so yet another instance in a progress-

[3] I have recently argued for taking sight beyond author-centricity in: «Beyond Author-Centricity in Scholarly Editing», *Journal of Early Modern Studies* 1.1 (2012), pp. 15-35. (Issue title: «On Authorship», edited by D. Pallotti and P. Pugliatti.) http://www.fupress.com/bsfm-jems; republished in German with slight revisions as: «Wider die Autorzentriertheit in der Edition», *Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts 2012*, pp. 316-342.

ing series of material representations of the work. It is the editor's text and as such distinct from every other extant representation. The critical essence of copy-text editing, for instance, lies not in a one-to-one matching of the copy, but in the editorially adjudicated departures from it. Similarly, if I properly understand the groundings of editing from out of transmissions of the pre-Gutenberg era, one cannot strictly in their case either claim to be «editing documents».[4] Facsimile reproductions aside – what editing here, too, always involves is putting the texts from documents (that is, the texts found inscribed in extant manuscripts) through the editorial process. This will always require departures from the text realisation in the original, be these, say, «simply» expansions of abbreviations, or else emendations (based on collations with the texts of the given work in other material documents), or conjectures (edited-text adjustments critically arrived at without supporting material evidence). The result is again an editor's text. The editor's edited text situates itself in an historical spectrum of representations of the work in material texts. To perceive that this is so circumscribes scholarly editing essentially as an historical enterprise. It also opens the door to recognizing the task of «editing the work» as the more comprehensive complement to «editing a/the text».

To edit the work, then, means to lay out, so as to render analyzable, the historical spectrum of material representations of the work. These comprise all texting towards a work, and every materially extant representation of the work. They all go together, as I strongly maintain, textually to constitute the work. This is not revolutionary thinking. It simply re-states how editorial scholarship has understood the task of text editing all along. That a re-stating is felt to be needed at all is because both critical and theoretical thinking today demands re-assessment of the interrelationships within the spectrum at several of its nodal points. First and foremost: an edited text at the center of an edition may hold that position not, say, because of an assumed or contingently real claim to «authority», but because it is the product of an argued systematic editorial procedure – it is not so much the author's «authorized» text as it is that fresh text in a series for the work, established by consistent and declared method

[4] As for the trajectory of my own thought in this matter, by advocating «The Primacy of the Document in Editing» [*Ecdotica*, 4 (2007), pp. 197-207], I did not imply that «the document» be understood as the determinant of an editorial enterprise. As always, it is the document text with which and from which the editing takes off, and an edition will define itself by its critical departures from that text; the identities with it which the edition will responsibly retain, go (as it were) without saying.

on the editor's responsibility. This clears the sights anew onto the textual evidence from the body of extant documents of composition and transmission that provide the material substance for all editing. Here, the perception of, as well as the critical views on, textual changes and variation in and across document texts have much, and in important respects fundamentally, changed. An editorial methodology is today in demand to give new responses to the changed perceptions – of which beginnings are already to be seen, for instance, both in medieval studies in their development of a «new philology», or, say, in modernist studies with manuscript editions, meanwhile dominantly digital, answering to the methodological stance of genetic criticism (*critique génétique*).

The digital medium is, as I strongly believe, well on course to becoming the primary site for the scholarly edition. This will, and should, bring about genuine re-conceptualisings and re-envisionings of the several discourses which in a scholarly edition relate to the edited text, as well as among one another. What for instance urgently needs to be digitally re-born is what is traditionally termed the textual apparatus. This entity was in scholarly editions in book form always already of course the locus for correlating the (transmitted and/or edited) text with the recorded variants. The relationship was understood as essentially binary – authentic reading versus error – and was dealt with by way of foot-noted or appended lemmatized listings. In such typographical isolation from the presentation of the edited text, the records proceeded instance by instance with little or no regard for textual structure or to contextualization and meaning. Against this, the book (already on the eve, as it were, of the transition of editions into the digital medium) had begun to realize alternative apparatus formats functionally to support the distinction between, on the one hand, «readings», individually separated out as error and corruption, and, on the other hand, textually non-separable, always in-context revision and variation. The challenge to the edition in the digital medium is to take its cue from here and design digitally native structures for correlating the several members of the body of text representing a work in such ways as to become genuinely the comprehensive textual foundation for all manner of research on and into the work.

But the problematics of editing text and editing (the) work have yet wider dimensions. To find new bearings for editorial scholarship beyond its 20th-century narrowing-in on text editing, we need to remind ourselves of one main engagement of the learned edition of old. It saw its purpose above all in mediating the work – the work represented indeed by the given edition's text – to not just literary professionals (let alone

to textual scholars only), but to a general readership. The discourse dominantly serving this purpose was the commentary. This was where the edition not only provided factual information of multiple kinds, but also addressed, via the edition's manifest text or texts, the work's meaning(s) and significance.

It is the experience of every textual critic and editor that at every point and moment of engagement with the text substance for the edition in progress, interpretive considerations of meaning impinge. The circumstance that works of art in language, in themselves immaterial, are (bar the loss of documents) always, as said, represented by multiple material texts, raises the situation to considerable complexity. The interpretative process never ends, it is of the essence of reading. That is, it is ever dynamically progressive. To engage progressively with and in the dynamics of interpreting the meanings of text and work was something the material medium of manuscript and book could not open-endedly sustain. The experiments with quasi-hypertextualizing typographical arrangements for commentary in some medieval manuscripts or early printed books are amazing, and the compilations of discursive commentary in, say, the Shakespeare Variorum volumes (still on-going!) are awe-inspiring. But commentary in book editions always needed to be cut off, with a wide range of rationalizations for chosen limits (e.g., not to prejudice critical interpretation, not to repeat what dictionaries or encyclopedias could provide, not to assume ignorance of the self-evident, etc., etc.). The prime rationalization for the virtual disappearance of explicatory and discursive commentary from the full-scale scholarly edition in the 20th century, the critical edition of Anglo-American as well as the historical-critical edition of German persuasion, was that the edition's edited text could claim permanence far beyond any commentary, seen as possessing a much shorter half-life.

Yet we might also discern a true potential in the felt transience of commentary. For to admit it allows constant adjustment of factual knowledge as well as re-articulations, modifications, or revisions of critical insight and understanding. In technical terms, a digital platform would help to realize an on-going interactive commentary dialog along such lines of progression. To embrace this option would importantly contribute to leading the scholarly edition out of its inherited mode of authoritativeness in decreeing what «the text» is and what «the work» says. It is time to de-hierarchize the scholarly edition and to re-conceive it not only as a product of, but more importantly as a forum for critical scholarly engagement. The digital medium is where this may be accomplished. Hence, admittedly, we

should also expect and be prepared to accept that the scholarly edition will in the digital medium thoroughly metamorphose into shapes other than those of the scholarly edition in print. The digital scholarly edition should, and I hope it will, become a dynamically progressive interactive research site, energized by a work through its texts, and reciprocally energizing scholarship and criticism, as well as engaged explorative reading, in their out-reach for innovative forms of enquiry and communication.[5]

Paul Eggert
What We Edit, and how We Edit; or, why not to Ring-Fence the Text

In the most developed of an adventurous series of recent essays on editorial theory and practice, «Beyond Author-Centricity in Scholarly Editing», Hans Walter Gabler argues: «what textual scholarship engages with, directly and tangibly, is not authors but texts (and equally not works but texts), materially inscribed in transmissions».[1] Thus editing is, for him, always and only definable as *text*-editing. He means this in a special, non-trivial sense that I will shortly elaborate. But first an initial observation is necessary. His urge to ring-fence the object of the editor's activity in this way creates the ground of disagreement between us since that object of attention – text – must now be defined on a solid basis. This is where, for me, the trouble starts, even though a number of his subsequent conclusions are important ones that I can and would embrace.

[5] This brings me up once again to the brink where I have come to a halt repeatedly before, as for instance in «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», online in: *Literature Compass,* 7/2 (2010), (special issue *Scholarly Editing in the Twenty-First Century*), pp. 43-56. Downloadable at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-4113.2009.00675.x/full; *or via* http://lmumunich.academia.edu/HansWalterGabler/Pa. To go further, I feel that, as James Joyce phrased it for young Stephen Dedalus: «I require [perhaps] a new terminology and [certainly still] a new personal experience». [James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. (ed. Hans Walter Gabler.) New York, Random House Vintage, 1993; London, Random House Vintage, 2012, V.1271-72]

[1] H.W. Gabler, «Beyond Author-Centricity in Scholarly Editing», *Journal of Early Modern Studies*, 1 (2012), pp. 15-35: 15. His other essays are: «The Primacy of the Document in Editing», *Ecdotica*, 4 (2007), pp. 197-207; «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», *Literature Compass*, 7.2 (2010), pp. 43-56; and «Thoughts on Scholarly Editing", at Ecdotica, 7 (2010), 105-137,and *Journal of literary Theory* 2011: http://www.jltonline.de/index.php/reviews/article/view/307/891

Text may be definable as semiotic system – as an older generation of postwar German editors found it attractive to do when they appealed to Prague structuralism – or it may be based, as Gabler now proposes for editorial purposes, on the fundamental fact of textual variance. This is usually visible on authorial holographs or when any two typings or typesettings of the same work are compared closely to one another. Gabler wants to call it the «author function».[2]

In doing so he is borrowing and then adapting Michel Foucault's famous gambit.[3] Foucault was responding to the habit of appealing to authorial intentions or empirical facts to settle a work's meaning. Foucault deemed this appeal to external factors to be illusory and reduced it to the level of discourse: one of many possible discourses. By defining discourse itself as the basis of textuality, he liberated the range of relevant meanings that a text might be thought of as instantiating or invoking. Invoking Foucault's author-function helps Gabler to separate the text-object from the biographical author who, empirically, brought text into being on an extant or lost document. Editorial discourse arises from the need to record and explain the observable fact of change as text was coming into being on the page (its genesis) or as it changed between successive revisions, corrections or copyings of it (its variance). Thus it is textual change as laid down in documents, whether or not extant, that Gabler argues is *endogenous* to text and that underwrites the editorial prerogative and ought therefore to be understood as the exclusive focus of the editorial gaze. Everything else is, in contrast, *exogenous* in Gabler's schema. Thus the editorial act cannot be based on and be justified by an appeal to the external empirical factors *per se* (who wrote or altered the text? with what intentions in mind? when? and under what conditions?), as most Anglo-American editors have understood their task to be, but on textual change itself as then elaborated in editorial discourse about it.

Strictly speaking, Gabler muddies the waters a little by invoking the term *author* function since it is only the appeal to discourse and the idea of externality-to-text that he needs from Foucault. For Gabler, as for Foucault, texts are not functions of biographical authors. For Foucault texts are functions of other texts, that is to say, of discourse. Gabler introduces a necessary intervening step by claiming that texts are functions of documents.[4]

[2] Gabler, «Beyond Author-Centricity in Scholarly Editing», p. 31.

[3] M. Foucault, «What Is an Author» (1969, in English 1979), in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow, London, Penguin, 1986), pp. 101-20.

[4] «[T]he text should be seen fundamentally as a function of the document»: Gabler, «The Primacy of the Document in Editing», p. 199.

When they come under the editorial gaze they are analysed, and the analysis is recorded, within the discursive environment that he takes the scholarly edition to be. This is what Gabler means by *text*-editing. For him, the idea that text is a function of document is the condition that permits editorial analysis to occur.

Editorial discourse must therefore be a focussed exposure of the textual genesis and change uncovered by the editor. Gabler shrewdly observes:

> As the emendation apparatus thus argues the edited text, it stands to reason that the edited text must argue back: that is, must hold its own against the apparatus pronouncements addressing it. This confirms, reciprocally, the standing of the edition text as one distinct strand of discourse.[5]

Such discourse can take the form of text emendation, commentary about change between versions as well as defences of the emendations, and also explanatory notation and as an extended history of the text. These are interrelated discourses, Gabler argues; within an electronic edition they are dynamically interrelated. The reading text is therefore the text of the edition, not the text of the work or the text of a version. Finally, differentiating between document and text as Gabler now consciously and more strictly does, he is in a position to argue that documents themselves cannot be edited. Editing is text-editing: Gabler's position comes down to this near- but non-circularity.

Gabler's argument is logical and, although he does not acknowledge it, his tight patrolling of its boundaries to maintain a certain purity of attention satisfies that *wissenschaftlich* instinct that is intrinsic to the German philological tradition. To be taken seriously as a *Wissenschaftler*, in this case, a practitioner of the human sciences, one needs to be precise in one's definition of what it is that one studies. It needs to be solidly in place. So it is not surprising that Peter Robinson, an Australian medievalist working in a more empirical Anglo-American tradition, should have queried the purism of Gabler's approach. There is a stirring article by him in a recent issue of *Variants*. I concur in important ways with Robinson but also have some disagreements with his position that I draw out below. First, I set out my critique of Gabler's position. This is done partly in the hope of being able to nominate where we basically agree, which, for some of our readers at least, may be the more productive outcome.

[5] Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», p. 45.

1

The main difference between Gabler's newly elaborated position and mine revolves around the role of reading as being constitutive of text, which I claim it is. If that is the case then our traditional understanding of what we call «text» needs to expand. Gabler's claim that text is a *function* of document keeps his definition locked into a robust binary, but it does not define what the functioning consists of, is based on, or is activated by. Sticking with the binary of text-document does not allow it to open out into the real world where meanings are actualised by readers. To accommodate this latter textual dimension we need to be able to juggle two meanings of «text» simultaneously: *text* considered as a dimension of experienced meaning and *text* in its familiar sense as the inscription in a particular document: what we can agree it «says». My emphasis here is on the former, on text as dimension, while leaving the latter, logically secondary, agreement pragmatically in place.

Correspondingly, then, our understanding of what we mean by the term «document» needs to expand. Documents, I argue, are only recognised as such in the same moment as their texts are actualised. Then we process and categorise them, give them names, thus leading to the meaning of «document» in the familiar sense. Until then they are only paper and ink. That book lying there on the table might be a blank, a publisher's sample, intended to show booksellers what the coming publication will look like. It is not yet a document existing in a dialectic with text and never will be. The two dimensions, in my account, depend on one another to secure their own identities, but what arises from them for the reader is not some transcendent thing – say, the ideal text of the work – since the dialectic process is necessarily open-ended. The dialectic has to be understood, I have argued, in Adorno's sense as negative: it is not an idealism.[6] Therefore the work emerges not as an object but as a regulative concept that embraces the endless iterations of the text-document dialectic, a dialectic that inevitably involves the workings of agency and takes place over time. To allow this series of associations to

[6] For Adorno and for the claims in the next sentence, see further Eggert, *Securing the Past: Conservation in Art, Architecture and Literature*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, chapter 10; «Brought to Book: Bibliography, Book History and the Study of Literature», *The Library*, 7th series, 13.1 (2012), pp. 3-32; and *Biography of a Book: Henry Lawson's «While the Billy Boils»* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, and State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013), introduction and chapter 13.

enter the editorial-theory debate rather than sticking with our existing (and admittedly, in book form, very practicable) definitions of texts, documents and works will better prepare us, I believe, for the changes in editorial methodology and thinking that the digital medium will soon demand.

At a definitional level, therefore, I disagree with Gabler. According to my account the empirical realities that he deems *ex*ogenous to *text*-editing are certainly *end*ogenous to *work*-editing. And I go further when I point out that, once the work is understood as a regulative concept that comprehends all acts of editing as well as writing, copying and reading, then only work-editing is possible. I mean this is a special sense. One is always editing, one is always reading, *within* the work. Thus Gabler's concept of text-editing needs to take note – pondered, theoretical note – of the larger context in which *it* operates: the editorial theorist cannot responsibly insulate text-editing from the continuity in which it takes part. This is a matter of definition. The challenge for Gabler is how to expand his definition to accommodate the sustaining continuity, without having to throw over his proposal altogether. As I see it, because the work unfolds over time it can, in principle, never be completely comprehended editorially. In this special sense «work-editing» is never fully achievable. Instead, editors survey the process – usually only part of it, typically the versions from the author's lifetime – and then intervene editorially. Such editions-as-argument about the constitution of the work's text or texts, selected from one or more parts of its history, are perfectly feasible. Each of them operates under the sign of the work, a fact that the electronic work-site or work-bench – which is where one draws on the digital archive of the work and where editorial operations may be performed – will make more and more obvious to us.

To summarise: the consequence of my account is that, because text-editing, in the way that Gabler defines it and in the stress that he gives it, rules out the constitutive factors of meaning-making at the hands of readers, his account must be, if not invalid, then conceptually inadequate by failing to take measure of the life of the work in which text-editing can at best take an influential role, but a part-role only. For Gabler the work «stands outside the realm of the material», instantiated by texts as «materially documented representations».[7] Thus Gabler's view is materialist in reference to text but idealist in reference to the work. This combination goes with a desire for system – the edition as a *system* of

[7] Gabler, «Thoughts on Scholarly Editing», p. 14.

discourses – that will undergird systematic study of texts now able to be hypothesised and treated essentially as objects. But the editor and the edition can never, in my account at least, stand so adroitly outside the empirical, agented and material processes of transmission, agented by writers, producers and readers, including scholarly and other editors. From this point of view the pursuit is an illusion: there *is* no outside position.

In a related manner, as part of his idea of the edition as a system of discourses, Gabler distinguishes those of commentary and annotation from those of the textual introduction, editorial rationale and reading text, traditionally seen as the periphery and centre of editions, respectively. His case is that «the scholarly edition urgently needs to be rethought as again a functional whole. Annotation and commentary need to be brought back into it ... no longer as add-ons to the edition but instead as essential strands in an edition's set of interrelated discourses» that are «in functional interdependence» with the text and apparatus and textual introduction.[8] His call for annotation and commentary to be acknowledged as functionally interdependent is not as new as he assumes,[9] but he does usefully lay out the case in a formal and generalisable manner. His acknowledgement of the needs of readers at this level is indeed welcome.

[8] Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», p. 46.

[9] Cf. my parallel account given originally in a conference paper at Montpellier in 1990: «One is, or at least upon reflection one ought to be, relieved then to find that the editorial matter [the historical and textual introduction in each volume of the Cambridge Works of D.H. Lawrence] has not been consigned to the back of the book as has been common in editions validated by the Center for Editions of American Authors or the MLA Committee for Scholarly Editions. This practice creates the misapprehension that the reader is being given an unmediated access to the author's text, whereas in fact the access is to an editorially established text – what can only be a collaboration of author and editor. At least the Cambridge introductions say this straight out before one arrives at the reading text; but should one skip the introductory matter and turn directly to the text, one will encounter line numbers which are there to key into the textual apparatus. Sooner or later curiosity will triumph and, turning to the apparatus, one will in turn feel the need to read the introduction to make sense of what the apparatus is recording and why the editor has made the textual choices he or she has. One will find then that the introduction frequently refers to entries in the textual apparatus and in the explanatory notes where particular textual decisions are justified: one then gets a dawning awareness that the volume is a mass of cross-references, that it is, despite the internal divisions of its editorial matter, working as a single unit. Everything seems to be there to document and justify the approach taken in the construction of the reading text, or otherwise to serve it by explaining its compositional history, its allusions, and by listing its rejected readings»: «Reading a Critical Edition With the Grain

If Gabler's use of the term *discourse* were only metaphorical I would have no disagreement with him. But in the commentary and annotation, just as in the text-establishment and apparatus, the editor's active role as reader, recorder and interpreter (making and remaking the textual meanings, thus granting the work an onward, renewed life) again shows that there is no secure position outside the text that is being edited. The editor has continuing agency in all of the activities. That is why at first I had no problem with one of Gabler's injunctions, «to grant autonomy to the edition text as the editor's text» (rather than the work-text).[10] But then, in ways that I further elaborate below, I saw that I was constrained to describe the editor's text as an embodied argument *about* something and addressed *to* someone, not as an autonomous object or discourse in and of itself.

In his reply to Gabler, Peter Robinson also expresses a pragmatic as opposed to a strictly *wissenschaftlich* orientation to the editorial problem. I follow him in not wishing to rule out the so-called exogenous considerations of «intention, agency, authority, and meaning».[11] My contribution here is only to provide a definitional framework for that shared instinct. But, in doing so, I realise that I reach a sort of stalemate with Gabler: our definitions rule one another's out because, I suspect, they spring from different instincts concerning how to go about solving complex problems. I fear that our models of the edition are simply incompatible.[12]

2

What advance can I propose in this situation? How can I recast the stalemate in a way that might allow the conversation to get beyond it? If there is a way it might proceed as follows. To undergird the study of the unfold-

and Against: The Cambridge D.H. Lawrence», in C.L. Ross and D. Jackson, eds., *Editing D.H. Lawrence: New Versions of a Modern Author*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995, pp. 27-40: 30). The essay goes on to show (and, in this, contradicting Gabler's account of the edition as a closed system of discourses) that, as well as undergirding the coherence of an Anglo-American scholarly edition, the explanatory notes and the textual apparatus entries also may provide information that potentially rebel against it, thus allowing one to read the edition *against* its grain. (*Securing the Past* also has passages about this: pp. 153, 177).

[10] Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», p. 47.

[11] P. Robinson, «Towards a Theory of Digital Editions», *Variants*, 10 (2013), pp. 105-31: 114.

[12] On German vs Anglo-American scholarly instincts, see further, P. Eggert, «Anglo-American Critical Editing: Concepts, Terms and Methodologies», *Ecdotica*, 9 (2012), pp. 113-24.

ing life of the work, and therefore to plot the continuing dialectic of its documentary instantiations and textual realisations at the hands of readers – which is what I am arguing ought to be the broader aim – a binary, synchronic semiotics will not do. We need one that models the development of meaning from a documentary basis over time. C.S. Peirce's semiotics offer a way of allowing for the observable fact that, for any work, the material document remains usually unchanged or little changed while the meanings raised from it will each be differently contextualised and agented.

Thus readers need to be conceptually accommodated within the definition of the edition, but Gabler's binary or dyadic model cannot logically do so. This is why I prefer not to invoke Foucault and his account of discursivity but, rather, Peirce. In doing so, I change the philosophical context from a post-structuralist one to a Pragmatic one that readily embraces agency and time. What Gabler deems exogenous I deem to be endogenous since work-genesis does not stop at publication. Just as writer-as-reader, editor-as-reader and typesetter-as-reader take part in the pre-publication work-activity, so too, after publication, do ordinary readers. They are involved in the repeated coming-into-being of the work, even though documentary testament to their activity is only rarely laid down in the form of marginalia or commentary of one kind or another.

This is also why I argued earlier that scholarly editions do not escape the general textual condition. A triadic modelling of them as constituting part of the unfolding life of the work is called for. No matter how intently focussed the scholarly editor may be upon the documentary texts of a work, the edition is ultimately prepared for readers. Scholarly editions meet their fate in the act of reading. They reach forward into an anticipated future. If they constitute an argument then it is one that invites response from readers. But if they are a series of interrelated discourses, as Gabler believes, then they are definable as a whole, as an interrelated and self-supporting discursive system. To use Gabler's term against him, readers are exogenous to his model even though he declares annotation and commentary to be meaning- and reader-directed. If one is defining a discursive system then real-life readers are essentially an afterthought. They are outside of it.

On the other hand, recognising reading as constitutive of text and therefore of the edition gives my view an advantage. The editorial role – once understood as argument *about* the resources in the archive – is freed to become more fully and openly interpretative.[13] Even if I cannot accept

[13] For a fuller account, see P. Eggert, «The Reader-Oriented Scholarly Edition», forthcoming.

the terms of Gabler's underlying modelling of the edition as «a *systemics* of discourses and argument»[14] (italics mine) because of the danger that this will generate only more self-justifying enclosure, more ring-fencing, I readily grant that this is the opposite of his laudable intention to «re-embed editorial scholarship in literary criticism and theory».[15] I sense he is right when he concludes bravely: «The greatest opportunity... for an innovation of scholarly editing as criticism through electronic editions may ultimately lie in the field of the commentary».[16] Of course, for practical reasons scholarly editors need to be, first of all, textual critics. But in a digital environment much of the textual record will already have been transcribed and, given sufficient funding, checked. Together with the relevant digital images, the record will, in effect, be the target of the editor's work. Thus there need be no necessary boundary condition for the discharge of the interpretative function once the implications of the digital medium are recognised. So what I am arguing – now, very much *with* Gabler – is that the change in medium will help us or push us to reconceive the scholarly editorial role. To do so would potentially to right an old wrong perpetrated during the New Critical period when literary scholarship and literary criticism went their different ways. The shift to the digital medium reopens the practical possibility of a healthy and mutually beneficial *rapprochement.*

3

Peter Robinson's position and mine are similar, but teasing out the differences between us will help to clarify the foregoing discussion. Robinson puts to good use some argument in my 2009 book *Securing the Past*, but he departs from my account when he declares that «the text is the site of meaning which links the document and the work».[17] Now, of course, any of us is at liberty to give special meanings to traditional terms if clarification will ensue, just as I have tried to do above. But if the term *site* is to retain any sliver of its normal meaning then it is surely the document that is the site and the text that is the meaning. Robinson's declaration is meant to serve his call for a return to

[14] Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», p. 53.
[15] Gabler, «Beyond Author-Centricity in Scholarly Editing», p. 15.
[16] Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», p. 53.
[17] Robinson, «Towards a Theory of Digital Editions», p. 120.

the scholarly editing of works rather than of documents. He sees the latter trend as a dangerous development in recent digital editions and in tool development; and this is the camp in which he believes Gabler is implicitly placing himself.

To the extent that Gabler – who spent his academic career in *Anglistik* rather than *Germanistik* – has been affected by the tenets of German historical-critical editing he may be suspected, rightly or wrongly, of having a leaning towards documentary editing. But editors of the German tradition saw themselves as editors of works, even if their inflection of this obligation led them to stress the integrity of documentary texts. More significantly, Gabler's 1984 edition of James Joyce's *Ulysses* is anything but a straightforward documentary edition, and in recent years his interest in textual genetics – elucidating the series of steps in arriving at a text witnessed by heavily revised holograph manuscripts – doesn't mean per se that he believes that the goal of work-editing is illegitimate, only that editing any one documentary or documentary-genetic presentation of it can be rewarding. I do not see that editing a documentary text need cancel out a commitment to edit what the editor argues to be the text of the work. In the digital environment each such edition of a particular work will be done for good reasons or bad (often with a particular purpose for the reading text in mind) and need not cancel the other out. The reasons, as specified by the scholarly editor, will buttress or fail to buttress the argument constituted by the edition. Both approaches are editorial interventions between the source documents and the readership of the edition. So I think Robinson is on the wrong track here.

The situation is rather like the concert pianist for whom it would be paralysing to believe other than that, as she plays, she is playing the work. Yet even a little reflection shows that she is creating only a rendering of it, and performance styles change over time and among pianists. Texts of works are, as Robinson acknowledges, constructed differently by readers since reading involves some level of interpretation, a fact that having to encode texts for computer transcriptions also brings sharply to mind. Thus the work as an aim or as a concept can only be regulative; there is no firmer or more positive basis for it, as Robinson hopes to prove there is. I agree with him when he writes: «as we explore the document we seek to discover the work in the text we draw from the document».[18] We are something like the pianist. But when Robinson is tempted to go further and claim that as we read, the work is «shadowy

[18] *Ibid.*

but omnipresent»[19] he is getting dangerously close to an idealist view of the work. From that dilemma there is no way out unless he wishes to embrace G. Thomas Tanselle's position (see Coda, below, for a discussion). But to do so he would lose touch with the participation of readers in the text and the work – a belief to which, borrowing partly from my formulations, he states earlier in his own essay that he strongly subscribes.

When Robinson argues that as a matter of principle «a scholarly edition must, so far as it can, illuminate both aspects of the text, both text-as-work and text-as-document»[20] he believes he is countering Gabler's urge to put the document first. Now, Gabler writes: «recognizing the primacy of the document – meaning that texts are, logically, always functions of the documents transmitting them – becomes essential» in the changed digital medium; and «texts are and, if properly recognized, always have been constructs from documents».[21] This is obviously so when editing the fluid text of a much revised manuscript draft (which Gabler has in mind here), but he is also implying a general textual condition that binds documents and texts together, as expressed discursively by the edition. It is on this that I have reflected above.

I hesitate to follow Robinson here because the decision as to how to proceed under the sign of the work is the very testing ground for the editorial argument about the extant documents. If editions are purposeful in serving different categories of readers, then there can always be more than one legitimate purpose. If all editors adopted an argument that scarcely lifted the edition above the level of archival recording – so that digital surrogates both in transcription and facsimile of each documentary version were on offer but no intervention in their texts were risked in the service of some argued aim – then, as readers, we may well feel ourselves sold short. The edition would not have gotten us out of first gear. If not reader-oriented, the edition would be moribund, although its archival contribution might prove of value to other, more inspired interpreters.

If editors risk their arm then, whatever route they take and if supported by a well-populated digital archive, there will in future be no hiding behind the unavailability of documents to readers. The cards will actually be on the table – or on the «work-bench», as I think we can now

[19] *Ibid*., p. 123.
[20] *Ibid*.
[21] Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», p. 51.

call it – as they never could be in the printed edition that struggled to discharge both archival and editorial functions. Fredson Bowers once promised this desirable outcome, but only now is it realisable.[22] And the test of editorial skill is or will be how that textual data is turned into argument about the work. This is where the edition must necessarily be reader-oriented, as I have argued at more length elsewhere.[23] Readers have a deep investment in the work-concept, whether they know it or not. Despite Robinson's fears, the work-concept is not going to go away, and that it is primarily because it serves us well.

If we grant the functional (if not categorical) distinction between digital archive and edition it can immediately be seen that the digital archive should be designed to serve many purposes, not only the present editorial approach. To do so it probably should, in its encoding, be as light and unobjectionable as possible. That may mean its being preliminary; if it implies to Robinson a documentary orientation in subsequent editing it need not. The stage at which work-designations should be encoded is only a practical matter since the characteristics of the document need to be captured and it will usually make sense to do that first. If Robinson allows the distinction then some of his concern about recent trends in digital editing, including what he takes to be Gabler's role in it, fall away I believe.

4

In conclusion, I have to acknowledge an obligation that my approach incurs. In 1971 the leading German editorial commentator Hans Zeller argued that what was sought was the «objectification of editing».[24] This would be achieved through a conception of text-as-system. Gabler reaches after the same condition now by, in effect, ring-fencing the text. If I reject their desire for objectification because they alienate the very thing that lends works ongoing life (reading), then it follows that I must allow a reconception of the edition's share in this life. I must acknowl-

[22] F. Bowers, «A Preface to the Text» in W. Charvat, R.H. Pearce, C.M. Simpson, F. Bowers and M.J. Bruccoli, eds., *The Scarlet Letter*, The Centenary Edition of the Works of Nathaniel Hawthorne, vol. I, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1962, p. XLVII.

[23] See n. 13 above.

[24] H. Zeller, «Record and Interpretation: Analysis and Documentation as Goal and Method of Editing», in H.W. Gabler, G. Bornstein and G. Borland Pierce, eds., *Contemporary German Editorial Theory*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995, pp. 17-58: 54.

edge the role of the reader of, and therefore in, the edition. I must grant that editors are in slow dialogue with their readers and recognise that scholarly editions therefore extend the offer of an editor-reader transaction via the argument about the contents of the archive that constitutes the edition. The argued edition-as-transaction needs therefore to enter into our editorial discourse at a formal level – and here I believe Gabler, Robinson and I find common ground.

Coda: Philosophical groundings for the work-concept

There are a number of possible philosophical groundings in the analytic tradition for an ontology of the work. They are usefully brought together for discussion by Lydia Goehr in *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992). There is the Platonic view, that works are permanent entities distinct from their documentary embodiments or performances, and that the writer therefore discovers rather than creates them. There is the more nuanced form of this position that works are structural types distinct from but dependent on the creation, in the empirical world, of tokens of them, such as performances or manuscripts. The Aristotelian view allows works the condition of structural essences but confines their substance to their performances. The nominalist view sees the musical and literary work only as a projection – a naming or descriptive referencing device – transferred from the work's embodiments in real-world manuscripts, score-copies and performances. The aesthetic philosopher Nelson Goodman, whose name often crops up in editorial theory, is a nominalist by virtue of his argument that musical works are classes of performance perfectly compliant with their scores. So he is not committed to the belief that works are distinct and abstract entities with an ongoing existence. Finally, there is the idealist view that comes from R.G. Collingwood in the 1930s and, before him, Benedetto Croce in the 1920s. Here, the work is considered to be the idea or ideas in the mind of its creator, not any real-world instantiation of them.

The distinguished inheritor of the Greg-Bowers tradition of Anglo-American postwar scholarly editing, G. Thomas Tanselle, was regularly accused by editorial theorists and others in the 1990s of being a simple-minded Platonist. He isn't. The charge confused Platonism with idealism. Tanselle's well-known distinction is between the text of the work and the text of the document, together with his insistence that the text of the

work is just as historical as any documentary embodiment of it. The text of the work is therefore, he argues, retrievable by critical means, though not with complete certainty. By this subtle move Tanselle shifted the focus from the creator's mind (which would put him perfectly in touch with idealism) to the text of the work. But because judgement of authorial intention is fundamental to establishing that supposedly historical text of the work, Tanselle's argument loops him back to the 1930s idealism, of which his position may be seen to be a sophistication or adaptation. Goehr points out, however, that idealism has not gained much support in the analytic tradition; and Goodman's initially attractive nominalist position received a devastating reply from Kingsley Price in 1982.[25]

Another problem with Tanselle's position is that it consigns the work into a category of its own, over and apart from readings of it, despite the fact that, empirically and historically, reading is part of every phase and stage of a work's creation, production and reception. Thus his text of the work must be seen as an ideal one posited in the present not, as he claims, a historical text. Once we accept that the past is always a projection, that there is no way of being there, then the fact that a historical text of the work is so posited *and* the fact that the editor does not so much work *on* the text as *in* it (as is tacitly acknowledged by every emendation that the editor makes) need not make us regard Tanselle's approach as illegitimate but only as standing on somewhat different ground to the one he invokes. I doubt that Tanselle, on reflection, would disagree; indeed, he has been most eloquent on the matter of reasoned speculation about the past.

We have to appreciate the consequence: that the scholarly edition of the work, whether in print or digital form, does not supplant all previous editions. Rather, it intervenes in and extends the life of the work, typically by the introduction of information that sheds new light, and by documentary means adjusts, the reader's experience of the work. This does not mean that the other editions have gone away or that their dealings with earlier generations of readers are suddenly put at nought. The life of the work includes all of them and all dealings with them.

[25] K. Price, «What Is a Piece of Music?», *British Journal of Aesthetics,* 22 (1982), pp. 322-36: 325-7.

Bárbara Bordalejo

The Texts We See and the Works We Imagine: The Shift of Focus of Textual Scholarship in the Digital Age

Introduction

The process of editing a text is, in the first instance, an act of imagination. An editor who has collected materials, gathered evidence, and compared variants eventually has to decide what does it all mean, who will care about it and how to present it; but most importantly how those materials relate to each other. The answers to these questions are not in the documents that preserve versions of the texts, but in the minds of the scholars who have carefully studied the physical documents, their texts and the variant states of the text they represent. In this essay, I present my working definitions of the text of the document, the variant states of the text and the work, show how they relate to each other and how they have been affected by digital technologies or how they have arisen from them. I also conclude that while some concepts might remain unchanged from the days of print, others are fundamental only to born-digital texts.

At the beginning of the 80s, Jerome McGann and D.F. McKenzie, almost simultaneously but independently, questioned the textual critical establishment and its intentionalist view of editing.[2] Up to that point, first Fredson Bowers and later G. Thomas Tanselle, both following W.W. Greg, advocated copy-text editing and the recovery of authorial intention. For McGann and McKenzie, the text was a result of a series of physical processes that had to be taken into account, as well as explained, as part of the editorial process.

With the advent of digital editions, editors found that they could include an amount of information that would not have been possible in print where the only limitations were time and money. The first electronic editions, Kevin Kiernan's *Beowulf*; Peter Robinson's *The Wife of Bath's Prologue on CD-ROM*; Murray McGillivray's *Book of the Duch-*

[1] I would like to thank Paul Eggert for his comments on the first draft of this paper.

[2] J.J. McGann, *A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1983; D.F. McKenzie, *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts* (The Panizzi Lectures, 1985), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

ess; Viscomi, Essick and Eaves' *The Blake Archive*; McGann's *The Rossetti Archive;* Price's *The Whitman Archive*, rely heavily on images and present a series of transcriptions of documents. Editors, perhaps enamored of the new medium, stopped editing and began compiling vast amounts of images of documents with their respective transcriptions. This did not mean that the theory of textual editing had been set aside, but despite various editors considering the subject, the production of critical digital editions was left for some other occasion.[3]

Documents and texts

In leaving the production of critical editions for the future, editors have focused on the transcription of primary textual sources and the production of digital surrogates for those documents containing text. This has led Hans Walter Gabler to describe texts as the functions of documents:

> Digital editions must however, in their turn, and precisely in their 'otherness', derive bearings from their texts' native transmissions in the material medium. This is where recognizing the primacy of the document – meaning that texts are, logically, always functions of the documents transmitting them – becomes essential. It is exactly where, and when, the text is and remains separate from the material support of its transmission that the material parameters of that support need to be adjudicated as potential determinants for the digital edition. To see the text fundamentally as a function of the document helps to recognize afresh that in all transmission and all editing, texts are and, if properly recognized, always have been constructs from documents.[4]

Here Gabler identifies the process of «constructing» the text, which he identifies with the editorial process of creating a critical edition, and he declares the primacy of documents before offering the idea that «texts are functions of documents». This is a very imprecise definition: documents are the material support for texts and do not cause texts to do anything. Only a reader can extract meaning from texts; each reader, depending

[3] Critical editions have continued to appear in print. Some of these have benefited from using digital methods for their realization, for example, the Nestle-Aland edition of the Greek New Testament or the *Editio Critica Maior*. See http://www.uni-muenster.de/INTF/Publications.html#Editio_Critica_Maior, accessed 13 September 2013. See also F. Rico, «Texto y textos en tiempos de crisis», *Medioevo romanz*o, 35 (2011), 58-65: 64-65.

[4] H.W. Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», *Literature Compass*, 7.2 (2010), pp. 43-56: 51.

on his or her background, might extract more or less meaning or might comprehend one or various levels of that meaning. Of course, one could, as Peter Robinson has done, recognize the merits of paying close attention to documents, while highlighting the dangers of the «flood of facsimile editions in digital form» that have already resulted.

Elena Pierazzo also gives great weight to documents and documentary editions.[5] Her exposure to Jane Austen's draft manuscripts have given shape to her understanding of the importance of diplomatic transcriptions. However, she takes this understanding to a new level in advocating that:

> [a] diplomatic edition is a non-objective, interpretative operation, then it follows that [it] is also a scholarly activity and can be justified on these grounds, in the same way that a critical edition can, with both presenting the scholarly and computational analysis of the chosen textual phenomena.[6]

From the above quotation, it becomes clear that Pierazzo has a particular agenda: having worked as part of the Jane Austen's Fiction Manuscripts, she finds herself in the position of having to prove that documentary editions are, at least, equal to critical editions.[7] In the process of doing this, she defines a

> ...new type of editorial object, the *documentary digital edition*, as the recording of as many features of the original document as are considered meaningful by the editors, displayed in all the ways the editors consider useful for the readers, including all the tools necessary to achieve such a purpose.[8]

It is unclear whether Pierazzo thinks that the innovation came before or after the Jane Austen's Fiction Manuscripts edition, but given the absence of any other examples in her article it appears she believes this is the first edition in this category.

[5] E. Pierazzo, «A Rationale of Digital Documentary Editions», *Literary and Linguistic Computing,* 26 (2011) pp. 463-477.

[6] Ibidem, p. 472.

[7] Jane Austen's Fiction Manuscripts: http://www.janeausten.ac.uk/index.html, accessed 16 September 2013. The assertion of the value of documentary editions is beating a dead horse: editions have different aims and serve different purposes, they all present (and always have presented) a degree of subjectivity. Certain types of edition are not inherently superior to others, so there is no need to try to «vindicate» any type. Textual scholars know this.

[8] Pierazzo, «A Rationale of Digital Documentary Editions», p. 475.

The text of the document

A document that has been inscribed with text has no function unless a reading agent is present.[9] Once this reading agent is present, meaning can be extracted from the text preserved in the document. For most competent readers, the action of reading is so habitual and occurs so quickly that they fail to notice all the underlying processes that their experiences bring into the equation.

What I call the text of the document is the totality of the text as preserved on its physical support. Scholars with experience with the transcription of primary sources will immediately understand that I am referring to all the meaningful marks on the page made by someone with the intention of communicating something. The meaningful, intentional marks that are not script, that is that do not contribute to the representation of words or pauses (punctuation), are included as part of the text of the document.[10] To make it really clear, any indications as to which text might be considered erased or what needs to be included, marks that suggest a change in order or any other meaningful signs on the page, are part of this text of the document. Thus, the phrase the «text of the document» refers to the complete sequence of marks present in the document, independently of whether these represent a complete, meaningful text in itself. That is: the reader sees a sequence of letters, occurring in various places in relation to each other (perhaps between the lines or within the margins) and carrying various markings (perhaps underdottings or strikethroughs).

The text(s) in a document: the variant states of the text

The text of the document, as described above, can be interpreted to mean more than just one variant text. In this way, a single document contains two or more variant states. I have stated elsewhere that:

[9] This agent could be human or machine. For the purposes of the latter the text should have to be encoded to be read. For the purposes of this essay, when I refer to a reading agent, I am talking about a person who both has a high-level understanding of the language of the text and who has reached an adult level of reading comprehension. Such a person, I call a competent reader.

[10] A document can present marks that are the result of accidents (ink splatters, stains) or exposure (dust). These unintentional marks are not part of the text of the document.

The reader understands the marks present in the text of the document as meaningful and constructs one or more specific senses from them. Where more than one sense can be constructed from the text of the document, I refer to these as the «variant states of the text», or as the constructed texts. I deliberately avoid the use of the phrase the «text of the work», as this is a completely different concept that refers specifically to an abstract concept of «the work».[11]

So in the process of interpreting the marks on the document, often without even realizing it, a reader can abstract several variant states of the text from a single document. This act of abstraction, as I explained before, becomes much clearer when one is in the process of transcribing a text. This is due to the difference in nature, as well as in speed, that transcription entails. To synthesize, the text of the document is made up of *the meaningful marks on the page*. The variant states of the text *are extrapolated by an individual* (a reader) who, consciously or unconsciously, makes decisions about how to interpret the text of the document.

What is a work?

While writing on the *Divine Comedy*'s encoding system, I stated that I never used the phrase the «text of the work» because I might only use that concept in reference to the abstract (some might call ideal) concept of the work, a concept linked to ideas expressed, on more than one occasion, by Tanselle.

I owe a great debt to Tanselle's writings and his teaching. However, there are some areas in which I cannot completely agree with him. These points of connection and contrast relate particularly to Tanselle's concept of work, as presented in *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*:

Even the most unsophisticated readers have sometimes decided that a particular formation of letters or sequence of words – apparently meaningless in the language being used or inappropriate in context – is a «typographical error» or a «slip of the pen», and in so doing they have perhaps faced more aesthetic issues than they knew. They were first of all showing that they wished to understand what was intended by someone else... Then they were implicitly claiming that they had been able to locate the real work – the real statement, though not nec-

[11] B. Bordalejo, «The Encoding System», in Prue Shaw, ed., *Dante Alighieri. Commedia. A Digital Edition*, Birmingham and Florence, Scholarly Digital Editions and SISMEL-Edizioni del Galuzzo, 2010.

essarily the real or only meaning – hovering somehow behind the physical text, which had served as an occasionally unreliable, but always indispensable, guide to it. They were also recognizing that what they had recovered (or attempted to recover) was not simply someone's thought but the actual expression of those thoughts – that (whatever we take the relation between thought and language to be) verbal works or statements are thoughts employing particular arrangements of words as their ultimate medium.[12]

This concept is now recognized, whether other scholars are in agreement with it or not, as a classic one in Anglo-American textual criticism, a field in which considering the «work» always leads to the discussion of Tanselle's ideas. These discussions centre on the question of the materiality of the work which the above quotation states is not really material (although material traces are used in its construction), but rather the expression of someone's thoughts. Further, in imagining a correction, one is attempting to recover that expression which only existed before those thoughts were ever put onto paper. It is no wonder that Tanselle has been referred to as an idealist since, despite the clear materiality of the documents and his insistence in highlighting them as the only traces left of the work, the work itself appears not to have any materiality. In this sense, for Tanselle, the work is an abstract concept, an idea.

I tend to agree with Tanselle's definition as I understand it, but I do so with reservations. Tanselle is thinking about what could only be described as authorial works, probably literary and most likely post-Romantic. For most post-Romantic literature, one requires only a relatively small leap, a small act of imagination, to link texts and works, and to recover authorial intention from a multitude of documents. This abundance of drafts, printer's copies, separate magazine publications, proofs, personal diaries, letters, notes, etc, present an ideal environment for the possible restoration of authorial intention (the editorial position generally advocated by Tanselle). In comparison, pre-Romantic texts usually present a much less varied and rich set of documents. It is my experience with pre-Romantic works which makes me feel uncomfortable with Tanselle's definition, not because it invalidates his concept of the work (it doesn't), but because it implies that the concept must be put to use in the recovery of authorial intention; a recovery that is not always feasible with older texts.[13]

[12] G.T. Tanselle, *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989, pp. 14-15.

[13] Although final authorial intention could be applied to any text of any time, it might be more easily carried out with 19th and early 20th centuries text.

Tanselle takes these notions, of work and document even farther to create a clear separation between the concepts of the «text of the work» and the «texts of documents». I have never have had a particular problem with the phrase the «text of the work» when it is used to describe the perfected sequence of words that were meant to be, let us say, *David Copperfield.* I have a problem with the idea of the recoverability of the texts of the work in all circumstances and with the idea that this is an adequate approach to edit pre-Romantic texts. But this is the subject of a different discussion. The most important conclusion that is drawn from the dichotomy is that the text of any document is different from the text of the work, and so, by my own definition, each of the variant states of the text is also different from the text of the work.

A substantial amount of my textual critical research relates to works which are much older than those ordinarily considered by Tanselle. Most of those works are authorial: Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, Boccaccio's *Teseida*. Some, however, like 15th century Castilian *Cancioneros* do not easily fall into that category.[14] It is not that Tanselle's notion of work ceases being effective, but rather that the evidence preserved in the extant documents lets us down and would never allow us to pursue the evasive intentionality which seems to be the final objective of the Tansellian system. In this, I agree with Paul Eggert when he states that:

> Shillingsburg deviates from McLaverty here but follows him (and also Tanselle) on another level when he argues that a work is only implied by physical manifestations of it; it is not identical with any of them. The reader infers the existence of the work and its text (or the versions of it and their texts), perhaps making allowances for any errors believed to be present. This text of the work is a 'Conceptual Text' since it is not materially witnessed: hence the traditional need for editorial action to recover it.[15]

Although, for some texts, the recovery of authorial intention might be possible, desirable or even necessary, the concept of work cannot just be constructed as part of an intentionalist agenda. If it were conceived only in this way, then its use would be very limited.

[14] To a lesser extent, I have explored other textual histories or studied the transmission of texts that not only do not have the benefit of having a single author, but that have developed during the course of many years: Middle Egyptian texts or the text of the Greek New Testament.

[15] P. Eggert, *Securing the Past*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 229.

My background and my understanding of how texts function influence the way in which I understand the work. They force me to phrase the concept of work slightly differently: *the work is a conception in the mind of an author at a particular point in time that serves as a minimal denominator to identify its remaining physical manifestations*. If we take it in parts, «a concept in the mind of the author» is more akin to a general idea than to a series of sentences that form the totality of a novel, a poem or any other kind of text. When I refer to «a particular point in time» I bring in a time dimension (also considered by Eggert), which is very important in understanding that the creative process is not necessarily inspirational and instantaneous, but that it can be the result of years of crafting, molding and reshaping the structure of language. The idea of the «minimal denominator» is essential to my concept, because it is what marks the fact that the function of the work is classificatory in that it allows us to recognize different instances of one thing.

It might be possible to argue that, at some point, the author thought of a sentence and that this was later transcribed onto paper, but such a sentence might have been modified later by the same author (as it can often be seen in authorial drafts). The creative process in literature is not likely to be that an author suddenly conceived an idea that starts with the words «Of man's first disobedience...» and continued in absolute order to «Through Eden took their solitary way». It would be ludicrous to think that an author is just a «transcriber» of his or her own text. Perhaps some of Coleridge's contemporaries believed his account of the creation of «Kubla Khan»; few readers now do.[16]

In my concept, as much as in Tanselle's, the work, or even better, fragments of the work, are something that cannot be found in the realm of the material, not because they are not material, but because their materiality is so sudden and so fleeting that we no longer have them. Traces of the work, evidence of its existence can be found in the documents and the texts they hold, but the work itself is none of these instances while, at the same time, is somehow present in all of them. To some observers, this might appear as «idealism». But in my definition, the function of the concept of work is to permit the recognition of its manifestations in the physical world, the recognition of the texts that are material expres-

[16] Even Edgar Allan Poe took to mocking this notion of creation in his essay «The Philosophy of Composition», first published in 1846. The essay is a fictional account of the process of composition of *The Raven*, which had been published in 1845.

sions of the work. The concept of work, defined as series of phenomena which occurred during fleeting moments in time, helps to build the bridge for that act of imagination that is editing.

The concept of work outlined above has served me very well as a textual critic and an editor. I use it particularly to shape my understanding of textual traditions, to make decisions as to which texts are to be compared with which others and to refer to the works that I am studying. In the world of textual transmission, our acknowledgement of a text being witness to a particular work is what defines whether that text belongs or not to a textual tradition.

The limits of the concept of work

When discussing my own concept of the work as a minimum denominator to establish a text as part of a textual tradition, I stated that I do not agree that one must always attempt in all circumstances to recover the work as the author's concept. For many works, the recovery of authorial intention is so unlikely as to make the task simply unworthy of any effort. In those cases in which the documentary evidence is so scarce, so far removed from the author or authors; one is better off employing the concept of the work as minimum denominator to relate existing documents to one another in an attempt to understand how they relate to each other and how they evolved.

There are many factors that affect an edition, and the concept of work is just one of them. For example, for a critical edition of the *Canterbury Tales*, I would follow new-stemmatic principles, and build a text that is the latest witness of the textual tradition,[17] one that calls attention to places of variation and explains both the relationships between different witnesses and the evolution of the text. In my work for the CantApp, an application for mobile devices, I have a very different objective in mind. The CantApp requires a reading text aimed at the general public,

[17] Peter Shillinsburg in his article «Literary Documents, Texts and Works Represented Digitally», in this collection, makes a similar point when he states that: «First, remember that print scholarly editions always produced new texts: sometimes accurate lexical reiterations of historical texts and sometimes eclectically edited new texts. In either case, the reading text was a new text, not an old one; and it was bolstered or surrounded by historical introductions and an apparatus of textual materials from alternative texts, which among other things attempted to indicate what was new and what was old about the newly produced scholarly edited text.»

but specially to undergraduate students. For the CantApp, I am creating a reading text that enhances the literary experience of the *Tales*. While producing editions such as these, I still hold the notion of the work that I have highlighted above and which has helped me to decide, for example, about canonicity and exclusion in reference to the tales and links that should be part of an edition of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*.

What is an editor?

The document-centered perspective, as championed by Gabler and Elena Pierazzo, in digital editing is so pervasive that it has led some editors to exalt the document as if editing not only begins with the document, but ends with it too.

For Gabler the editor becomes a «facilitator»: that is, a mediator and a guide to the document.[18] Gabler is specifically referring to complex draft materials (as he does in other sections of his article), in which case the use of the word facilitator might appear less dissonant. However, for documents which are easily read by any competent reader, one hardly needs a facilitator. To talk about the editor as a facilitator is to diminish the importance of the work editors do. It is true that editors might make it possible for scholars and non-academics alike to read texts and to understand the complexities of textual transmission, but when an editor presents an edition after working on a text for an extended period of time and analyzing it from different perspectives he or she is really presenting a hypothesis that might be the result of years of research, analysis and reflection. The term facilitator falls short of describing the work that goes into the production even of the simplest type of edition. Although to study texts, particularly with the aid of computers, we might have to transcribe them, the final objective of textual critics is to understand the series of historical phenomena linked to the different variant states of the text, to offer precise accounts of these, and to formulate rational hypotheses to explain them.

[18] H.W. Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition»,: 52. The term «facilitator» is (sadly) repeated by Siemens *et al.* when discussing the so-called social edition, «Toward Modeling the *Social* Edition», *LLC,* 27 (2012), p. 453.

Editing texts in the digital age

Many commentators on digital editions have asserted that scholarly editions in the digital medium are fundamentally different from those of the print age. Elena Pierazzo states:

> It is the argument of this article that editions as we know them from print culture are substantially different from the ones we find in a digital medium.[19]

I argue that indeed we will see fundamentally different editions in the digital age. However, they will not be different from print editions for the reasons given by Pierazzo. According to her (and also Kiernan and Gabler), digital editions are different in their exclusive focus on the documents, while leaving aside the production of edited texts.[20] The digital medium has enabled this shift of focus, by breaking down the space restrictions usually linked to the production of printed editions. However we have had facsimile editions, often with transcriptions (sometimes, very elaborate) beside images, since the mid-nineteenth century. Nothing new here. The other areas which Pierazzo identifies as unique to the digital medium are the use of complex computer encoding, particularly using the TEI Guidelines, and the ability to record multiple phenomena (names, locations within the page, intricate transcriptions) within the one transcription. All this before concluding:

> Printed and digital editions may have the same function, namely to make a given text available to an audience, but the way they have to be prepared, the kind of questions the editor needs to answer, and ultimately their very natures are substantially, if not ontologically, different.[21]

Here Pierazzo confuses digital humanities questions with textual critical issues. Processing texts using digital methods requires a different preparation of the material because they need to be coded to be used with computers. This is true whether the final result is a digital edition or a printed edition. The questions that Pierazzo poses and that an editor

[19] Pierazzo, «A Rationale of Digital Documentary Editions», p. 463.

[20] K. Kiernan, «Digital facsimiles in Editing», in L. Burnard, K. O'Brien O'Keeffe and J. Unsworth, eds., *Electronic Textual Editing*, New York, Modern Language Association of America, 2006.

[21] Pierazzo, «A Rationale of Digital Documentary Editions», p. 475.

needs to answer have to do with the use of computers as tools to produce the edition. Again, this is true whether the final edition gets printed or published digitally. Textual scholars have always recorded fine detail, within transcriptions, in introductions, notes, tables and indices. One may argue that the TEI system allows these to be done more efficiently; but an increase of efficiency is not a revolution.

Daniel O'Donnell, in private conversation, has stated how puzzling he finds the lack of discussion of Digital Humanities subjects at the conference of the Society for Textual Scholarship. This should not be surprising. When Tanselle states that printed and digital editions «are not ontologically different» and that «their conceptual status of the text in each case is identical»,[22] he is right: the subject has not been changed by the methods we are using for our research. Even among textual scholars who are very involved in the production of digital editions, the subjects of discussion within the field are very much the same as they have always been: either theoretical (as this article and the ones that accompany in this special section) or practical (relating to the difficulties presented by particular texts, documents and authors). Textual scholars continue to use more or less the same methodologies and approaches that they had in the past. The main difference is how much easier some of those tasks have become. If we think, for example, about collation and the classification of variants, both activities can be carried out faster and with greater efficiency thanks to the computer but, as activities, they are not fundamentally different from those carried out before the digital era. This is not to say that nothing is different and although from a theoretical perspective we continue to face the same issues, there is one aspect of our work that is changing due to the use of computers: the status of copyright. For digital editions, and indeed all digital work, to continue and thrive, we need to encourage new forms of licensing that leave behind the nineteenth century notions of copyright and authorship. All editorial work (but also non-editorial work), should be licensed under the creative commons Attribution 3.0 unported.[23] This is the single difference, and a fundamental difference, between digital editions and its printed counterparts. The former

[22] G.T. Tanselle, «Foreword» in Burnard, O'Brien O'Keeffe, Unsworth, eds., *Electronic Textual Editing*, p. 6.

[23] Or a version that supersedes this one in the future. Notice that this license does not have a commercial restriction, a very important feature in a world where both site advertisement (a single commercial add in an otherwise free site could bring about legal action if there is a non-commercial restriction in place) and lawyers abound.

require the freedom that creative commons grants: freedom to reuse, to modify, to upcycle.[24]

Conclusions

There is no doubt that texts can change over time and that they indeed change. Our notion of what relates them to a historical event or series of events is informed by the concept of the work as presented in this article. It is possible to create a wider ranging concept, one that would encompass the work and its manifestations in physical form, and would be closer to Eggert's definition of the work as a «regulative idea», but which cannot be completely equated with my own concept of work.

This paper started with the statement that the process of editing a text is, in the first instance, an act of imagination. It is an act of imagination because we need to bridge the gap between the words that we see physically marked on the surface of the material document and our idea of the work as conceived by one or many authors who wanted to convey a set of ideas at a particular point in time. The act of imagination occurs when we leap from the text we see to the work we imagine, when, after researching and carefully considering our options, we choose one among a multitude of variant readings to be included as part of the text we are about to present. G. Thomas Tanselle would say that we use our critical judgment to achieve this decision and truly some editors do exactly this. But the act that takes us from one to the other, from the variant readings to the edited text, is as much the result of careful thought as it is the result of an instinct trained by years of study: it is a leap of imagination.

Peter Shillingsburg

Literary Documents, Texts, and Works Represented Digitally

The advent of digital technologies for preservation and dissemination of texts has complicated rather than revolutionized textual scholarship on literary texts. Disputes about methods and goals for scholarly textual studies in the fields of bibliography, textual criticism, and scholarly

[24] «Upcycling» refers to the action of repurposing something, that might have been worthless before, to create a new item with a new and unforeseen value.

editing have been the subject of continued debate and development for centuries and have been particularly productive in the last century, producing a range of competing schools of thought, such as, rationales for the selection of copy-texts and development of emendation policies, or for Historical-Critical methods for establishing print surrogates for scattered manuscript and print archives, or for genetic studies and genetic editions. Given the liveliness of this history of dispute, it is not surprising that computerized methods are not so much new as they are more convenient. Perhaps that understates the case in the same way that it is an understatement to say that taking a train from London to Edinburgh is more convenient than walking. While amenities are greater, the destination is the same: a clear understanding of relationships among the texts of surviving documents. There have been at least four significantly new waves in methods and tools for digital expressions of textual studies, and yet, there is no consensus about basic principles for creating digital archives and editions.[1] In TEI/XML we have currently broadly subscribed encoding schemes for scholarly presentation of text transcriptions, but a survey of scholarly textual projects shows that, for the most part, both the tools used for development and the designs of interfaces are either weakly generic or project specific. This is to be expected in this incunabular period of digital humanities. The focus here is on how scholarly principles from pre-digital textual studies can be translated into practical principles for developing tools and environments for digital scholarly editions. The aim is to suggest some points of beginning and to see if consensus on broad principles of practical development can be approached.

I. Context: Histories

The context for examining the current state of scholarly editing *vis-à-vis* developments in digital archiving and editing can be laid out in a potted history of the controversies about how to do scholarly editing.

First, remember that print scholarly editions always produced new texts: sometimes accurate lexical reiterations of historical texts and sometimes eclectically edited new texts. In either case, the reading text

[1] Waves cannot be firmly categorized, but using computers to prepare print editions, issuing digital projects on CDs, developing monolithic proprietary electronic tools like Dynatext (now dead) and Anastasia (now open source), and mounting first generation web-based archives might be said to constitute four waves.

was a new text, not an old one; and it was bolstered or surrounded by historical introductions and an apparatus of textual materials from alternative texts, which among other things attempted to indicate what was new and what was old about the newly produced scholarly edited text. Always the print scholarly edition text involved resetting type, producing a new configuration of inked words on new paper in newly designed covers, a new object constructed for the purpose of giving readers a sophisticated guided tour of the history of the text and a chance to read either an important historical lexical text or a new text constructed from the surviving textual evidence – a new text thought to be optimal in some way.

In America, the third quarter of the twentieth century was dominated by Fredson Bowers's recommendations for eclectic scholarly editions, but, in the early 1970s Donald Pizer and James Thorpe separately initiated arguments against eclectic editing: Pizer, reacting specifically against new editions of Stephen Crane's *Red Badge of Courage* and Theodore Dreiser's *Sister Carrie*, objected that readers were already invested in the historical texts, which the new editions disrupted by restoring cancelled manuscript readings; Thorpe argued that in many cases authors were grateful for what had been done to their texts.[2] Thorpe's ideas were enlarged in the 1980s by Jerome McGann's social theory of text production and his application to editing principles of Donald F. McKenzie's re-examination of bibliography as a sociology of texts.[3] It is interesting to note that McGann's social theory was about the collaborative nature of production for each historical physical edition of a work and actually has NO consequence to scholarly editing other than to show that editing of any kind fails to preserve or recreate the evidence of historical social collaborative production histories, and, rather, produces a new social production event. And it is further interesting to note that McKenzie's sociology to texts was not an editorial argument, but rather a bibliographical one for broadening the purview of historical bibliography. That McKenzie's argument was about bibliography and the history of books and not about

[2] D. Pizer, «Review of the Pennsylvania Sister Carrie» in *American Literature*, 53 (1982), pp 31-37; «Self-Censorship and Textual Editing», in J.J. McGann, ed., *Textual Criticism and Literary Interpretation*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985, pp. 144-61; and J. Thorpe, *Principles of Textual Criticism*, San Marino, Huntington Library, 1972.

[3] J. McGann, particularly in *A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983, but also in other writings such as *The Textual Condition*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991; and D.F. McKenzie, *Bibliography and the Sociology of Text* (Panizzi Lectures, 1985), London, British Library, 1986 (reviewed by McGann in *Theories of the Text*, *London Review of Books* 18 February 1988, pp. 20-21.

editing is borne out by his edition of the Works of Congreve, which is based on an early text and emended eclectically according to McKenzie's views of what Congreve wanted his texts to be, in spite of what the social collaboration and the bibliographical sociology of text production had given him in the printed form of his early editions.[4]

Although I think that McGann and McKenzie's social and sociological insights have been misapplied to editing, they have a bearing on how one (re)presents a historical text in facsimile and how one writes introductions and historical notes, because arguments against eclectic editing apply to any textual investigation designed to provide accurate accounts of historical documents.[5] That includes digital virtual archives and the Historical-Critical school of «editing» refined in Germany. Editing is in scare-quotes because the German objection to eclectic editing is based on the confusion caused by what logicians call the «undistributed middle term» – in this case «editing». Historical-Critical editing is about compressing the data of historical bibliography for a particular work into the space between the covers of a single book. The aim is archival – encrypted archives – providing access to information about the historical documents. With two small caveats, the resulting text is not «edited» but merely «reiterated» as an anchor for an archive of documents compressed in an apparatus.[6] The Historical-Critical edition is designed to stand in the place of the whole scattered collections/archives for a given work for the benefit of future editors of reading editions who can base their scholar/student editions on all the evidence without having to redo the work represented by the Historical-Critical edition. Few Anglo-American scholarly editions had that kind of work in mind

[4] D.F. McKenzie, ed., *The Works of William Congreve*, 3 vols., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.

[5] McGann has argued eloquently to the contrary (see footnote 3), but the lynchpin of his application of social theory to scholarly editing – that emendation to restore authorial forms violates the production realities of the social authority of historical book production – entails, I think, flawed logic; for a photo-facsimile edition with no emendations also violates those realities. Every new edition, regardless of how faithful to one's notion of history, results in a completely new social production, not the preservation or even the reiteration of an old one. His insight applies to book production, not to editing literary texts.

[6] The two caveats relate to the word «Critical»: editors of this school can correct demonstrable errors or draw attention to them in notes; and, there is a considerable amount of critical analysis involved in preparing the apparatus which not only records the differences among authoritative documents but provides explanations and reveals significance of the documentary record.

when «editing». Perhaps the Cornell Yeats and Cornell Wordsworth editions, focusing on getting the manuscript texts transcribed and placed in the context of early print editions were archival in this sense.[7] In fact, when the Cornell Yeats edition was first submitted to the Modern Language Association's Committee on Scholarly Editions (CSE) for its seal of approval, it was reluctantly rejected on the grounds that it was not, essentially, an edition. Instead it was considered to be unedited archival work, very much worth doing, but not under the aegis of the CSE, which was about editions.[8]

The line between archival editions and scholarly editions was beginning to blur in America by the 1980s, in part because of the rising argument about «process v. product» in scholarly editing, in part because of a new fascination with multiple texts, each understood as a production process developed for specific purposes, and in part because of the attacks on eclectic editions mounted most effectively by Jerome McGann. Blurring of terms has never, in my opinion, been useful as scholarship, though it is very effective in persuasion. In this case, the scholarly *archival* aim of representing the history of documentary evidence for the texts of a work is opposed to the scholarly *editorial* aim of sifting through the surviving documentary evidence in an effort to determine what the text or texts of the work should have been or were meant to be in spite of the errors and interferences of well-meaning but often careless or incompetent production staff members, from secretaries, copy-editors, compositors, censors, and even by authors.[9] Edit-

[7] *Cornell Wordsworth*, 16 vols., gen. ed., S. Parrish; *Cornell Yeats*, 30 vols., gen. eds. Ph.L. Marcus, J.C.C. Mays, S. Parrish, A. Saddlemyer, and J. Stallworthy.

[8] At the time I was coordinator of the CSE and recollect the discussion in committee.

[9] It is often difficult in essays on textual studies to speak precisely because terms such as document, text, and work are used interchangeably; I use document to mean a physical object upon which text is inscribed; I use the word text to refer to the series of symbols inscribed in a document or held in memory; and the word work I use in two ways: first, as the conceptual uptake or aesthetic object implied variously by each of the documentary texts that reasonably belongs under the same title and is a copy or version of the literary entity known by that title; second, work is a categorical noun, useful in aggregating the disparate texts that seem to represent the same literary entity. In addition, work is an active verb word suggesting that each engagement with one or all the texts categorized as members of that entity is labor of some kind, either of authoring, reproducing, or reading. Editing, traditionally, focuses on the work in relation to documentary texts thought to be «authoritative» – which sometimes means «authorial». In short, the word work, as I use tends to unite the conceptual or mentally functional experience of literature with the naming of the group of documents that represent that literary entity. I return to this subject in section III, below.

ing, traditionally, focuses on the work in relation to documentary texts thought to be «authoritative» – which sometimes means «authorial». That is, it tends to omit from focus the appropriations and adaptations of text created by persons considered to be unauthoritative.

So, if the archival impulse is to reiterate texts and the editorial impulse is to fix texts, then it seems fruitless for an archival editor to blame a scholarly editor for misrepresenting the documents by emending; and it seems equally fruitless of a scholarly editor to blame an archival editor for stopping with «mere reproduction» before the hard work of actual editing is undertaken.[10] They are talking about two different things, each using the same word, «editing», to mean a different thing.[11]

The development of digital editions (as opposed to editions that were developed using electronic means but published in print), beginning in the 1990s, notably with the Blake archive, made it possible to think more in terms of surrogate textual archives rather than encrypted archives in print or newly edited texts, though, of course, editors everywhere continued to work as of old, using the same term, editing, to apply to whatever it was they were doing.[12] The digital surrogate archive of historical texts is a triumphant extension of the archival impulse in editing. Its potential to advance eclectic editing has not yet been sufficiently explored or discussed. Archives are always historical and should be accurate as representatives of the texts found in historical documents. Editions, on the other hand, give new life in new forms to texts of works from the past.

[10] The happy phrases «archival impulse» as opposed to «editorial impulse» are Paul Eggert's, recently used in conference papers, and of course taken up immediately because they articulate what now to me seems so obvious.

[11] Whether or not «editing the work» as opposed to «archiving the documents» is worth doing remains a question which many textual scholars have already decided in favor of archiving documents. Editing, in the sense used here, is occasionally denigrated as the result of one editor's opinion about the evidence in the document, or as critical thinking, not hard research. And there are other dismissive arguments designed to put down the notion of fulfilling the intentions of author or the potential of works, thus creating «neither fish nor foul» or «something never before seen on land or sea». That is name-calling, not argument. For the nonce, I will assume that if one edits the work, the aim and methods will have to be different from those adopted by those whose aim is to «reiterate» documents in a virtual archive.

[12] The Blake Archive, like the Rossetti Archive and the Whitman Archive might, as Kenneth Price suggested at a recent conference, be more accurately called Collections, but their aim is archival in the sense that they gather and present virtual images and transcriptions of historical documents. They are not «editions» in the sense of sifting the historical evidence in an attempt to edit the work as it should have been or as it was intended by its author to be.

Editorial goals, as indicated, are different from archival ones, but in digital environments they can live side by side in the same project without being confused with one another.

Third, early digital scholarly editions may frequently have used the word archive in their names, but, partly because of the way in which social textual editing had co-opted McKenzie's sociology of texts, developers of so-called digital archives seemed to compete with scholarly print editions – as if a digital *archive* could replace a scholarly *edition*. The upstart digital editions/archives had to be as good or better than established print editions and, so, the digital took over several characteristics of the print scholarly edition, even as it added certain important and obvious new characteristics such as search ability, manipulability, and wide access, to say nothing of hypertextuality or intra- and inter-textual linking. Among the print characteristics that remained, however, was the complete new «resetting of type» – an anachronistic way of saying digital text transcriptions are always new texts in a new environment with a new configuration of relationships between text and medium of display. The historical and textual introductions remained more or less the same as they had been in print, and the apparatus had the same goal of presenting the history of textual change, though opportunities for new display designs did begin to appear as pop-up windows, parallel text displays (not totally unknown in print), and hot links.

In short, in its beginnings, digital scholarly editing involved developing a system for displaying both a newly «typeset» text and a history of textual variation. Until about halfway through the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, digital archives relied almost entirely on transcriptions of texts. Though unfortunate, this was understandable, first because the advantages of electronic editions (search, manipulation, distribution, text analysis, etc.) required transcriptions, and second because digital image files were too big, too slow, and too expensive for the equipment then available. In view of the need to represent historical texts primarily through transcription, and because transcriptions required encoding for every aspect of text that could not be recorded by a single keystroke on the qwerty keyboard, encoding was invented.[13] TEI uses encoding for the same purpose, though its particulars were

[13] I am grateful to Desmond Schmidt for providing two references to the early history of encoding: W. Ott, «A Text Processing System for the Preparation of Critical Editions», *Computers and the Humanities*, 13, (1979), pp. 29-35; and, G. Silva and C. Bellamy, *Some Procedures and Programs for Processing Language Data*, Monash University 1969, p.5.

designed for scholarly uses in order to offer some hope that scholarly work on digital texts had a good chance of migrating from aging operating systems and/or digital platforms to new ones, and the hope that standardization would lead to easy interchange of data among different projects. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, image files became faster and cheaper, and storage space and upload times ceased to be significant issues. Images offer a more reliable representation (accuracy of both text and appearance) of historical documents than can any quasi-facsimile transcription, and so, a significant shift is taking place in our understanding of what is required in transcriptions – are they essential representations of the work? or are they merely conveniences for computer-assisted text analysis?

For print editions before the web, I advocated strongly for *eclectic* editions because, producing new typesettings of texts readily available in historical editions did not seem worth the time or ammo. Diplomatic transcriptions of manuscripts were worth doing – and still are –because manuscripts can be difficult to read. In addition, unless the social, industrial, and market dynamics of book history is investigated, textual histories might not be understood at all, might in fact be misunderstood, or might be turned into a narrow or even biased narrative. Donald F. McKenzie deserves a great deal of credit for opening our eyes to the value of a broader perspective, but I have never fully understood why some editors and theorists, seem to wish to «edit» in a way that could perhaps be done more effectively by a photocopier or scanner. McGann and Speed Hill both declared eclectic editing to be dead as a dodo, advocating in its place the reproduction of historical texts, justified as the results of a historical social dynamic of production.[14] To some it appeared that Americans had finally begun to see also the value of Historical-Critical principles in order to eliminate the fallible editorial critical judgment of individual editors from the serious business of recording the history of texts. Nevertheless, the new socially and historically responsible editors, in both print and digital form, by resetting type and encoding aspects of texts, destroyed the historical authenticity they were striving to preserve. The objects of social theory could only be seen by looking at an original or possibly at a good photo-reproduction of an original. And what was being encoded in transcriptions could also be better seen and understood by examining an image if not an original.

[14] McGann quoted by Speed Hill in a review of Dave Oliphant and Robin Bradford's *New Directions in Textual Studies* (1990), *TEXT*, 6 (1994), pp. 370-81.

In my potted history, then, the next step in digital scholarly editing was the wholesale introduction of images of historical texts, particularly high-definition images of manuscripts, formerly offered only in samples. But we have reached an age when full high-definition color images of every page in a book, including the blank ones, is not only possible but becoming ordinary. Important as it may be to raise the social democratizing question of how the poor in developing countries are going to benefit from capabilities that require equipment they do not have, a great deal of the thinking that initially guided digital scholarly editing requires rethinking in light of advanced digital capabilities.

As a textual scholar, author of *Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age*, which I typeset using Donald Knuth's TeX typesetting programs (in plain tex form, for those restricted to AMS macro-packages and LaTeX), and author of *From Gutenberg to Google: Electronic Representations of Literary Texts*, and editor of ten volumes of a scholarly edition of the Works of W.M. Thackeray, all but one of which I constructed and typeset myself using computers, I can say with all honesty that I have never been interested in technology or in computers or in programming or in TEI *for their own sake*. That is to say, I would not have lifted a finger to find out about these things apart from what they could do for me as a textual scholar, investigating the history of texts and representing the fruits of scholarship so that other textual and literary critics could share in my discoveries. I represent the world of textual scholarship that finds analytical and descriptive bibliography and editorial theory, from the archive through the eclectic edition and the social edition and genetic textual aids, sufficiently complex that I do not want the added responsibility of learning a new technology which itself is still finding it way toward robust solutions to the digitization of physical manuscripts and print objects.

Nevertheless, for development of tools, methods, designs and capabilities for digital archives and digital editions to be sophisticated, durable, and worthy of the advanced scholarship of textual investigation and representation, they must be undertaken in cognizance of the complexity of the textual condition. My best attempt to understand that complexity is expressed in an essay entitled «Text as Matter Concept and Action» which surveyed the rationales for various ways of understanding the relationships between documents (physical), textual (symbolic), and experienced (conceptual) forms of literary works.[15] The variety of

[15] Originally published in *Studies in Bibliography*, 44 (1991), pp. 31-82; rev. in Ch. 3 of *Resisting Texts*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996.

ways to conceive those relationships is complicated by the variety of roles adopted by persons handling and experiencing and processing literary works in these forms: authoring, producing, editing, distributing, reading, reviewing, criticizing. Hence the waste of breath in so many disputes where the same words are used to mean different things. And now we face the added complexity of digital forms, for which there is a strong temptation to find a simple correlation between the ease of using digitized texts and the apparent simplicity of texts themselves. No, that which you see on the screen is not the work itself; it isn't even the 1842 or 1927 edition of the work; it is a representation, subject to both error and reconfiguration, such that allowances and adjustments must be made by the scholar using the digital form to generate insights into what historically was physical in documents, symbolic in texts, and conceptual in the uptake of every reader from the author forward. These observations are so basic and obvious as to seem unnecessary to be stated.

The distinction between archival and editorial impulses[16] and the fact that textual scholarship in the digital age has, so far, adopted the surrogate archive, not the scholarly edition, as its lodestar, has created a new light to shine on our activities, if not exactly the light that Germans, like Bodo Plachta, as proponent of Historical-Critical Editing, wanted Americans to see.[17] Digital textual scholarship is not like print textual scholarship in ways that probably everyone knows but which can escape notice.

II. Context: Disciplines

Two further contextual issues should be taken up: first, the relation between digital and textual humanities (i.e., between technical digital implementation and textual scholarship), particularly in the area of tool development; and, second, questions about the desirability, methods, and place of editions, defined as the results of *textual criticism and editorial scholarship* to present an edited text of the work, as opposed to the

[16] It has been argued that there is no clear line distinguishing these impulses because even the most basic «literal» transcription involves critical interpretation and transfiguration from the specifics of analogue physical originals (especially manuscripts) to digital forms. The purpose for each impulse is different, even if at their foundation there is overlap.

[17] B. Plachta, «In Between the 'Royal Way' of Philology and 'Occult Science': Some Remarks About German Discussion on Text Constitution in the Last Ten Years», *TEXT*, 12 (1999), pp. 31-47.

results of *bibliographical, collecting, and representational scholarship* to present virtual surrogates for the archival record of documents.

First, digitally, we can do what we could not afford to do in print: we can build a full-text virtual archive – a surrogate for physical archives – a collection of documents normally residing at a collection point like a rare-books room or other building, or, more often, in several buildings around the world. Digital archives can be comprehensive, but, by virtue of being digital, they are restricted to images and transcriptions, both of which are copies, not the original things. Digital archives lack the third dimension, weight, texture and physical substance of the originals, but still, they are visually palpable and capture a simulacrum of originality that does not depend on the individual critical judgment of those who create the digital project. Furthermore, digitally, we can create what is very difficult to create physically – to wit, a complete archive collected in one virtual place and available virtually everywhere, even though (pleasant paradox) some of its items are unique.

Print textual scholarship relies on a complete bibliography and, usually, extensive travel; digital textual scholarship requires the same bibliography, but dispenses with the travel. Researchers will not always be content with digital images, but with a digital archive they need no longer despair of ever seeing at least a good simulacrum of the one copy of some rare or unique document listed in the bibliography. Textual scholars already know that multiple copies of the same edition can differ. Therefore, as virtual archiving grows, we can anticipate having images of multiple copies of every edition (assuming the physical copies survive). In preparation for that day we need E-Hinman programs to compare digital images; there are a few already under construction.[18]

Although digital images represent the texts and appearance of originals faithfully, they do not do so comprehensively. They fail to represent weight, texture, substance and smell, of course, but we expect digital editions to be searchable, malleable, collatable, quotable, analyzable, which images alone do not allow. For these functions we need transcriptions, and if transcriptions are to be fully expressive, they must be encoded – that is what TEI is for. Furthermore, particularly in the case of manuscript materials, many of us need help to read the originals, and

[18] The one I know best was developed (not yet launched) by Nicholas Hayward for the HRIT project at Loyola Univ. I have also seen the prototype developed for the Edmund Spencer edition. I have heard about adaptations of photoshop for the purpose, but have no experience with them.

we thank editors for transcriptions. But, really, transcriptions are, therefore, just a convenience, just an aid to our reading and investigation of texts as found in original documents. The transcription cannot stand in place of the originals. Nor does an analysis (by whatever means) of a transcription count as reliable until its results are checked against originals (or good reproductions). Every textual critic wants to see originals – or at least images of them. Imagine, as I've said elsewhere, going to the Newberry Library or the Berg Collection and asking to see a manuscript and being offered instead a transcription. No thanks. The first duty of a digital archive is to be a faithful iconic representation of the original. And for that one needs images. The second duty is to make the original legible and otherwise useable, for which one needs a transcription. But only an accurate one will do.

The theoretical foundation of digital archives has nothing to do with a sociology of texts or a social / democratic value for communally constructed historical artifacts. The theoretical foundation of digital archives, intended to be used as surrogates for the originals, is that, for convenience – particularly the convenience of world-wide accessibility – the digital archive stands in temporarily for the physical evidence, answering as many questions as the medium can support, i.e., questions that a textual critic might want to ask of the original documents. To reach that standard, accuracy of representation, not adequacy of editorial theory, is required. Digital archives will always fail to achieve complete representation perfectly, but it will not be because their compilers failed to understand the right editorial ideology to follow. It will be because even digital images do not capture all the evidence of the originals, and it might be because a compiler failed to see that accuracy is the only guarantee of evidence. Nevertheless, digital archives can support a tremendous amount of research, leaving visits to original documents for double checking results of more convenient work online.

What do I, as a textual critic, want in order to conduct the business of building a digital archive? As a textual critic, a bibliographer, and a book historian, I can say what I do not want: I do not want to learn to write computer programs, I do not want to learn TEI encoding, I do not want to learn how to judge the relative merits of various content management systems, and I do not want to spend my time combing the newest gadgets and apps to see what is happening out there. I want tools that will enable me to mount a digital archive of images of texts (combining high resolution with quick download times), each with an accurate transcription designed to aid in the reading and searching and analysis

of that text, and ways to generate collations of images and collations of transcriptions which will render the results in texts that look just like their printed originals, with italics and special characters in place, not codes for the same. As a textual critic I already know everything I need to know about what to include in a transcription. I do not need TEI to teach me textual criticism or paleography or transcription. TEI learns from textual scholars what needs to be included. Textual scholarship is NOT more important than digital scholarship; they are different. Textual scholarship offers challenges that push digital scholarship into new areas of investigation. Digital investigation of capabilities is exciting and important, but not my area of primary interest. Now I hope digital scholarship makes tools that «speak humanists' language». It seems a bit draconian – or perhaps just nearsighted – for digital humanists and computer scientists to think that for textual humanists to take advantage of digital capabilities they need to learn the language of computer science. To think that or to think for a nanosecond that textual critics learn how to transcribe texts by learning TEI means that digital capabilities will be (actually, currently are) restricted to a small audience, which, to join, one must pass rites of passage.

Textual scholars need digital tools that use the language of textual criticism. We are not there yet, perhaps by a long shot. But making digital humanists out of textual scholars is not a long-term answer. No one is asking digital humanities to make textual criticism easier or automatic. Textual criticism is difficult and complex all by itself. Thank god for computer scientists and digital humanists who have broadened our expectations of ourselves about what we can learn about texts and about how to represent archives and editions. But it is not enough to show these possibilities and then tantalizing non-DH humanists by insisting that the intricacies of TEI and XML must be learned first. Where would the world of word processing be if its tool developers had insisted on similar barriers to intuitive use?

My goals are in textual studies (bibliography, textual criticism, scholarly editing, and book history) not in those other fields (computer science, programming, coding). And yet, those fields are the (still) emerging disciplines that explore the potential of the new media that textual criticism stands to benefit from. And so, the nature of tools, the methods of transcription, the possibilities for file storage, data mining, and options for display of textual materials are the main subject on our minds. Many who have gone before have provided partial answers, tools and designs that begin to fulfil the promise of the digital archive. The scholarship

that goes into collecting, describing, analyzing or introducing materials is very much the same whether for print or digital projects. But developing a digital textual site is not yet in the grasp of humanist textual scholars because the tools are not there for them. Having demonstrated that sophisticated, complex digital archives and editions are possible was a giant first step (journey, really). The tools that are now needed are those a textual scholar can use to develop digital sites designed for the study of texts – the user-friendly tools to be offered to developers and users of the sites. What is the content management system? and Which are the tools that will help the textual (not digital) humanist to populate the framework with textual content? Where are the tools that will spit out the collation of transcriptions so that they can be checked against the originals to identify false variants resulting from transcription errors? Where are the tools for importing and exporting text? for mapping transcriptions of texts onto the images of documents they derive from? Where is the encoding editor that speaks my language and that does NOT embed analytical and annotational markup in transcription files that should be text and the minimal markup required to overcome the deficiencies of qwerty keyboards? That is what, as a textual critic, I want to know about the digital.

Others, who are interested in the digital for its own sake – and thank god there are such folk, for we need them – can spend their time exploring general capabilities in that world. This attitude of mine causes a valued colleague, who is really my DH conscience, to call me a Luddite. But my focus of interest is on texts as documents first, on texts as works second, on humanistic engagements with works as texts and as documents third, on the fascinating options and capabilities of digital media to enhance those first three interests next. And last, if at all, I am interested in understanding coding, programming, interfaces, storage, interoperability, and file migration. Without computer scientists and digital humanists textual scholars will never have robust, user-friendly digital archives or digital edition development tool-sets. But its time to stop being nice to people who think one is not a scholar worth his salt if he/she does not learn TEI. We are willing to learn things that make our desires real. We have all learned more than we want to know about technical aspects of computing for that reason. Every minute spent learning «that stuff» is a minute taken away from reading, weighing, comparing and understanding the texts of works.

My second remaining contextual issue (the first being the relation between digital and textual humanist interests and skills), concerns the desirability of editorial intervention in creating new texts, including

eclectic texts, as opposed to the presentation of virtual surrogates for the archival record of documents. This essay is not the place to present an apologia for editing as opposed to archiving or reiterating historical texts. But there are some points to make, assuming that such editing is chosen as a task in a textual digital project. The first is that bibliographical investigations and archival representations are necessarily preliminary to any effort to edit; hence, edited digital texts are additions to digital archives, not substitutes for them. Secondly, therefore, an edited text (or even several differently edited texts) of a work should be labelled as such, with emendation rationales and methods explained, and emendations scrupulously recorded – just as in print scholarly editions. And third, it is pointless to rail against such editorial activities as if they were inherently unscholarly or tainted by whimsy. All scholarship is potentially tainted by whimsy, which does not mean all scholarship is so tainted. The principles for choosing copy-texts and emending them can be very disciplined and impersonal – to the extent that any critical activity can be. Drawing inferences about that which cannot be seen is a fundamental scientific and logical activity. There is no reason to restrict editors to that which can be proven directly when there is ample evidence from which to draw inferences. Scholars take responsibility for their work just as much as they take credit for their accomplishments. Both the archival and editorial impulses are achieved through careful application of thought and methods. They are two different things; not a right and wrong way to do the same thing. None of it is absolute.

III. Works, Editions, and Digital Representations

Much of the discussion in archival and editorial theory has been about how to focus the labour on the objects appropriate to the work. In Historical-Critical editorial theory, the distinction used by Gunter Martens, Hans Zeller and others between the text as document and the text of the aesthetic object was not only a fine distinction, it severed the aesthetic object from editorial and archival attention.[19] Admitting that as humans/humanists we are driven primarily by our interest in the aesthetic object, they insisted, nevertheless, that the editor/archivist role was

[19] Essays by Marten, Zeller and others collected in H.W. Gabler, G.Bornstein, and G.B. Peirce, eds., *Contemporary German Editorial Theory*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995.

with documents, their histories, and their relationships. The focus was to be on the evidence, not on the experience of the evidence, which would be personal to the editor, not verifiable scholarship. The aesthetic object was the uptake from the documentary and contextual evidence that a reader invoked in order to read and understand and experience the work. Therefore, the task at hand was NOT to edit a *work* but to edit its *documents* – to curate the evidence for works.

Print media in fact forced editors to ignore this fine distinction and, for many, to deny that they were ignoring it; for transcribing and composing text required translation from one medium to another (manuscript to print), which cannot be done without uptake, without an attempt to understand what one is transcribing or composing. Digital archives and editions do not help editors to avoid invoking the aesthetic object – that which they believe the documentary text to be «saying». And yet, it remains the goal of the archivist to purge this individual participation in the archive from the archive.

But if the work, thus understood, is always the result of an individual (any individual) sentient being's efforts to transform a lump of paper and ink into a conceptual, and indeed often, emotional artistic experience, how can such purging take place? and why should such purging take place? and if it should take place, why are we happy to have authors but not others continue to exercise their participatory role in revising a work? McGann made the case for allowing the original production personnel to be involved, but drew the line (with some allowances) at the death of the author. On what grounds must it stop there?

If one accepted that the archivist/editor's goal was to curate the evidence and not to allow critical, interpretational thoughts to interfere with that activity, there remains the problem that, strictly speaking that goal is impossible. Evidence is evidence; once reproduced it stands only as a witness to the real thing. But if one accepts that archival and editorial representations of evidence are, nevertheless, worthy actions, where does one legitimately draw the line between representation and interpretation?

Add to that problem the fact that, as works wend their way through new editions over time, the ways in which individuals (re)construct the aesthetic object, which for each person IS the work, change. Even if the text of the work were stable through time, which it is not, the uptake changes and, therefore, the conceptual work becomes different. It matters not what any archivist or editor thinks should be the case. The case is that what readers take the work to be changes even when the texts stay the same – which of course they seldom do.

Hence, new editions, whether print or digital, are new; new documents, new texts, new contexts, new readers, and, therefore, new aesthetic objects which could not have been created in the minds of readers of a previous age or place. Does the scholarly editor, re-creating the work for modern audiences, have any responsibility toward this developing, evolving notion of the work? Should the editor allow such considerations to alter the text itself? Should the editor try to surround the reconstruction of the author's or otherwise historical text with metadata and critical and historical annotations that will encourage (or prevent) modern reactions to the work? How can editors incorporate the facts of an evolving notion of the aesthetic object(s) supportable by the historical evidence?

I tend to side with Gunter Martens – the focus of editing is the text of the historical documents. I go one step further and say editors have a right, if not obligation, to seek to emend the documentary texts to fulfil what logical and scientific inference leads them to believe the text was meant to be according to some well-articulated notion of authority for text. To take that step is to admit that the aesthetic object entertained by the author, editor, and compositors of historical editions can be inferred from the record of variation found in those documents. I hold that position without believing that two editors could, would, or should edit the same way. The digital archive has room for critically edited texts as well as historical ones. Of course the history of evolving reader reactions to the aesthetic objects they have variously extracted from the textual evidence may also be of interest both to modern editors and modern readers, but the effect that such reader responses have had on subsequent editions is not the concern of the archivist and scholarly editors of the texts of the work. That history of reading is the province of book historians and analysts of the history of critical responses to the work. I would define the term «work» in two ways: first, as a category into which we place all texts that appear to be versions of the same artistic unit, including all editions and printings regardless of accuracy or authority. And, second, «work» is conceptually that which is implied by the authoritative texts. The second definition leaves open the question of what is meant by authoritative, but each archivist or editor has to articulate that meaning in order to limit the range of documents to be collected or represented. These definitions leave out the idea that the word «work» is a good one to use when referring the range of aesthetic objects extracted from physical texts. If that idea were to be included, it would seem to suggest that the scholarly editor could or should take the

history of a work's uptake as an element that constitutes what the work is. That would have (to me unattractive) editorial implications for the text. Study of the history of such experiences is, I think, the province of book history, i.e., of histories of reading, publishing, and the cultural impact of individual works of literary art.

Progetto grafico e impaginazione: Carolina Valcárcel
(Centro para la Edición de los Clásicos Españoles)

1ª edizione, aprile 2014

Carocci editore S.p.A., Roma

Finito di stampare nel aprile 2014
dalla Litografia Varo (Pisa)

ISBN 978-88-430-6451-9