Ecdotica

7

(2010)

Alma Mater Studiorum. Università di Bologna
Dipartimento di Italianistica

Centro para la Edición
de los Clásicos Españoles

Carocci editore

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Con il contributo straordinario dell'Ateneo di Bologna
e con il contributo della Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio in Bologna

ALMA MATER STUDIORUM
UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA

CEE
CENTRO PARA LA EDICIÓN DE LOS
CLÁSICOS ESPAÑOLES

FONDAZIONE
CASSA DI RISPARMIO
IN BOLOGNA

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Via Sardegna 50, 00187 Roma
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GLI STUDI TESTUALI NEL MONDO ANGLOFONO

ROGER CHARTIER, GIORGIO INGLESE
E GARY TAYLOR

La sezione principale del volume 6 di Ecdotica è un'ampia antologia degli studi testuali nel mondo anglofono negli ultimi decenni curata da due dei massimi specialisti nella materia, Peter Shillingsburg e Paul Eggert: «Anglo-American Scholarly Editing, 1980–2005». Sul commento di questo volume, allora fresco di stampa, si è incentrato il «Foro» della nostra rivista che ha avuto luogo a Bologna il 14 maggio di 2010. Pubblichiamo ora, ringaziandoli, gli interventi del maestro dell'*histoire du livre* Roger Chartier (Collège de France); di un italianista del prestigio di Giorgio Inglese (Università «La Sapienza» di Roma), e di Gary Taylor (Florida State University), grande animatore degli studi testuali e curatore di *The Oxford Shakespeare.* A questi testi abbiamo aggiunto un contributo del noto studioso tedesco Hans Walter Gabler dove si ragiona sul tema del «Foro» partendo dall'importante libro di P. Eggert *Securing the Past*.

ROGER CHARTIER

Historicité des textes et lisibilité des œuvres

Dans l'essai où il defend G. Thomas Tanselle contre les critiques de Jerome McGann, Richard Bucci distingue entre les «practicing editors» et ceux qui «write about editing» (p. 352). J'appartiens, hélas, à la seconde population et ma lecture de ce formidable numéro de Ecdotica n'est pas celle d'un praticien, immédiatement confronté aux choix

et decisions qu'implique l'édition d'un texte, quel qu'il soit, mais celle d'un historien de la culture écrite fidèle aux leçons d'Armando Petrucci et soucieux de ne pas séparer les œuvres qu'il est convenu de designer comme 'littéraires' des écrits documentaires ou ordinaires.

Deux remarques, pour commencer, à propos de la composition de cette anthologie. Les vingt-et-un textes qu'elle rassemble se distribuent entre deux périodes très différentes. Treize essais ont été publiés entre 1981 et 1991. Ils sont dominés par les polémiques d'alors entre les tenants d'une pratique éditoriale «author-focussed», inscrite dans l'héritage de Greg et Bowers et reformulée par G. Thomas Tanselle, et les défenseurs d'une manière d'éditer qui établit un texte compris comme le résultat de multiples processus qui impliquent «institutions of publishing» et «social institutions» (Jerome McGann, 1983, p. 52) ou les «reception performances» (Peter L. Shillingsburg, 1991, p. 234).

Les débats, souvent fort âpres, se sont cristallisés autour des critiques et des propositions de Jerome McGann dans ses deux livres *A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism*, publié en 1983, et *Textual Criticism and Literary Interpretation*, paru en 1985, et celles de D.F. McKenzie dans ses «Panizzi Lectures», *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts*, données cette même année 1985 et publiées l'année suivante. Mc Gann opposait à une théorie textuelle fondée sur l'idée de l'«author's autonomously generated text» (p. 51) une pratique éditoriale capable de rendre compte tant des conditions sociales de la composition et de la reception du texte que des multiples collaborations, volontaires ou obligées, qui régissent sa production et publication. McKenzie indiquait, quant à lui, que si la bibliographie est définie comme «the discipline that studies texts as recorded forms, and the process of their transmission, including their production and reception» (p. 100) et si elle s'attache à tous les états imprimés d'une même œuvre, elle montre une réalité historique fondamentale, à savoir que «new readers make new texts, and that their new meanings are a function of their new forms» (p. 113). Pour McKenzie comme pour McGann, il s'agissait de libérer la critique textuelle et la théorie éditoriale de l'idéologie romantique de l'auteur souverain qui hantait les minutieuses descriptions de la «new bibliography», chargée de retrouver sous le texte imprimé, altéré par les modalités de sa transmission et publication, celui que son auteur avait imaginé, composé et écrit. C'est cette perspective que G. Thomas Tanselle réaffirmait avec force en 1989 dans *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*, lorsqu'il distinguait entre «authorial intention» et «authorial action», entre le texte désiré et le texte effectivement rédigé, et concluait: «the scholarly editor must be

prepared to make alterations in any documentary text if the goal is to arrive at the author's intended text» (p. 165).

Les six essais publiés entre 1998 et 2005, qui constitue une seconde séquence de cette anthologie, participent d'une autre conjoncture intellectuelle. Ils portent un regard en arrière comme l'attestent les articles qui prennent pour objet les thèses des protagonistes des controverses des années 80, dont les noms apparaissent dans les titres eux-mêmes: ainsi, l'article de Richard Bucci de 2003, «Tanselle's "Editing Without a Copy-Text"», ou celui de David L. Hoover de 2005, «Hot-Air Textuality: Literature after Jerome McGann». Cette réflexivité est accompagnée par un déplacement de la discussion sur la possible «death of the editor» et la proposition de «unediting» les textes anciens. Cette position, presentée dans l'essai (non repris dans Ecdotica) de Gary Taylor, «The Renaissance and the End of the Edition», publié en 1993 dans un volume édité par George Bornstein et Ralph G. Williams intitulé *Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities*, est farouchement combattue par Trevor H. Howard-Hill, qui affirme: «not to edit, or exclusively to edit facsimiles or states of works, or to shift editorial burdens on to unprepared readers are not supportable alternatives to a long tradition of editing that comes to us from earliest times and is represented by a large variety of kinds of edition» (p. 298).

Le débat sur la responsabilité de l'éditeur et sur l'édition comme indispensable médiation n'est pas séparable, dans cette dernière generation de contributions, de la réflexion sur les possibilités promises par l'édition électronique. Paul Eggert les annonçait avec une lucidité anticipatrice dans un article paru en 1994: «When satisfactory software for electronic editions is finally written, readers will have the capacity to view simultaneously or near-simultaneously the competing versions at any point in a text as well as being able to flick to the appropriate commentary and annotation. It is doubtful that a single reading text, established eclectically according to copy-text principles, will seem incumbent in the electronic environment. ... The inertial authority of the printed book will gradually be eroded, and with it may go the cultural assumption of the singularity of the work. And the law will catch up in due course» (p. 273).

Un autre trait frappe à la lecture des textes ici rassemblés: l'accent mis sur des œuvres et des auteurs des XIX^e^ et XX^e^ siècles, par exemple William Blake, Jane Austen ou Mark Twain. Seulement trois essais sont consacrés à la période privilégiée par les études des pionniers de la «new bibliography», McKerrow, Greg ou Bowers, à savoir, l'Angleterre élizabéthaine ou de la Restauration. Dans un essai de 1990, Harold Love s'attache aux

problèmes spécifiques posés par l'édition des «scribally transmitted texts» et, en particulier, des oeuvres qui ont circulé en forme manuscrite dans des miscellanées et des anthologies. Comme on sait, la redécouverte de l'importance de la publication manuscrite à l'âge de l'imprimé a été essentielle pour réévaluer les modes de composition et de lecture de certains genres, à commencer par la poésie.

Dans son refus de la mort de l'éditeur et de la pratique du «UnEditing», selon le terme proposé par Randy McLeod en 1982, Trevor H. Howard-Hill fait retour sur l'œuvre qui fut le laboratoire où se forgèrent de nouvelles théories et catégories éditoriales: les *Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies* de Shakespeare. Et c'est sur ce même corpus shakespearien que Paul Werstine désigne en 1990 l'ambivalence fondamentale de la «fonction auteur», pour dire comme Foucault, dans le régime de production et d'assignation des textes des XVI^e^ et XVII^e^ siècles. Pour dépasser le faux débat entre «author-centered editing» et «poststructuralist authorlessness», il fait la proposition suivante qui reconnait, tout ensemble, la production collective du texte et le primat du nom propre dans l'ordre des discours littéraires et de leurs lectures: «Perhaps we might entertain an at least provisional distinction between editorial practice, in which the author remains an elusive phantom in spite of Greg's attempt to conjure up Shakespeare through the method of copy-text editing, and reading practice (by editors and others), in which, as Eggert has noted, the author function continues to flourish despite poststructuralist critique» (pp. 341-342).

Cette remarque incite à une confrontation entre l'édition des œuvres des XIX^e^ et XX^e^ siècles, qui peut s'appuyer sur de riches archives littéraires, et celle des œuvres des XVI^e^ et XVII^e^ siècles qui, sauf cas exceptionnels, ne dispose pas d'une telle ressource. Le contraste est présent dès le premier article du recueil, publié en 1981 par Hershel Parker et illustré par les exemples de Mark Twain, Herman Melville, William Faulkner ou Stephen Crane. Il commence, en effet, par une question qui n'a de sens que si existent de nombreuses traces du processus de composition et de publication des textes. Faut-il commencer «with a printed text» ou «with whatever early documents survive: manuscripts, variant editions, contracts, other publishing records» – et la critique génétique pourrait ajouter à l'énumération toutes les traces laissées par l'écriture elle-même: notes, esquisses, brouillons, révisions, épreuves corrigées, etc.? Pour l'éditeur d'un texte du XIX^e^ ou du XX^e^ siècle, le commencement est le résultat d'une décision assumée, d'un choix entre plusieurs possibilités. Pour celui d'un texte de la première modernité, il n'en va pas ainsi et

le seul point de départ matériellement disponible est le plus souvent un état imprimé de l'œuvre.

En effet, ce n'est qu'à partir de la seconde moitié du XVIII^e^ siècle que les manuscrits autographes existent en nombre. Ils sont aujourd'hui conservés soit dans les bibliothèques ou archives nationales, soit dans les archives littéraires qui ont été rassemblées à Marbach dans la Deutsches Literaturarchiv, à Reading dans la collection des «Author's Papers» des Special Collections de la bibliothèque de l'université, à Milan par Apice, ou en France par l'Institut Mémoire de l'Edition Contemporaine. A suivre l'exemple français, si les manuscrits d'auteurs ne sont pas rares après 1750 (ils existent pour *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, *Les Liaisons dangereuses*, *Paul et Virginie*, ou les *Dialogues ou Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques* dont Rousseau fit quatre copies autographes), il n'en va pas de même pour les œuvres écrites antérieurement. Seules des circonstances exceptionnelles expliquent la conservation des fragments autographes des *Pensées* que Pascal rassemblaient dans des liasses mais qui ont été collés et réorganisés sur les pages d'un cahier au XVIII^e^ siècle, ce qui rend difficile de les considérer comme le manuscrit original de l'œuvre, ou bien les corrections et additions de Montaigne aux *Essais* qui n'ont subsisté que parce qu'il les a portées sur un exemplaire de l'édition de 1588, le fameux 'exemplaire de Bordeaux'.

La seule véritable exception à cette rareté des manuscrits d'auteur avant la mi-XVIII^e^ siècle est donnée par les manuscrits de théâtre, tant en Espagne qu'en Angleterre. En Espagne, nombreux sont les manuscrits totalement ou partiellement écrits par les dramaturges eux-mêmes. La Bibliothèque nationale de Madrid conserve ainsi dix-sept autographes de Calderón et vingt-quatre de Lope de Vega. En Angleterre, l'exemple le plus spectaculaire d'un manuscrit écrit par les dramaturges eux-mêmes est *The Booke of Sir Thomas More*, une pièce sans doute écrite entre 1592 et 1596 par Anthony Munday en collaboration avec Chettle et Dekker, puis révisée par Heywood et Shakespeare dont la main serait la main D du manuscrit. Si tel est bien le cas, comme le suggèrent les données paléographiques, lexicales et stylistiques, les deux passages ajoutés par Shakespeare à la pièce (159 vers à la scène III du second acte et les 21 vers du monologue de More qui ouvrent la scène I du troisième acte) seraient ses deux seuls manuscrits littéraires.

Doit-on considérer ces manuscrits autographes des dramaturges de la première modernité comme semblables à ceux laissées par les écrivains des XIX^e^ et XX^e^ siècles? Sans doute pas, si l'on pense qu'ils ont été souvent utilisés comme livres de régie ou '*prompt books*' destinés à organiser

les représentations et comme document enregistrant l'autorisation de représenter la pièce. C'est le cas avec les manuscrits anglais qui portent la '*license*' et, parfois, les suppressions ou demandes de réécriture du *Master of Revels*, ou avec le manuscrit autographe de la *comedia Carlos V en Francia* de Lope de Vega (conservé à la Bibliothèque de l'Université de Pennsylvanie) où se trouvent enregistrées pendant plus de quinze ans après la composition de l'œuvre, qui date de 1604, les '*licencias*' des autorités ecclésiastiques permettant sa représentation dans diverses villes d'Espagne.

Les manuscrits d'auteur peuvent aussi être des exemplaires présentés à leurs protecteurs, ce qui les situe, paradoxalement peut-être, au sein des copies établies par les scribes professionnels et, en particulier, par ceux employés par les troupes de théâtre. En ce sens, les auteurs des XVI^e^ et XVII^e^ siècles doivent être considérés comme des copistes d'eux-mêmes et leurs manuscrits tenus, non pas comme les traces du processus de l'écriture, objet privilégié de la critique génétique, mais comme des copies de l'œuvre. Ils sont ainsi les héritiers de Pétrarque pour qui, comme l'a montré Armando Petrucci, seule la multiplication des copies autographes de ses œuvres pouvait les protéger des erreurs commises par les scribes professionnels. La proximité entre auteurs et copistes est d'ailleurs rendue visible par la présence dans le même manuscrit des mains des uns et des autres (dans *The Booke of Sir Thomas More* la main C serait celle d'un copiste) et par les mêmes fonctions attribuées aux manuscrits autographes des dramaturges et aux centaines de copies faites par les scribes (même si ces derniers sont aussi les producteurs de véritables éditions manuscrites mises sur le marché).

Le rôle décisif des copistes dans le procès de publication est l'une des raisons de la disparition des manuscrits d'auteur avant la mi-XVIII^e^ siècle. Au Siècle d'Or, comme l'a montré Francisco Rico, les manuscrits autographes n'étaient jamais utilisés par les typographes qui composaient avec les caractères mobiles les pages du livre à venir. La copie qu'ils utilisaient était le texte qui avait été mis au propre par un scribe professionnel et qui avait été envoyé au Conseil du Roi pour recevoir les approbations des censeurs, puis la permission d'imprimer et le privilège du roi. Rendu à l'auteur, c'est ce manuscrit qui était remis au libraire éditeur, puis au maître imprimeur et à ses ouvriers. Un premier écart sépare donc le texte tel que l'a rédigé l'écrivain de la 'copia en limpio' ou 'original', mis en forme par un copiste qui lui impose des normes absentes des manuscrits d'auteur, par exemple épistolaires. Comme on le sait, ces derniers ne présentent aucune régularité graphique et ignorent largement la ponctua-

tion à la différence des 'originaux' (qui, de fait, ne le sont pas) qui devaient assurer une meilleure lisibilité du texte soumis à l'examen des censeurs.

La préparation de l''original' afin qu'il devienne la copie destinée à la composition typographique accroît plus encore la distance entre le manuscrit autographe et le texte donné à lire aux lecteurs. Tous les mémoires ou traités qui ont été consacrés au XVII^e^ siècle à l'art de l'imprimerie, tenu pour un art libéral et non mécanique, voire même pour l'art des arts, insistent sur le rôle décisif des correcteurs et des compositeurs. Les formes et les dispositions du texte imprimé ne dependent donc pas de l'auteur, qui délègue à celui qui prépare la copie ou à ceux qui composent les pages destinées à la presse les décisions quant à la ponctuation, l'accentuation et l'orthographe.

Après l'impression du texte, le manuscrit utilisé dans l'atelier était très généralement détruit ou, plutôt, son papier était recyclé pour d'autres usages. C'est pourquoi peu nombreuses sont les copies d'atelier qui ont survécu, avec l'exception des centaines de manuscrits d'imprimerie conservées à l'Archive et à la Bibliothèque nationale de Madrid, sans doute parce qu'en Espagne un secrétaire du Conseil du Roi devait collationner le livre imprimé avec le manuscrit qui avait été autorisé afin de vérifier que rien n'avait été ajouté à celui-ci durant l'impression. Après les multiples intervention faites sur le manuscrit de l'auteur, l'autographe avait connu le même sort. Sans importance, il n'était conservé par personne, pas même par celui qui l'avait écrit.

Il n'en va plus de même à partir du XVIII^e^ siècle. La fétichisation de la main de l'auteur, de la signature authentique, du manuscrit autographe deviennent alors la plus forte conséquence de la dématérialisation des œuvres dont l'identité est située dans l'inspiration créatrice de leur auteur, sa manière de lier les idées ou d'exprimer les sentiments de son cœur. La main de l'auteur est désormais garante de l'authenticité de l'œuvre dispersée entre les multiples livres qui la diffusent auprès de ses lecteurs. Elle est l'unique témoignage matériel d'un génie immatériel.

C'est pourquoi lorsque l'autographe n'existe plus, il faut l'inventer. De là, la prolifération des faux dont les plus spectaculaires sont les manuscrits shakespeariens 'découverts' par William Henry Ireland, qui expose en 1795, dans la maison de son père à Londres, plusieurs manuscrits du dramaturge: les lettres envoyés à son protecteur, le comte de Southampton, sa très protestante *Profession de foi*, et les manuscrits originaux du *Roi Lear* et de deux pièces perdues mais heureusement retrouvées, *Henry II* et *Vortigern and Rowena*. Edmond Malone, éditeur et biographe de Shakespeare, sera le premier à dévoiler la supercherie en comparant les

faux fabriqués par Ireland avec des documents authentiques dont «un fac-similé inédit de l'écriture de Shakespeare». Ce même souci du texte autographe explique, également, la constitution, à la fin du XVIII^e^ siècle, d'un marché des manuscrits littéraires et la multiplication des collections de signatures des grands hommes.

La forte relation entre manuscrit autographe et authenticité de l'œuvre a été alors interiorisée par certains écrivains qui, avant Flaubert ou Hugo, se sont fait les archivistes d'eux-mêmes. C'est le cas pour Rousseau qui conserva pour *La Nouvelle Héloïse* ses brouillons, quatre copies de sa main et des exemplaires annotés de trois éditions, constituant ainsi un dossier génétique de plusieurs milliers de pages. C'est le cas de Goethe qui se préoccupa de la conservation de ses manuscrits, lettres et collections et qui intitula l'un de ses essais «Les archives du poète et de l'écrivain». Dans les deux cas, le souci d'une édition complète des œuvres a pu guider le souci de l'archive, mais plus encore une intense relation personnelle avec l'écriture qui ne détache pas les écrits, même publiés, de la main de l'écrivain.

L'existence d'archives littéraires composées par les auteurs eux-même a de profondes conséquences sur l'édition et la délimitation même de l''œuvre'. On sait, pour les temps contemporains, comment Borges manipula le contenu canonique de son œuvre, excluant trois livres écrits entre 1925 et 1928 (*Inquisiciones*, *El tamaño de mi esperanza* et *El idioma de los Argentinos*) et choisissant avec son éditeur et traducteur français, Jean-Pierre Bernés, les textes qui devaient la constituer, ce qui lui fit inclure dans l'édition de La Pléiade des comptes rendus, des chroniques et des articles jusque là maintenus hors des frontières des *Obras completas*. On sait, aussi, quelles sont les discussions à propos des limites de l'œuvre de Nietzsche, entre la 'prolifération' plaisamment suggérée par Foucault, allant jusqu'à inclure dans l'œuvre les indications d'un rendez-vous ou d'une adresse, ou une note de blanchisserie trouvées dans un carnet d'aphorismes, et la 'rarefaction' proposée par Mazzino Montinari, excluant de l'œuvre son livre le plus fameux, *La Volonté de puissance*, composé comme tel, non par Nietzsche, mais par sa sœur Elisabeth à partir de notes, esquisses et réflexions laissées par son frère sans intention d'en faire un livre.

Né au XVIII^e^ siècle, ce souci d'une définition par les auteurs eux-mêmes du répertoire textuel qu'ils reconnaissent comme leur œuvre a inspiré rétrospectivement aux éditeurs d'auteurs qui ont écrit dans un temps sans archives littéraires des décisions qui ont transformé les contours de leur corpus canonique. Ainsi, la publication de plusieurs

textes pour la même œuvre, comme dans le cas de la publication de deux états, ou plus, des pièces shakespeariennes, à commencer par le *Roi Lear* ou *Hamlet*. Ainsi, les variations dans la composition du canon shakespearien, qui, à partir des trente-sept pièces rassemblées dans le Folio de 1623, peut, contradictoirement, inclure de nouvelles œuvres (ainsi, récemment, *Edouard III*, *Sir Thomas More* ou *Cardenio*) et en retrancher d'autres ou, pour le moins, les publier sous le nom d'un autre dramaturge avec lequel Shakespeare aurait collaboré: ainsi *Timon d'Athènes*, *Macbeth* et *Mesure pour Mesure*, présentes dans la récente édition des œuvres de Middleton de John Lavagnino et Gary Taylor.

Mais plus encore que ces redéfinitions des contours de l'œuvre, la présence des archives littéraires et la configuration conceptuelle qui les a rendues possibles, ou nécessaires, a imposé une manière nouvelle de lier la production littéraire et la vie de l'auteur. A partir de la mi-XVIII^e^ siècle, les compositions littéraires ne sont plus pensées comme fondées sur le réemploi d'histoires déjà écrites, la citation de lieux communs, partagés parce que sublimes, ou les collaborations exigées par les protecteurs aristocratiques ou les entrepreneurs de théâtre. Elles sont conçues comme des créations originales qui expriment les pensées ou les sentiments les plus intimes de l'individu et qui se nouent avec ses expériences les plus personnelles.

La première conséquence de cette mutation fut le désir de publier les œuvres d'un même auteur en respectant la chronologie de leur composition, afin de saisir le déploiement de son génie; la seconde fut l'écriture de biographies littéraires. Pour Shakespeare, comme l'a montré Margreta De Grazia, Edmond Malone fut le premier à associer les deux projets. Il fonda sa *Life of Shakespeare* sur la recherche de documents authentiques et il proposa la première chronologie des œuvres de Shakespeare, appelant ainsi à rompre avec la distribution des pièces entre comédies, histoires et tragédies, durablement héritée du Folio de 1623. Mais la tâche n'était pas aisée en l'absence de tout document autographe laissée par Shakespeare (à l'exception de quelques signatures et, possiblement, de son testament holographe) et du petit nombre de documents qui le mentionnaient. Elle exigeait de recourir au seul procédé disponible pour écrire les biographies des auteurs sans archives: situer les œuvres à l'intérieur de la vie suppose de retrouver la vie dans les œuvres. Les difficultés posées par ce cercle vicieux sont un heureux rappel des effets pervers produits par l'utilisation rétrospective d'un paradigme de l'écriture constitué seulement au XVIII^e^ siècle. Il impose, en effet, des catégories telles que l'individualisation de l'écriture, l'originalité de l'œuvre ou la

propriété de l'auteur à des textes composés et publiés dans un régime de production et circulation textuelle tout différent.

Les conséquences ne sont pas minces. La première est la transformation des significations des 'mêmes' notions. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, de la mobilité du texte, comprise soit comme désignant, dans la persective de la génétique textuelle, les moments successifs d'un 'work in progress' ou bien, dans celle de la bibliographie matérielle, les différents états imprimés de l'œuvre. Un autre effet de l'universalisation d'une configuration conceptuelle née au XVIII^e^ siècle consiste dans l'identification des œuvres comme «what authors have in mind when they are writing» ou comme «immaterial verbal works», selon les expressions de G. Thomas Tanselle (p. 165 et p. 173). Ainsi définie, chaque œuvre transcende toutes les représentations textuelles qui en sont données, toutes ses possibles matérialisations, et elle se trouve inscrite, comme le voulaient Blackstone, Diderot ou Fichte, dans le langage, les sentiments ou la manière d'écrire de son auteur.

Une telle perspective a pour corollaire le difficile ajustement entre la quête de cette œuvre, tenue pour un concept idéal, et la multiplicité de ses états imprimés qui, pour la première modernité, sont en général les seuls accessibles et qui, de toute façon, sont ceux qui ont été lus par les lecteurs du passé. La pratique éditoriale se trouve ainsi divisée entre deux exigences contradictoires: soit établir un texte donné comme celui que l'auteur a rêvé ou désiré, mais qui n'a eu aucune existence historique, ni imprimée, ni manuscrite, avant son édition moderne; soit publier les différents états textuels d'une même œuvre, mais avec un vertige semblable à celui produit par la carte borgésienne identique au territoire qu'elle représente, puisque éditer une œuvre consisterait idéalement à en éditer non seulement toutes les éditions, mais aussi tous les exemplaires, puisque, à l'âge de la presse de Gutenberg, les «stop-press corrections» introduisent des différences entre eux.

C'est contre l'impossibilité de cette infinité de représentations, ou pour mieux dire, contre l'illusion de la reproduction à l'identique, que Joseph Grigely mobilise le «Pierre Ménard, auteur du Quichotte» de Borges et propose de considérer les textes comme des événements, des «utterances» jamais reproductibles: «Each time we 'reproduce' a text – whether we do so in an edition or in an apparatus of an edition – we do not reproduce that text at all, but rather print it in another new and different context» (p. 262). De là, le constat, sans doute ontologiquement fondé, mais qui laisse critiques et éditeurs désarmés: «we cannot reproduce, reprint, or reenact a text: each act of textual production is an act of sequential (even homeostatic) production» (p. 264).

Pour sortir de l'aporie, une pragmatique de l'édition ne peut que se replier sur des positions de compromis. Dès 1984, James McLaverty suggérait une voie pour surmonter l'opposition entre le respect des intentions de l'auteur et la conscience que la publication d'un livre et la production d'un texte sont toujours le résultat d'un processus collectif: «the editor needs to respect the integrity of the different versions of a work, and he should consider himself free of duty to the author's final intention. On the other hand, he must try to establish the author's text, not that of the compositor or house-corrector. The author's intentions are important because of their intimate connection with his meaning, but only a limited range of intentions is relevant to the editor and any of the important issues in editing are left untouched by the concept» (p. 74).

Un autre compromis, nécessaire mais difficile, est proposé par Francisco Rico, dans ses editions et dans son ouvrage de 2005, *El texto del Quijote*. Entre le respect absolu des textes tels qu'ils ont été imprimés et lus par les lecteurs du passé, y compris avec leurs incohérences et leurs anomalies, et la souveraine autorité attribuée à l'auteur, seul maître du sens, il suggère une voie plus pragmatique. La collation la plus scrupuleuse et la connaissance la plus exacte des différents états textuels d'une même œuvre permettent de trancher entre plusieurs leçons, de réparer les erreurs manifestes qui l'ont défigurée et, parfois, de restaurer un texte trahi par toutes les éditions imprimées – ce qui est retrouver une inspiration fondamentale des éditeurs les plus novateurs du XVIII^e siècle. Mais le texte ainsi établi n'est pas, et ne peut pas être celui que l'écrivain a donné à lire à son premier copiste. Et même, si par miracle, le manuscrit premier de Cervantes était un jour découvert dans une autre Alcaná, il ne serait que l'un des états de l'œuvre, et non celle-ci en sa correspondance parfaite avec le texte imaginé et désiré par son créateur. Francisco Rico affirme ainsi, tout ensemble, le droit à la lisibilité du lecteur, qui ne peut être égaré dans une forêt de variantes, et la responsabilité de l'éditeur, qui doit refuser les solutions arbitraire et fonder ses décisions sur une connaissance profonde des conditions qui ont gouverné la composition, la transmission et la publication des textes.

Réfléchir sur le lien noué entre l'historicité des textes et la lisibilité des œuvres est sans doute le moyen le plus sûr pour en finir avec «the ideological closure», regrettée par Joseph Grigely (p. 251), de la tradition éditoriale et critique dont ce numéro de Ecdotica permet de prendre mesure. Sa force lui est venue de cette clôture même, construite à partir d'un corpus de references obligées, d'un répertoire d'œuvres et des termes de débats menés dans une seule langue. En rendant accessibles les textes les plus fondamentaux de ces controverses et propositions, cette

anthologie montre ce que nous pouvons encore en apprendre. Mais elle montre, également, que les temps ont changé et que, aujourd'hui, les mêmes questions, toujours vives, exigent le désenclavement des traditions nationales et le croisement d'approches trop longtemps séparées. Le «Anglo-American Scholarly Editing» peut aussi y trouver profit en confrontant ses principes et pratiques, au demeurant divers, avec les apports d'une critique textuelle fondée sur une approche philologique et historique, ceux d'une histoire de la culture écrite saisie en son entier, ou ceux d'une sociologie des textes qui ne sépare pas la materialité de leurs formes des conditions sociales et culturelles gouvernant leur composition, leur transmission et leur appropriation.

GIORGIO INGLESE

Autore/lettore, testo/edizione: il quadrato magico

Il volume di Ecdotica dedicato a *Anglo-American Scholarly Editing, 1980-2005* (6, 2009) è ricchissimo di suggerimenti e indicazioni degne di approfondimento.

Mi soffermerò soltanto su alcuni spunti, a partire dal saggio *Forms* (pp. 116-125; ed. or. 1984), in cui uno dei curatori, Peter Schillingsburg, fissa e discute quattro distinti orientamenti dell'*editing* ('ecdotica'): storico, estetico, autoriale, sociologico. Gli orientamenti storico e sociologico sono accomunati dal rifiuto di produrre testi «eclettici» (cioè costituiti sintetizzando una pluralità di testimonianze); ma solo gli editori puramente «storici» non condividono l'obiettivo di un testo che rappresenti ciò che l'autore voleva, o avrebbe voluto, presentare al lettore.

L'orientamento editoriale «estetico», osserva ironicamente Schillingsburg, non è mai dichiarato dai suoi cultori. Lo si può infatti considerare una versione patologica dell'orientamento «autoriale», quando l'editore intenda farsi co-autore dell'opera secondo il proprio gusto letterario. Ove la tradizione esibisca una pluralità di lezioni, si tratterà invece di «ordinare» questa pluralità secondo il tempo, e, secondo la qualità dei testimoni, distinguere le lezioni attribuibili all'autore e quelle derivanti dall'intervento di soggetti diversi (copisti, tipografi, revisori). Tale discriminazione è possibile nella misura in cui il testo dimostri di presupporre *sistemi* (linguistici, logici, culturali) abbastanza coerenti da

identificare *violazioni* non tollerabili, o per lo meno atti a qualificare acquisti o dispersioni di significazione.

Schillingsburg annette all'orientamento «estetico» le valutazioni o gli interventi correttivi giustificati in forza delle «regole» del genere letterario. Non è chiaro se vi comprenda anche le opzioni e i restauri di ragione metrica. Al riguardo, bisogna distinguere. Opzioni o restauri di tal genere sono leciti soltanto se è possibile attribuire all'autore la pratica di una norma metrica rigorosa; negli altri casi, conviene rispettare le incongruenze del testo documentato. Poiché l'attribuzione a un autore di un certo grado di rigore metrico può avvenire solo in base alle testimonianze testuali stesse, vi è il rischio di un circolo vizioso. Ma lo studio approfondito del caso determinato (poniamo, di Giacomo da Lentini) permette di giungere a un'ipotesi altamente probabile, che guida l'editore nelle sue scelte.

Lasciato dunque da parte il caso patologico dell'editore «estetico», rimangono a confrontarsi gli orientamenti «autoriale», «storico» e «sociologico», che privilegiano rispettivamente l'intenzione espressiva dell'autore, l'identità del documento, il contributo del «processo produttivo» alla fisionomia del testo. Ciascuno di questi orientamenti mette capo a un tipo di edizione (diplomatica, interpretativa, critico-processuale, critico-sintetica), ciascuna con la propria funzione e utilità. Nel dibattito anglosassone (e di materia moderna) registrato da Ecdotica, questo confronto ha invece toni fortemente polemici, in cui evidentemente si riverberano più profonde divergenze di vedute sul senso stesso della letteratura.

Trevor Howard-Hill, nel saggio *The Dangers of Editing, or, The Death of the Editor* (pp. 284-301; ed. or. 1998), critica duramente i filologi scespiriani di orientamento post-modernista (Warren, McLeod, Ioppolo). Teorizzando la riproduzione non-interpretativa di ogni documento testuale (per es., il primo in-quarto [1608] affiancato all'in-folio [1623] di *Lear*), essi delegano al lettore la discriminazione degli errori e il giudizio sui vari stati del testo. Dopo avere citato una bella frase di Tanselle, per cui l'edizione critica è, di fatto, un caso particolare di lettura-interpretazione, Howard-Hill conclude negando la qualifica di «editore critico» a chi, pubblicando *Hamlet*, si limitasse a giustapporre le varianti che toccano il famoso incipit (I II 129): «Oh, si dissolvesse questa mia carne troppo dura (*solid*) / troppo contaminata (*sullied*)...». Howard-Hill vuole che l'editore si renda utile al lettore che «non ha tempo e voglia di consultare gli apparati critici». Personalmente, ritengo che l'editore debba sentirsi responsabile della comparazione esegetica fra le varianti;

ma che il lettore debba dedicare una parte del suo tempo alla consultazione degli apparati critici (resi, magari, più accessibili e fruibili).

Nel contributo intitolato *The Monks and the Giants. Textual and Bibliographical Studies and the Interpretation of Literary Works* (pp. 76-95; ed. or. 1985), Jerome McGann prefigura un «textual criticism» capace di realizzare un comprensivo studio testuale e bibliografico dell'opera sotto diversi profili. Egli ci ricorda che «il linguaggio in cui i testi ci parlano non è limitato al sistema verbale»: per intenderlo a pieno bisogna dunque rifarsi «all'intero processo di sviluppo della trasmissione storica», senza trascurare gli apporti *non-authorial* alla costituzione del testo. In una versione moderata, questo indirizzo di ricerca comporta la valorizzazione «culturale» dell'apporto di copisti, correttori, curatori, tipografi ecc. alla pubblicazione del testo. I dati non-verbali (tipo di scrittura, impaginazione, illustrazioni) devono ricevere la massima cura interpretativa quando il «libro» sia stato pensato e realizzato dall'autore o sotto il suo controllo. Una lettura raffinata dei *Rerum vulgarium fragmenta* non dovrebbe, per esempio, eludere la dimensione «pagina». In termini assai più sfuggenti, il problema si pone per le opere di cui manca il «documento autoriale». Penso alla *Vita nova* e al problema della sua scansione in «paragrafi», riaperto recentemente da Gorni.

Gli studiosi anglosassoni suggeriscono anche di valutare come significativo il *format* entro cui il testo è stato ed è pubblicato. McGann cita l'esempio di una poesia di Emily Dickinson. La si può leggere in edizione critica, o entro un'antologia della poesia moderna, o in facsimile: benché le parole che la costituiscono siano ogni volta identiche, si tratterà di tre «very different reading experiences» (p. 90). Dal canto suo, Paul Eggert (*Document and Text: the «Life» of the Literary Work and the Capacities of Editing*: pp. 267-283; ed. or. 1994), fa il caso di un romanzo di Ada Cambridge, apparso su un giornale di Melbourne nel 1889, e, molto più tardi, in edizione critica (1988). Solo chi oggi la rilegga nel «format» giornalistico, avverte Eggert, è in grado di cogliere il contesto non letterario che condiziona e precisa il significato che il racconto propose ai suoi primi lettori. Lo spunto è molto interessante. Come esempio di influenza del *format* sul *meaning* di un componimento, prenderei la canzone dantesca *Donne, ch'avete intelletto d'amore*; essa è leggibile: (1) all'interno della *Vita nova*; (2) in uno spazio bianco dei *Memoriali bolognesi*; (3) nel Canzoniere Vaticano, associata alla «risposta delle donne», *Ben aggia l'amoroso e dolce core*; (4) come prima delle rime di Dante nel ms. Casanatense d,V,5 (sec. XVI) e in molti altri. I diversi *format* non hanno indotto – mi pare – peculiari alterazioni di lezione. Ma non è

questo il punto. Anche i versi della Dickinson, cui si riferisce McGann, sono verbalmente identici nelle varie comparse editoriali: apparentemente identici, dice il critico, ma «in fact very different, for they exist in bibliographical environments... that enforce very different reading experiences» (p. 90).

Nelle diverse situazioni, *Donne, ch'avete* si offre a diverse «esperienze di lettura», e, in questo senso, cambia di significato. Non dubito che ogni situazione possa dar luogo a specifiche interpretazioni critiche (cfr. appunto Justin Steinberg, *Accounting for Dante. Urban Readers and Writers in Late Medieval Italy*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame [Indiana] 2007). Rimane tuttavia una gerarchia, una scala di valori e interessi, che conferisce una posizione di privilegio al *format* voluto dall'autore (il prosimetro *Vita nova*) rispetto a quelli determinati di volta in volta dalla *readership*. Lo stesso Eggert, pur ritenendo che le alterazioni patite dal testo d'autore nel processo di trasmissione debbano considerarsi «contributions rather than corruptions» (p. 276), ribadisce che «il momento e l'agente originario (del processo) hanno un significato primario», contestando a McGann che la nozione di «social production» del testo disconosce la responsabilità individuale, e il valore proprio, di ciascun atto documentale.

La linea «sociologica» di McGann è esplicitamente riportata a Bédier (p. 90). Ma (nell'ambito delle tradizioni di copia) la «questione Bédier» si può ormai considerare pragmaticamente risolta nella distinzione fra univocità e plurivocità del testo (Contini); e fra tradizioni testuali discendenti da una autorialità «forte» (sì che nel processo di trasmissione si postula possano soltanto deteriorarsi) e tradizioni rielaborative (in cui, tendenzialmente, ogni testimonianza ha validità per sé stessa). Il riferimento al rango dell'autore decide dunque il metodo editoriale (sintetico o analitico) e la gerarchia fra gli orientamenti di ricerca. Se l'autore si chiama Dante Alighieri, o Niccolò Machiavelli, la lezione originale «mi interessa» per sé stessa, più delle lezioni storicamente diffuse: tanto mi interessa da proporre, in questo o in quel punto, un *restauro congetturale*, ossia una lezione «storicamente» e «sociologicamente» nulla.

D'altro canto, anche qui il termine «gerarchia» ha un valore metaforico e comunque relativo, poiché «si può ripetere delle forme di edizione il famoso detto del Croce sulle forme di critica, che ognuna è buona quando è buona» (G. Contini, *Breviario di ecdotica*, Milano-Napoli, Ricciardi, 1976, p. 8).

GARY TAYLOR

Editoria

I am not a bibliographer. I am not a sociologist of text. I am not a book historian. I am not a digital humanist.

I am an editor.

Reading the excellent anthology of essays in Ecdotica 6, I realized how alienated I feel from «Anglo-American Scholarly Editing, 1980-2005». I spent those twenty-five years in England and America, editing, but those debates seem to me now fundamentally foreign. They recognize the social nature of authorship, but say almost nothing about the social nature of editing. I edited Shakespeare's *Complete Works* in the 1980s because Stanley Wells hired me to do so; he was my patron, and his patron was Oxford University Press. Stanley was and is a generous and inspiring mentor, who repeatedly gave me the freedom to challenge his own views, but we were both operating within the constraining and enabling space created for us by Oxford University Press. Given Shakespeare's canonical status and market value, Oxford University Press insisted on shaping the edition, and subsequently marketing it, in ways that had nothing to do with editorial theory or individual editorial agency. The guaranteed scholarly visibility of any edition of such an author, published by such a press, catapulted me, at the age of 24, into a position of editorial power that was enviable, and envied, but also intrinsically vulnerable to the whims of a global corporation, to changes of management, to the instability of institutional memory and commercial loyalty.

My experience editing Middleton – also collaboratively, also under the imprint of Oxford University Press – was entirely different. Middleton had no real commercial value, no canonical status. No one envied me the job of editing his works. Oxford was not willing to employ me, full time, to produce the edition, which meant that, like most editors, I had to squeeze editing into the shifting fault-lines between teaching and university service, and balance the needs of a long-term research project against the need to publish regularly, in order to get tenure, promotions, salary raises, fellowships and grants. But in exchange for these more difficult working conditions I was given an extraordinary amount of freedom. Nobody at Oxford University Press much cared exactly how I edited Middleton. There was no existing tradition of customer

expectations to be satisfied, no core of fans poised to resist innovation. Notably, the greatest resistance encountered by *The Collected Works of Thomas Middleton* focused on the three places in the volume where the Middleton canon overlapped with the Shakespeare canon.

The position of the editor is always social. Every editor is situated within a social network of patronage, economics, institutional and personal hierarchies. But so is every text being edited: it occupies a social space within or outside the canonical literary system. Whatever editorial theory demands, editorial practice must negotiate the realities of the hierarchical social world inhabited by editors, their texts, and those who pay for those texts. Editorial freedom is inversely proportional to the importance of what they edit.

1. The need for and absence of a reliable old-spelling edition has haunted editors of Shakespeare for half a century. Greg, for instance, could refer to the modernizing of 'vild' to 'vile' as 'sheer perversion'. In order to palliate their sense of guilt about continuing to produce the modernized texts which publishers want to publish, some editors have modernized the text grudgingly and half-heartedly, producing hybrids of Renaissance and modern orthography which satisfy the needs neither of scholars nor of common readers. However much we admire the proponents and accomplishments of the 'new bibliography', we must also recognize that the movement had some unfortunate side-effects, including a schizophrenic attitude towards modernization and an increasing dissociation of bibliographical research from practical editing. Greg insisted, rightly, that an editor must understand the basic circumstances of transmission before a text can be properly edited. But at some point, having determined these circumstances, the editor must still sit down and edit the text, and familiarity with the process of transmission will not solve all editorial problems.

Earlier editors devoted their labours almost exclusively to problems of emendation, with scant regard to the circumstances of transmission; modern textual critics have, for the most part, simply reversed the prejudice. Like so much else, this practice begins with the Cambridge edition. W.A. Wright decreed that 'Vanity and Ignorance are the fruitful parents of conjectural emendation'. Vanity and ignorance are indeed fruitful parents, but conjectural emendations are not their only children; conjectural glosses and conjectural conservatism can also often be traced to their loins. Wright himself did not believe his own edict, for he and his colleagues – like all other editors of Shakespeare – accepted many conjectural emendations. But with very few (and insignificant) exceptions,

the conjectures which the Cambridge editors accepted were the conjectures of other people, not their own. Logically, someone else's old conjecture is no more authoritative than your own new conjecture; but a choice between pre-existing conjectures can, in the format of textual collation, appear indistinguishable from a choice between variant documentary readings. Editors in this way promulgate the notion that editing is no more than a matter of judicious *selection*; they obscure the fact that it also depends upon judicious *invention.* The intellectual authority of the Cambridge edition derived in part from its being so barren of new pride. This Victorian repression of the need for and the fact of editorial fertility has been perpetuated by the finest textual critics of our age. Bibliography aspires to the status of a science; at the least it can claim to be an archaeology of texts. Emendation is, by contrast, all too obviously an art – an art for which the despised poet-editors of the eighteenth century might have been rather better equipped, in some respects, than their sophisticated academic twentieth-century successors. Perhaps for this reason, the twentieth century has produced little fruitful discussion of the theory and practice of emendation in Shakespeare's text.

Greg's British Academy lecture on 'Principles of Emendation in Shakespeare', for instance, confines itself to the sound but minimal proposition that all emendation must be governed by a knowledge of the circumstances of transmission. A natural corollary of this postulate is that some texts in the Shakespeare canon will require more emendation than others. Yet editors almost invariably divide into those (like McKerrow) who in practice always emend sparsely and those (like Alice Walker) who in practice always emend generously. Though in neither case will the reasoning behind particular choices be discredited, the practice of emendation in either case must have more to do with the emendation-threshold of the individual editor than with the corruption-quotient of the individual text. If a translator rendered Herodotus and Thucydides, or Aeschylus and Euripides, so that they sounded stylistically indistinguishable, we should be certain that one author or the other was being misrepresented; we can be equally certain that editors who are conjecture-happy or emendation-shy in all circumstances are doing an injustice to half the texts they edit. Some plays in the Oxford edition – *Hamlet* and *Othello,* for instance – are edited more conservatively than usual; others – like *Pericles* – are edited less conservatively than usual; in each case the frequency and kind of emendation reflects our understanding of the text's transmission. Of course the Oxford editors are not immune from individual prejudice towards conservative or liberal emendation,

but we hope that the collaborative nature of the edition will have acted as a check on such prejudice.

Just as different kinds of text require different policies of emendation, so different kinds of error occur in every text. Most editors are either constitutionally interventionist or constitutionally non-interventionist; likewise most of them favour particular forms of intervention, and neglect others. Housman observed that classical editors prefer whenever possible to postulate palaeographical error, and a similar fondness for misreading can be discerned in most modern editions of Shakespeare. This predisposition was actively encouraged by the laudable efforts of the 'new bibliography' to establish the characteristics of different Elizabethan and Jacobean hands. But – as Hinman, among others, often insisted – scribes and compositors also commit other sorts of error. 'An emendator with one method is as foolish a sight as a doctor with one drug.' Most modern editors have, nevertheless, remained loath to accept substitution, transposition, interpolation, or (especially) omission as the explanation of a textual difficulty. On the evidence of their work in reprints, we would expect the Folio compositors to have omitted a few entire verse lines from every play, and we have no reason to suppose that the compositors who set Shakespeare's plays in quarto were any less fallible. Such losses can seldom be repaired, but it seems reasonable to admit from time to time that a line has probably been lost, by marking a lacuna.

Words and phrases, too, can be omitted. Editorial reluctance to concede this possibility can often be related to the modern hesitation to make emendations which restore metrical regularity. Just as eighteenth-century editors sometimes anachronistically supposed that Shakespeare shared their own ideals of strict metrical decorum, so twentieth-century editors sometimes anachronistically suppose that Shakespeare shared their own ideals of metrical irregularity and rhythmical freedom. Our own practice has been based upon a study of metrical norms in individual texts, and governed by certain simple propositions about the logic of metrical emendation. For instance, the more often a metrical pattern or licence recurs in different texts, the less likely is it to result from corruption; conversely, corruption is more likely if a metrical anomaly coincides with difficulties of sense or syntax. No doubt our application of these principles – as of all others – has been at times imperfect, but such failures of execution do not invalidate the general utility of the principles themselves, or the desirability of a coherent and articulated policy towards issues of metre.

Contemporary literary practice influences modern editing in more ways than in its attitude to metre. As many critics have observed (approv-

ingly or disparagingly), twentieth-century literature has been characterized by difficulty, by conspicuous obscurity, by a conviction that complex worlds cannot be uttered in simple words. One might share this aesthetic without believing that it prevailed in all periods. Nevertheless, modern editors of Shakespeare have sometimes advocated readings or variants which presuppose that the playwright aspired to be unintelligible. This tendency has been abetted by a misunderstanding of the classical editorial preference for *difficilior lectio,* 'the more difficult reading'. In fact, even in classical practice, *difficilior* does not mean 'more difficult to understand', but only 'more difficult to explain as an error'. That principle was originally formulated by editors of biblical texts, 'and then applied to the literary works of antiquity; but Shakespeare's plays were transmitted in different conditions by different technologies. For Shakespeare – and 'modern national scriptures' generally – the more relevant rule is *praestat insolitior lectio,* 'prefer the rarer reading'. 'Rarer' does not mean 'occurring in fewer textual witnesses', but rather 'lexically more unusual, verbally less commonplace'. Even this rule must be tempered by an awareness that revising authors sometimes deliberately replace an arcane word (like 'crants', in the second quarto of *Hamlet,* 5.1.226/3197) with a more comprehensible one (like 'Rites' in the Folio).

All propositions about the practice of emendation assume that emendation is itself a legitimate practice. That central assumption could be disputed. Philosophically, no emendation is logically defensible. It may be said that the text at a particular point does not make sense; but perhaps it was not meant to make sense; perhaps the character was meant to be mad, or incoherent; perhaps the passage has a private meaning; perhaps it has a meaning which would have been understood then though not now; perhaps its meaning is evident, even now, to some other reader. No emendation is 'necessary'; all emendations depend upon an individual assessment of probability and a subjective inference about intention.

2. Editing can be defined as the effort to establish a proximate text. The question then becomes: proximate to what? Proximate to something we value. Proximate to the individualized authorial text valued by Tanselle, or to the socialized collaborative text valued by McGann; proximate to the original spelling and punctuation valued by Bowers, or to the modernized spelling and punctuation favored by Wells. This conception of proximity allows us to recognize that there is no single source of editorial legitimacy; but that does not mean that every edition is as good as every other. Editions can be judged, can be measured, by their proxim-

ity to their chosen goals; most editions are lazy, incompetent, incoherent, or derivative. Likewise, the use of editions, by critics, can be judged by the proximity of the edition's goals to the critic's. It is incoherent for any historicist critic to quote Shakespeare in *modern* spelling; it is absurd for any critic interested in theatrical values to use an edition, like the Riverside, that is systematically *anti*-theatrical.

Editing seeks to establish texts that are proximate to a source of value. Insofar as it is concerned with proximity alone, editing is objective and scientific; insofar as it is concerned with the sources of value, editing is subjective and ethical. Every edition, every textual investigation, represents an assertion of value.

So, what is the value of more editions of Shakespeare? Textual proliferation does not, in itself, guarantee an increase in textual proximity to a valued goal, nor does it guarantee an increase in the variety of textual values being represented. What it does guarantee is a continual, and unexamined, increase in the value assigned to Shakespeare. It is textually valueless editions that measure the cultural value of a work. The proliferation of new editions insures for Shakespeare a ubiquitous proximity. Shakespeare's texts saturate our inter-textual spaces.

Obviously, such intertextualities are not simply given; they are constructed. As such they illustrate the distinction between active and passive proximity. Any text printed in London, or composed in the year 1606, has a certain passive proximity to every other. On the other hand, between the story of the British King Leir told in various Renaissance histories and the story of the Paphlagonian king told in (both versions of) Sidney's fictional *Arcadia* a very specific inter-textual relation was actively constructed by Shakespeare when he interwove the two stories in (both versions of) *King Lear.* This example illustrates another governing law of intertextual proximity: points in textual space can be moved. The distribution of texts can be reorganized. This fact impinges upon everything from editorial collations to literary history. For instance, authorial revision makes textual space radically portable and holistically variable; consequently, revision cannot be adequately mapped by the atomized linear sequence of traditional collations.

Literary history is equally portable, holistic, and revisable. In a famous formulation, T.S. Eliot declared that, as a result of «the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art... the *whole* existing order» created by previous works of art «must be, if ever so slightly, altered.» Borges, likewise, paradoxically insists that «every writer *creates* his own precursors.» Both Borges and Eliot are describing the creative redistribu-

tion of intertextual space, by the introduction of new reference points, new gravity wells, which create new relations. But the «proportions» of the «*whole* existing order» can be reorganized by critics, too. New Historicism works by juxtaposing canonical literary texts with otherwise obscure, chiefly nonliterary, documents. This copulative critical strategy depends upon a law of inverse proportion: the more obscure the nonliterary text, the more famous the literary text needs to be, in order to attract and sustain the interest of readers. New Historicism is thus almost inherently conservative in its deployment of textual space: it tends to reinforce the power of hegemonic texts and authors, by linking a vast and relatively unexplored discursive new world to the interpretive economies and ideological interests of a canonical old world.

3. *Change is expensive.* Change expends time, energy, resources of all kinds.

Computerisation enforces change. The accelerating evolution of textual technologies imposes upon society as a whole, and upon editors as $_{r}$ members of that society, a succession of mandated obsolescences. A book printed 400 years ago can be read more easily, in many more sites, \, than a file created ten years ago.

Changes in textual practices have always created narrow gates, through which texts have to pass if they are to remain legible. The change from uncial to minuscule script, the great vowel shift, the invention of print – these mutations of the media of representation transformed textual practices so radically that texts which were not translated into the new medium almost always perished, because they had become unintelligible to the textual classes. The change from print to digital technology has been correctly perceived as another such life-or-death gate. Unfortunately, it is not a single gate, but a succession of gates, with shorter and shorter intervals between them. *The more rapidly computers evolve, the more frequently files must be transformed, in order to remain legible.*

But change is expensive. Indeed, the more rapid the change, the **more costly it is.** Therefore, *the more rapidly computers evolve, the more expensive the maintenance of file-legibility becomes.*

As maintaining legibility becomes more expensive, *we will be able to afford the maintenance of legibility for fewer and fewer files* – unless our resources expand as rapidly as change accelerates.

But resources in the humanities – departmental and library budgets, the support of scholars rather than administrators – have, during the last thirty years, significantly and consistently declined. That change is almost cer-

tainly substantive, not incidental. Print technology developed in parallel with the rise of humanism and Protestantism; computer technology has developed in parallel with the rise of global corporations and capitalised science. Literature departments receive a small fraction of the funding that goes to business schools, medical schools or science departments. *As a proportion of total social expenditures, resources for humanities text creation, reproduction and maintenance decline, as digitalisation increases.*

At the same time, the development of digital technologies creates an increasing demand for their use. Thus, society favours cultural works which make maximum use of the multimedia potentials of the new tools: music on compact disc, film, video games, visual and audio encyclopaedias and archives, museum collections on CD-ROM. *In order to compete effectively for the available resources, editors must use the most sophisticated text-tools available.*

Hence, files that do remain legible will become accessible in an increasing variety and complexity of forms. As Randall McLeod and Jerome McGann and Graham D. Caie in their different ways have emphasised, the combination of photography and computers, the digitising of texts and images, makes possible modes of reproduction which preserve many more features of the texts generated by earlier inscriptive technologies (manuscript, print, engraving, etc.). Moreover, the same information technologies enable rapid and massive cross-referencing, concordancing, and all other forms of database searching. These preferred new modes of reproduction are preferred precisely because they are inhuman; no personality intervenes or intrudes between the original site and the new recitation, the original text and the new file. In this environment, *the best of all possible editors is a machine.*

Thus, editorial files must continue to become increasingly technologised. But that technological imperative further diminishes the available resource base. *Editorial files are becoming, not only more expensive to maintain, but also more expensive to create.*

Since resources are shrinking, at the very time when maintaining or recovering techno-legibility has become more expensive, *the number of old texts that can be made or kept legible seems destined to decline.* We are, for instance, already producing fewer editions of Renaissance authors than our Victorian predecessors did.

However, this decline is masked by the proliferation of versions. We effectively reproduce fewer works, but we produce more versions of the few works we do reproduce. We therefore feel that we 'know' those few works with an unparalleled breadth and intimacy; moreover, we test and

confirm all our cultural theories against the database of those few works. That diminishing number of works thereby becomes the measure of all things. It is not simply that we concentrate more and more of our attention upon Shakespeare; even within the Shakespeare canon, we concentrate upon a diminishing number of works – just as late classical culture concentrated its attention upon a small fraction of the plays of Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus. Hence the paradox which has so rapidly overtaken the work of 'revisionist' editors of Shakespeare: what in the early 1980s seemed, to its opponents and defenders, an outrageously revolutionary practice had come to seem, by the late 1990s, naively conservative. The revisionists attempted to de-idealise Shakespeare by demonstrating that, like other writers, he revised his work; but the revisionist editorial practice of 'versioning' has simply provided more material for idealisation, more texts of Shakespeare at the expense of other works and writers: *The fewer works we preserve, the more idealised they become.*

And it is not just Shakespeare which is being idealised. It is no accident that the rise of versioning, as a theory and practice among the editorial elite, has coincided with the computerisation of the writing class: computers not only make such versioning possible, they also make it seem 'natural'. Like other dominant ideologies, digitalism internalises itself in its subjects, by making artificial social arrangements seem utterly natural, inevitable, commonsensical. My personal computer automatically backs up any file I am working on every ten minutes; I always have access to more than one version of any file, and whenever I access and alter an existing file I am doing what my computer labels 'editing'. Writing as process, ubiquitous revision, the artificiality of closure, the infinite networking of texts, the anonymous and pervasive discursive grid which controls even as it enables our verbal performances – we are reminded of these social 'facts' every time we sit down to word-process the literary texts and literary theories by which we earn our livings. Critical Theory and the New Textualism, like all the other intellectual children of the pc-boom generation, have always proudly imagined themselves to be subversive. But those new theories never subvert word-processing, or the assumptions about the world entailed by daily word-processing. In fact, if we shift our attention from local disputes over textual minutiae to the larger cultural topography where those minutiae are contested, it becomes obvious that *the alliance of literary and editorial theory in the 'New Textualism' imposes a newly dominant ideology upon a marginalised, relatively impoverished, recalcitrant and residual fraction of the social world.*

People are most comfortable with the technologies familiarised in childhood: those technologies become internalised as part of an individual habitus, shared by age-cohorts. Technological revolutions thus inevitably create habitus-gaps, along a sliding generational scale. *In periods of rapid tool-change, tool-users of a given generation accordingly share a sense of technological superiority over their elders, which both enables and legitimates their efforts to secure institutional power for themselves.*

Older scholars, in such periods, have only two choices: to surrender, or to change – the only effective change being to internalise, self-consciously, the unselfconscious technological habitus of their younger rivals. In either case, *power among editorial elites will inevitably shift to scholars who have internalised the newly dominant ideology of The File.*

But the resulting invulnerability of the new elite (a governing class composed of fully technologised subject-files) is purchased by an increasing divide between Master DOS and microserf. The fantastic personal wealth accumulated by Bill Gates – now monitored, second by second, on an unauthorised website; he has made millions of dollars in the time it has taken you to read this text – is not an aberration, and it cannot be adequately criticised or celebrated as a personal achievement. *The widening wage-gap is a structurally inevitable consequence of the triumph of digital capitalism over all other forms of economic and social organisation.* In any humanities department of any postmodern university, administrative assistants (we used to call them 'secretaries' or 'scribes', in a less enlightened age) are required to know how to use a variety of programs marketed by infotech corporations over the last decade; they must adjust their goals, their minds, and even their bodies to fit the new digital products which have invaded their work-stations. Their salaries have not been adjusted upwards, to compensate for the technological adjustments they are being required to make. They can hardly complain, because they have become fungible, readily replaceable supplements to an irreplaceable hardware/software complex.

But the more complex that complex grows, the more vulnerable it becomes to complete collapse. The legibility of even those few editorial files which the new technology will maintain is dependent upon an unmanageably complex global infrastructure, in which temporally distinct and only marginally compatible technologies must constantly interact at accelerating speeds. Thus, the most vulnerable social structures are those moving most rapidly, but viruses which begin in those environments can quickly infect others, until the entire global structure reels into chaos. I cannot predict, as I write this, whether our current eco-

nomic dizzy-spells will down-spiral into permanent vertigo; I can predict, with absolute confidence, that the dizziness will keep coming back. The maintenance of everyday life on planet earth is dependent upon billions of lines of program code, collaboratively written by thousands of microserfs over decades, and now unintelligible and uncorrectable in its totality. To the new elites, the only thinkable solution to such problems is further versioning: that is, a further social investment in the same technologies, aiming at complete saturation of the human environment by an increasingly complex file-ocracy, committed to increasingly rapid file-turnover. *Digitalism increases, perhaps to certainty, the probability and severity of recurrent episodes of massive social and economic instability.*

In such periods of crisis, marginal activities will be further marginalised. The new Russia has even fewer resources than the old Soviet Union to preserve or catalogue the holdings of its archives, let alone to match the level of information digitalisation increasingly routine in the West. Multinational corporations will always be able to reward experienced software designers more lucratively than university libraries or academic editorial projects. *The instability of text, in postmodern textual ideologies, reflects the instability of the new social digitalism.*

But the preservation of past artifacts, the maintenance of old files, depends upon a stability which digitalism as a social system and an ideology denies. The New Textualism, translating text into file, collaborates with the dominant ideology in transforming the past into a version of the digitalised present. But no exemplar of that digitalised textuality, no single file, has any independent viability; if the network to which it belongs collapses, or becomes obsolete, the individual text-file becomes illegible. Therefore, unless we can develop effective social and editorial mechanisms to resist these foregoing tendencies, it seems virtually certain that *digitalism will eventually lead to the loss of all but a tiny, idealised remnant of the past.*

In the fourth century C.E, Roman Christians celebrated the official triumph of an energetic new religion in what was then the world's most powerful civilisation. They triumphally paraded through the gates of the City of God, into the Dark Ages.

4. This paradigm also forces us to recognize that there is no such thing as the comprehensive «impartial» bibliographical archive promised us by Greg or McGann, no yellow brick road that leads to the Oz of «unediting» promised to us by Randall McLeod (1982) or Leah Marcus (1996), no return to Jerome's paradise of textual innocence. Digital media make possible new kinds of editorial mediation, but the rationale of hypertext pro-

duces symbolic objects that are *more* mediated, not less—*more*, not less, dependent on the «technical, commercial, and institutional realities» that McGann associates with the codex (2001, 61). McGann's Rossetti archive is just as dependent on patronage as Jerome's Vulgate, and arguably even more vulnerable to social, political, and economic change (Taylor 2000).

What, then, are we to do, those of us who, like Jerome and Greg and McGann, wish to transport into the future the achievements of previous human generations? We can begin by re-conceptualizing editorial theory as a specialized subset of translation theory. Both are linguistic forms that Derrida would characterize as «regulated transformation», though their protocols of regulation differ. Both transfer texts from a source-language/community to a target-language/community. Both depend on intermediaries who are «cultural amphibians» (Coldiron 2003–2004), and often temporal amphibians too, masters of two separate codes, moving back and forth between them, modifying each in the process. The actions of those intermediaries are constrained by the norms of the target community, a «set of permissible or legitimate options» that determine what form of transference «is likely to be tolerated, permitted, encouraged, or demanded by those who control or are otherwise in a position to influence the means of production and distribution and the relevant institutions and channels in economic, social, ideological, and artistic terms» (Hermans 2000, 10-11). The dispute between old-spelling and modern-spelling editions, between Greg's big, expensive, scholarly parallel-text transcription of *Doctor Faustus* (1950a) and his short, cheap, modernized «conjectural reconstruction» (1950b), echoes the tension between two poles of translation practice: the old-spelling transcription is what Lawrence Venuti (1995) might call a «foreignizing» translation (forcing readers to adapt to an alien cultural idiom), while the modern-spelling reconstruction resembles a «domesticating» translation (forcing the text into forms easily recognized by readers). Since Greg's death, the dispute between foreignizing and domesticating editions of early modern drama has become increasingly bitter, in part because the gap between source-language/community and target-language/community has grown. Randall McLeod arduously and wittily insists on the absolute foreignness of early modern texts; Margaret Jane Kidnie advocates fully domesticated new editions of Shakespeare that are «conceptually and rhetorically disentangled from ideas of textual origin» and from «textual appeals to early modern history» (Kidnie 2009, 164).

We cannot escape from transcription and translation. Communication, including the communication of the past with the future, depends upon

media, and all media transform the signals that they transmit. Editions, like the television programs analyzed by Stuart Hall (1980), cannot escape from a cycle of encoding, decoding, re-encoding, re-decoding, which is also a cycle of enmediation and re-mediation. Editors must immerse themselves in the destructive element, must seek, not to resist or confine transmediation, but to multiply it. If we learn by «reading across the media», then the more media crossings editors make, the more forms are made available to more users. To modify an axiom of media theorist Henry Jenkins, «in the ideal form of transmedia [editing], each medium does what it does best». And the new aesthetic ideal will not be the ascetic ideal of Jerome, but will instead canonize works of the imagination that reward the maximum number of transmediated incarnations. Not textual transubstantiation, in which the accidentals remain the same while the substance inevitably suffers transfiguration, but textual transmigration, in which souls change bodies, as the transvestite changes clothes and the transsexual changes genders. The nature of things (*de rerum natura*) is that we always begin in the middle of things. Whether «the medium is the message» (McLuhan 1962, 7), the things we value are all enmediated and re-mediated. *In media res*. *In media veritas*.

§ 1. For further remarks and particulars, see *William Shakespeare: A Textual Companion*, ed. G.T., with Stanley Wells, John Jowett and William Montgomery, Oxford U P, Oxford, 1987 (paperback ed., W.W. Norton, New York, 1997). § 2. «The Renaissance and the End of Editing» in *Palimpsest: Textual Theory and the Humanities*, ed. George Bornstein and Ralph G. Williams, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1993, 121-150. § 3. Taylor 2000. § 4. «In Media Res. From Jerome through Greg to Jerome (McGann)», *Textual Cultures*, 4:2 (2009), 88-101.

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HANS WALTER GABLER

Thoughts on Scholarly Editing

In *Securing the Past*, a monograph bracketing a set of analyses of conservation in architecture, art, and literature, Paul Eggert's interest is in fields of force operative between the poles of origin as creative authorship, on the one hand, and of the cultural techniques of preservation, restoration, and editing, on the other hand.[1] At bottom, he sees these activities as one common enterprise predicated on two essentials. One of them is 'agency', the term under which are subsumed and progressively theorized both originating authorship and the re-fashioning, even re-creation, of cultural objects in their historical descent. The other, and concurrent, essential is the materiality of these objects onto which the cultural techniques are expended. Being by profession himself a scholarly editor, it is the editorial predicament that shapes Eggert's understanding and vision. He is aware of this: «I begin by recognising the categorical difference between

A Review Article occasioned by Paul Eggert, *Securing the Past. Conservation in Art, Architecture and Literatur*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009. xii+290 pp. £ 17.99 (paperback). ISBN: 9780521725910; £ 45.00 (hardback). ISBN: 9780521898089.

[1] Paul Eggert, *Securing the Past. Conservation in Art, Architecture and Literatur*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009. Reviewed by Paola Elia Ecdotica, 6 (2009), pp. 459-466.

editing and restoration. Scholarly editors do not physically alter ... original documents ... In comparison, conservators of historic houses, paintings and sculptures make changes to the physical objects themselves.» (12) Nonetheless, his declared aim is «to bring the arts of restoration together to examine their linked, underlying philosophies» (9). This interdisciplinary approach, in so far as it applies combinatory thought to diverse practice, does stimulate fresh insights. Yet the book's further reach towards abstractly theorizing the underlying philosophies is also a source of problems it ultimately leaves us with.

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with «The witness of historic buildings and the restoration of the churches» and «The new Ruskinians and the new aesthetes», respectively. Chapter 4 focuses on «Forgery and authenticity: historical documents, literary works and paintings», and chapter 5 problematizes «Conservators and agency: their role in the work». Drawing as it does on the study's antecedent, largely non-textual subject matter, this chapter especially underpins one of the centrally theorizable terms of the book's over-all argument, 'agency'. For the present reviewer, being like Eggert a literary critic and a textual scholar, it is hard to do justice to the sweep in these first five chapters of examples, observations and conclusions from the range of heterogeneous, even if comparable and mutually illuminating, cultural objects, as well as of activities over the past two hundred years or so in Europe or in Australia, in the service of securing the past. One feels an urge to bring together, say, a week-long intensive study seminar of restorers, conservators and conservation officials, museum curators, art historians, architects, local and regional politicians, sociologists, even criminologists, copyright lawyers and, indeed, creative artists, set them Eggert's monograph through chapter 6 as their course text and, from their several vantage points of expertise, have them explore its implications. They would pick up from the book's innumerable suggestive mentions of such matters as the correspondences between the Gothic revival an the restoration of churches in the 19th century, or the mirroring (or is it falsification) of the past in museums, or the vexed interchangeability of the authentic and the fake, or the perennial human tendency to shape the past in the image of the present, and ramify the book's subject matter each from out of their specific expertise and knowledge. This could yield an in-depth assessment, beyond the present study's valiant survey attempt, of how, and in what manifold ways, we, in our day and age, and at our point in history, conceive of securing the past.

Would we wish to have the textual scholar and editor in on such a seminar? It is a nice question. My instinct would be to have one, but to avoid having a sub-team of textual scholars; that is, to have Paul Eggert alone as preliminary key-note speaker and ask him to condense the second half of his book into at most an hour-long paper. This would bring to the fore just the generalisable and societally and culturally most relevant dimensions of textual scholarship and editing, such as they indeed share in the cultural pursuit of securing the past. Thus to engineer once again a judicious division of the realms that Eggert has comprehensively brought together would, owing to what he has in truth accomplished in his book, further contribute to deepening its achievement.

So much for a flight of fancy triggered by the first half of *Securing the Past*. To turn again to the book as it stands. Its second five-chapter sweep sets in still outside the realm of texts. Chapter 6, entitled «Subtilising authorship: Rembrandt, scientific evidence and modern connoisseurship», begins a trajectory that, ultimately in chapter 10, will culminate in a theorizing of the foundations of textual scholarship. Chapter 6 thematizes authorship in terms of creations in fine art, specifically of paintings by Rembrant/Rembrandt. Against the common-sense awareness of seeing them as painted, or authored, by the historical person whose real existence is amply witnessed and testified to, Eggert traces in valuable detail the activities of authentification and attribution carried out over two generations by the Rembrandt Research Project. To these, he proceeds to apply, by fleeting transfer (or, as must be recognised, by half-transfer), current thought from mainly literary theory towards defining authorship: «'Rembrandt' is not, then, the man who lived and painted. ... The term *Rembrandt* lives in its usages ... it has become an art-critical and curatorial abduction.» (122) Thus, initially, the argument appears to run in analogy to the Barthes/Foucauldian theorizings of authorship that have become an essential ingredient of modern thought in literary criticism.[2] Roland Barthes's title, «The Death of the Author», is all too often (be it wilfully or ignorantly) taken, and misunderstood, literally. In truth, the theoretical position that Michel Foucault's «What is an Author?» in particular designates is that texts, as works of art in language (written by live authors, of course!), and on account of the communica-

[2] Roland Barthes, «The Death of the Author», *Aspen*, V-VI (1967); Michel Foucault, «Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur?» *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie*, LXIII/3 (1969), pp. 73-104; repr. «What Is an Author?», *Language, Counter-memory, Practice,* ed. Donald F. Bouchard, Ithaca, New York- Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 113-38.

tive vector inbuilt in language, generate an authorship-defining point of perspective from within themselves. This «author function» (in terms of analytical narratology, it might alternatively be called an «author-effect») fundamentally generated out of language acquires structural as well as interpretative relevance for both the text's composition and its potential for meaning. It is categorically distinct from the real author, who is and remains always outside the text's autonomy. Such however, it turns out, is not what Eggert would want us to understand by 'Rembrandt' as «an art-critical and curatorial abduction.» For he goes on to claim that, as that abduction, the term «holds things together by its reference – factually, gesturally, wilfully – to the man who lived. The underlying appeal is to an integralness that reflects that of Rembrandt's body.» (122)

It is not easy to assess the usefulness of such an advancing and again retracting of a theoretical stance for the declared purpose of «subtilising authorship». In fact, it is perhaps even unwise in the first place to attempt, as Eggert does, to re-theorize authorship at all on the basis of the art of painting. For is 'authorship' here not spoken of but metaphorically? It seems doubtful that the limners of paintings can be thought of as authors in the same way that the originators of works of art in language have throughout our cultural tradition been so designated. The categorical distinction between painters (say) and authors arises from the difference in nature of the materials out of which they work: out of line and colour the painter, out of language the author. Of these materials, language is inherently semantic, while line and colour do not bring with them innate meaning. The work of fine art – a painting – comes about by a willed arrangement of its material and sensual elements; and it is by this process rendered representative. By contrast, the work of art in language is brought about by harnessing – by yoking together – elements (words, phrases, structures of grammar and syntax) that always already have cores of meaning. The work in language is consequently at bottom predicated on a pre-existing semantic core and potential for communication in its material substratum and is thus, in essence, not so much representative as communicative.

The harnessing and yoking together of the language material is what we conventionally designate as writing. Empirically, it is true, acts of writing are commonly seen as acts of origination, which of course they are on account of the writer's intellectual and creative input. Yet the view is indeed empirical, which means that it is not fully buttressed theoretically, since it leaves the innate semantics of language out of the reckoning. The potential of language to mean shapes writing as much as, recip-

rocally, it is instrumentalised and actualised by it. The origination of a piece of writing amounts therefore to a highly complex process of negotiation of meaning. All the more, it is true, we need (on the one hand) to lean on its empirical originator. For we not only wish to read the written, we also wish its content and meaning to be vouched for. Hence, we rely on the collocators of language, and accept them by convention and cultural agreement as the authors of any formed sets of writing. Yet if it is thus that in real life we gain our notion of 'author' and 'authorship', it is (on the other hand) also important to note that the designation is not just empirical. As concept, it has theoretical dimensions.

Conceptually, the empirically nameable and placeable originator of the writing whom we term author enacts a role in that triangled negotiation of meaning between him- or herself, the writing (as process *and* product: call it the text), and the recipient (*vulgo*, the reader). Being in this manner inscribed in a relational process of generating meaning is what essentially defines the author, and authorship. Empirically, the process constitutes a real-life condition of bringing forth works of art in language, which is something Eggert duly acknowledges at the opening of chapter 9, where pragmatically, by the run of his argument, the observation belongs. To recognise, however, that, with works of art in language whose medium, language, is innately communicative, author and authorship in turn are not just empirically and pragmatically, but in fact essentially inscribed in the generating of meaning, raises the definition of the terms to a systemic level. It is therefore that they can apply at most metaphorically, if at all, to the representative nature of works of fine art. Eggert's «subtilising» of authorship, then, amounts (as suggested) to a metaphoricizing of the term. In the chapter context, this is useful rhetoric for discussing the problems – whether of a scholarly or a market-place nature – inherent in the authentification of paintings with the 'Rembrant/Rembrandt' signature. Without positing the empirical painter-authorship, Eggert would lose «the man who lived» as the originating 'agent', active on the same empirical level of reality as the securing agencies serving the 'Rembrandt signature' «by abduction» at their due historical stations as restorers, curators, evaluators and scholar art-historians. But Eggert's retracting again the Barthes/Foucault stance on author/authorship that he yet briefly invokes is not sustainable in terms of theory.

Theoretical gain, by contrast, could be had from following up that fleeting invocation. Sustained (which would mean also: carried through to the book's concluding theory chapter), it might have led to recog-

nising fully that author/authorship are, conceptually and as terms, tied ineluctably to the realms of writing, and of works of art in language. Approaching writing in terms of its medium and mediality, Barthes/Foucault define author/authorship functionally. The «author function» as inherent in texts, and springing as it does from the semantically communicative nature of language, is conceptualised from out of an ontological understanding of the medium. Thus radically understood, empirical authoring as issuing in writing and texts stands revealed as the real-life spin-off of authorship into the materiality of documents – but equally, we should add, into the immateriality of oral composition and transmission. Such considerations put yet further in doubt the feasibility (feasibility in terms of theory, that is) of applying the term 'authorship' to the bringing forth of fine art. The work of the sculptor or painter, and beyond (say) of the architect, is expressed by way of, and thereby always inseparably tied to, its material manifestation in the one unique original that is its outcome. In terms of its crafting by the hand of its originator, it is an autograph. The work of art in language, or indeed any meaningful language collocation, by contrast, does not in essence so exist. It is allographic. The term as coined and used refers, as we know, in the first instance again to the work's material making, to its being scripted. What this implies, even just pragmatically, is that what is penned or printed in language is copyable without limit in any number of exemplars which all instantiate the work (that is, instantiate the work as text). Since we hardly ever think of works in language other than in scripted instantiation, this, to all appearances, ties 'allographic' to material media of reproduction.

But again, this is empirically, yet not theoretically sufficient. For in essence, any meaningful language collocation, and *a forteriori* any work of art in language, can exist without being recorded in writing, thus without instantiation in script. Were this not so, we would, for example, not be able to claim continuities from oral literature to literature in material transmission, or be able to interpret the full range of causes for the considerable variability of texts in transmissions from before the invention of printing. The circumstance that, in analogy to scripted language formations, oral collocations of language, too – be they laws or decrees, or proverbs, or works of art in language in any number of genres: poems, epics, plays, fables, fairy tales – can exist without script and be transmitted (as, for instance, recited from memory) in unlimited instantiations, helps to recognise that 'allographic' designates not merely an accidental attribute (i.e., the 'being scripted'), but an essence. This distinguishes

works in language fundamentally from works of architecture, sculpture, or painting. It means, moreover, (and does so perhaps even to the consternation of textual scholars and critics) that materiality must be thought of as accidental to works in language, and not as substantive and essential to them. From this follows as a further conclusion that for precisely this ontological reason the concepts of 'author' and 'authorship' must be posited specifically, and in theory exclusively, for application to works, and works of art, in language. Since, as works, they can in principle be instantiated materially or immaterially in unlimited replication, what brackets such allographic instantiation is the systemically functionalised concept of 'author' and 'authorship'.

Admittedly, Eggert hardly intended, and certainly he did not in chapter 6 attempt, to delve into such ulterior theorizing around the terms and concepts of 'author' and 'authorship'. His own already cited positioning of name and author (meaning at the same time 'name *as* author'): «hold[ing] things together by ... reference – factually, gesturally, wilfully – to the man who lived», and so vouchsafing an «integralness ... reflect[ing] that of Rembrandt's body», supports rather the chapter's analysis of the role of scholarship in the service of «modern connoisseurship». With curatorial and art-historical expertise closely tied in real life to the monetary evaluation of works of art, what is clearly at work, and what Eggert illuminatingly analyses, is what might be termed applied scholarship (notionally analogous to applied science, which, as we know, enjoys both cultural and social acceptance, not least for its economic consequences). As applied scholarship (be it scientifically self-fashioned and autonomous, or else variously time-serving), art history in the twentieth century has assumed a task of mediating the material heritage of art to contemporary expectations and tastes in reception. The need, under market-place pressure, to authenticate Rembrandt paintings has however, as Eggert shows, at the same time, and in terms of knowledge, understanding and method, palpably advanced the scholarly discipline of art history, as well as the curatorial and restorational crafts. A lead might be taken from here to distinguish in future more explicitly between applied and pure humanities scholarship, and to elucidate their distinct agendas, as well as to observe them in interaction.

With chapters 7 to 10, Eggert enters his native realm of textual criticism and scholarly editing. Chapters 7 to 9, progressively covering case analyses of exemplary editorial situations and modes, increasingly reflect

also on their theoretical implications. These, and those similarly following comprehensively from the book's coverage of subjects, are surveyed in the final chapter 10.

Shakespearean editing used traditionally to be where text-critical and editorial principles and paradigms were established in Anglo-American textual scholarship. This is acknowledged in chapter 7, with due reverence paid to bibliography and copy-text editing, the loadstars of Shakespearean textual criticism throughout most of the 20th century. Yet, headed «Materialist, performance or literary Shakespeare?» as it is, the chapter is nonetheless but tangential to this 20th-century mainstream of textual editing in Great Britain and the United States. It focuses, rather, on the fundamental end-of-the-century upheavals in the sub-discipline which altered, from within, its understanding of itself and which, from without, displaced it from its lead function in Anglo-American textual criticism at large. The displacement resulted from reformed thinking in literary criticism and theory and was, in this respect, energized from out of pure scholarship. While in their fuller scope, these fields of force are mapped out in chapters 8 and 9, the argument is set in motion with the survey in chapter 7 of some main factors that triggered renewed reflections on the textual situation for Shakespeare: sophisticated critical analysis of the plays as performance texts; increased awareness of the history of Shakespearean editing over the centuries as a history of adaptation in minutiae of language, style, or prosody; or the dependence of that history on its material substratum, by which Shakespearean textuality becomes amenable, for instance, both to being analysed in its material manifestations, and to being subjected to materialist literary theory. The emergence is recorded of the Oxford Shakespeare, the 20th century's main Shakespeare edition worked from the ground up, which appeared in 1986 out of a vortex of all these cross-currents, and reflects them all. As a whole, admittedly, the chapter couldn't claim to do comprehensive justice to the achievement of 20th-century Shakespearean textual criticism. As acknowledged, it serves mainly as a bridge into, and a preparation for the central argument beginning in chapter 8 around «Modes of editing literary works: conflicts in theory and practice,» and continuing in chapter 9 under the heading «Readers and editors: new directions in scholarly editing.»

To open chapter 8, the conflicting forces at work are panoramically named. They arise from orientations and re-orientations in terms both of understandings of culture and of movements of theory at the end of the 20th century and across the millennium threshold. These in turn

affect, as Eggert sees it, concepts of editing as a cultural and scholarly task. Editorial scholarship finds itself under pressure to review its subject-matter as well as its methodologies, to re-justify what it is doing and achieving with, and on behalf of, the material objects it is dealing with (or immaterial objects, for that matter, considering that, for instance, the literary work behind its materially manifest texts may legitimately itself be defined as immaterial – as we have contended above, and shall more fully explicate below). A few general, yet pertinent, definitions of «What and editor does» – very usefully containing also a roll-call of the many senses in which the term 'editor' is understood, in the first place – lead on to examples both from Australia and the US of how, and with what arguments, scholarly editing is both societally and culturally resisted.

What Eggert adroitly sees as perhaps the weightiest motivation for today's (and certainly the late 20th-century's) (Western) societies and cultural environments to resist scholarly editing as an imposition by specialists, is that it complicates straight consumptive reading by opposing the naïve assumption that texts be pure and stable, or the marketplace expectation that editions be definitive. The endeavour of securing the past in the field of scholarly editing is, quite to the contrary, nowadays heading in distinctly new directions, with fresh strength gained through textual scholarship re-theorized and reformed. No longer (to pick up Eggert's sporting-ground metaphor) is the editorial task defined (merely) as «tend[ing] the field properly» and then «let[ing] the [literary] critics get on with the main game.» To the irritation of the cultural as well as the literary critics, instead, «the editors [are now] wanting to expose the textual subsoil» (164) – that is, to reveal the process nature of texts, and thus the interplay of textual stability and instability. Since the notion of 'process' thus enters into defining the nature of texts, 'process' must pertain also to the nature of authorship – as we have already maintained above in emphasizing the authorial participation in the triangled negotiation of the meaning potential of language by which texts become texts. The answer-in-kind to this understanding of authorship and text must be ways and means for textual scholarship adequately to translate the processual nature of writing and of texts into processual modes of analytically unfolding and presenting texts in editions. This does not eliminate, nor in the day-to-day work of editing marginalise, the traditional task of editions to stay the corruption through error that ineluctably befall transmissions. Yet corruption is only a part-reason for the variability encountered in the materials documenting texts. For it is indeed of the very nature of texts to be variable; hence, their material

documents of origin commonly testify amply to variation from processes of revision. Under today's enlarged understanding of the nature of texts, consequently, it is incumbent on editors not just to establish texts by way of stabilising them against endogenous textual variation (that is, commonly, variation through textual error). A significant challenge arises further from the indigenous, text-immanent, variability and the demands it makes of editors to seek congenial forms of response to them in the shape and communicative potential of editions.

From its outlining of the innovative stance in textual criticism and scholarly editing, the chapter leads on to an in-depth discussion of «Gabler's *Ulysses*», i.e., the Critical and Synoptic Edition of James Joyce's novel I prepared in the late 1970s and early 1980s and published in three volumes in 1984 (touching it up with a few amendments in 1986, the year that also saw the commercial publication of its reading text only). Eggert's understanding of the edition's over-all conception is thorough, and his survey of the debates it sparked is both comprehensive and fair. Following from here through the remainder of chapter 8, and into chapter 9, not only is Eggert's own highly relevant editorial experience from his participation in the Cambridge UP D.H. Lawrence edition and, above all, his leading role in the manifold activities of literary editing in Australia infused into the discussion. Further samples, too, from recent editorial history are investigated in themselves and in the context of debates they elicited, such as James L.W. West III's edition of Theodore Dreiser's *Sister Carrie*, or J.C.C. Mays's edition of Coleridge's *Poetical Works* – editions, in other words, that were enacted outside, or at most but tangentially to, the Shakespeare-and-Renaissance-engendered editorial paradigm (that is, the Greg-Bowers paradigm, or theory, of copy-text editing).

Eggert knows the ropes of scholarly editing and possesses all the experience and skill needed to file into shape and tighten the requisite nuts and bolts. At the same time, moreover, he opens horizons from which to gain enlightening perspectives on the specialised craft of scholarly editing. These are in one respect theoretical, such as when, for the purpose of exploring the text-constitutive role of reading – that is, the constitutive role of reception for both editors and readers; as, indeed, for authors in respect of their own texts-in-process – the factor of textual meaning is brought into play to buttress the significance of scholarly editing for securing the past. In another respect, the horizon is enlarged in directions of methodology. Here, in particular, the «German Encounter» is focussed on in chapter 9 and the unaccustomed elements, even alternative systematics, of German textual scholarship in contrast to the cus-

tomary paradigms in Anglo-American text-critical thought and practice are laid out at length. In terms of the book's disposition, this follows from its highlighting of both «Gabler's *Ulysses*» and J.C.C. Mays's edition of Coleridge's *Poetical Works* that in different, and in a sense complementary, ways result from a fusion of Anglo-American and German editorial thinking. The German way in textual criticism and scholarly editing is thus impressively critiqued – a feat nowhere that I know of accomplished in English so comprehensively and with such understanding as here.

Chapter 10 attempts to draw the theorizable sum of the preceding chapter discussions. Headed «The editorial gaze and the nature of the work», and following on from the intense engagement with scholarly text editing through chapters 7 to 9, this concluding chapter patently contends that all active investment into securing the past, whether in architecture, or the fine arts, or the wide (and, indeed, much variegated) areas of textual transmission may be, and should be subsumed under the common denominator of 'editing'. To enhance the chapter's claim to anchoring the monograph as a whole in theory, Eggert begins by citing René Wellek and Austin Warren's *Theory of Literature* and its (mainly) inner-American responses. These however (e.g., E.D. Hirsch's *Validity in Interpretation*) would be incompletely understood without their backgrounds in European thought. Therefore, the chapter proceeds to draw in, successively, philosophical positions from Europe of the 1930s, Edmund Husserl and Roman Ingarden (phenomenology and the notion of the ideal text), as well as Martin Heidegger («The Origin of the Work of Art»), to which Jacques Derrida and French post-structuralism in turn can be identified as having reacted in the post-war period. Thence, an «Anglo-American Editorial Scene», hovering between pragmatism and theory (and tied here to the names of John McLaverty and Peter Shillingsburg), is briefly sketched out before the survey of philosophical positions is rounded off with a scenario for future orientation in editorial thinking, decisively at the same time tied back to the philosophies of C.S. Pierce and Theodor W. Adorno. Taken together, the positions in philosophy cited serve to theorize the concept of 'the work'. What the chapter is made to bear out, and what the book as a whole claims, is that it is the work (from the past) that centrally demands securing. To this end, so the argument goes, the work must be subjected to the «editorial gaze». For this concluding theory chapter, furthermore, the editorial gaze is now insistently trained on the work in terms of what it (and, with regard to the work in language, what its text – or is it: its texts?) mean.

The philosophical positions adduced are all concerned with questions of meaning – and, overwhelmingly so, with the meaning of artefacts (works) in language. And here lies the rub.

Eggert gains a heuristic definition of 'work' from setting the lexical term in English (identical as noun and as verb) against its apparent equivalents in German, French, Italian, Spanish, and Russian (where the respective terms are nouns only). «Getting a grip on the concept is notoriously difficult in whatever language.» So he contends in arguing the need to test the concept of 'work' against his philosophical *tour-d'horizon*, for the benefit of editors and conservators engaged in «cultural heritage conservation or scholarly edition.» (214) So centred in text-critical and editorial thinking is the ensuing discussion that it seems justified to meet it on the same ground.

To contend that an editor edits a work appears plausible enough, on the face of it. A closer look into the usages across languages, however, will soon reveal that in German, for instance, to edit *ein Werk*, while it may indicate the editing of a single work, yet conventionally signifies editing the works, that is: the oeuvre, of an author. The Scandinavian languages, taking this notion one step further, speak of editing *ett författarskap* (the Swedish variant of the term), that is 'an authorship', i.e., roughly again an oeuvre. So made aware, we recall of course immediately that, in the anglophone environment, one will quite commonly speak of editing Shakespeare, or Milton, or Keats, or Wordsworth – or D.H. Lawrence. The two-fold potential of signification of the noun 'work' as 'individual work' or 'oeuvre', or the metonymic exchangeability of work and author, are thus not absent from English, either.

The situation this points to is analogous to, and in a sense repeats what we discussed above with respect to author/authorship. Neither these terms, nor the term 'work' can – *pace* Eggert – be applied with identical signification and coincident implications to restoration in the fine arts, or architecture, on the one hand, and to the editing of transmissions in language on the other hand. A fundamental distinction instead must be made, one that Eggert does not consider: in restoring works of the fine arts, or architecture, there can never be any going-behind their material existence and presence, meaning also: their existence *as* presence. Editing works (of art) in language, by contrast, can never be accomplished without a preliminary, yet foundational going behind the extant textual materials.

If there has been one constant fundamental to editing throughout its history since antiquity, it has been both the need and the practice to go behind the texts witnessed in material documents in order to elicit edited

texts. Materially extant texts have ever been deemed flawed. The cultural technique of editing was consequently invented to mend their deficiency, and the main goal with edited texts has been to invest them with, and in, a new materiality differing from that of all antecedent text materialisations, on the basis of which they could be, and were, established. Great efforts, indeed, were undertaken to contain the extant instantiations of texts-to-be-edited in a systematized methodology supporting the assumption that, and defining the ways in which they related. Going behind the materially extant instantiations, too, into their lost, hence no longer material ancestry, led by dint of method to such logical constructs as archetypes, if not indeed to original originals, or *urtexts*. These were similarly posited by combining imagination, or divination, with methodologically controlled analytical procedures.

The venturing behind the materially extant textual manifestations relied on four *apriori* assumptions: one, that the variation between both extant and lost instantiations of a given text was due to errors of transmission, and errors of transmission alone; two (concomitantly), that there was at the source of a given transmission only one stable text; three, that it was the task of a scholarly edition to collapse the manifest instantiations of the given text into one invariant text; and four, that to unveil that text as the recaptured text of the lost source (or, to recover a text as close as at all attainable to that source) was tantamount to securing the pristine work. It should be observed in passing, moreover, that under these methodological conditions texts and their material instantiations, that is: texts and the documents (extant or lost) that carried them, were always thought of in conjunction, and viewed as inseparable; 'text' and 'document' tended to be metonymically exchangeable. This habitual attitude may, in part, explain Eggert's ease in arguing for restoration and scholarly editing as conceptual equivalents. The true flaw in the methodology as a whole, however, was and is the equation of text and work. It is a logical flaw, yet assuredly Eggert is not to be made answerable for it. It is in fact even to this day deeply ingrained in our cultural assumptions. Hence, Eggert builds on it. It is his doing so, however, that involves him in the particular intricacies of buttressing the argument for the mutual dependence of work and meaning that the monograph's concluding chapter develops. There can be no doubt, of course, that we perceive a work as what it is, and that we are able to relate to it only by way of a hermeneutical exploration of its meaning(s). Yet just how this relates, in turn, to securing the work for the past by editing its text(s) is, or would have been, for this book the pertinent question.

We maintained above that works (and works of art) in language can be instantiated both materially and immaterially, and can in principle be replicated without limit. The instantiations are textual, and as texts – whether materialised in documents, or replicated orally – they are always (by default, as one might say) variant. The variation may be transmissional, as foregrounded by traditional textual criticism and scholarly editing. It may be compositional and revisional, as evidenced in drafts, working papers, and successive publication in revised authors' editions. Or it may be oral, as when any one recitation of the work's text from memory is never *literatim* identical with any antecedent or succeeding one. Any one text, whether it has come down derivatively through transmission, or in a manuscript layered in revisions, or by way of oral performance, instantiates the work. It follows, conversely (as already posited), that the work exists but immaterially, even as it constitutes the energizing centre of its textual representations. Some would hold that this amounts to theorizing the work platonically, as an ideal. Suffice it to maintain that the notion of 'work' as an immaterial entity is the precondition for seeing the 'work' endowed with an energy to hold together its instantiations as texts.

What editors edit are not works, but texts. Leaving aside the new options for multi-text editions that re-conceptualising 'work' in the preceding manner opens, it is of course perfectly conceivable, and fundamentally indeed highly desirable, that among the work's many textual instantiations an edited text should be the one optimally representing the work (rivalled at most, perhaps, by a first-edition text or the text of an authorial manuscript). Such an edited text may well be the best result achievable from historically aware and textually critical efforts to secure the work, as a creation in language, from the past. Nonetheless, an edited text, even while it may in quality surpass all other extant textual instantiations of the work, is never more – though neither is it commonly less – than one (considered) textual representation of the work. Yet not the rivalry among instantiations is at issue here. The decisive point to be made is that they all (by whatever degree, which textual scholarship makes it its business to determine) represent the work. Under guidance of Paul Eggert's book, therefore, the question becomes just how securing the past is accomplished through scholarly editing. How do texts hold up under the editorial gaze?

In the first instance, the editorial gaze is not directed at the compass of complexities or depths of meaning of the work (which are ultimately what define the work as by nature immaterial). It is trained on the mate-

rial minutiae of the text revealed through comparison of its multiple instantiations. To the largest degree – at least in scripted records of transmission – these instantiations will be identical: the invariant substance from the multiplicity of text materialisations in documents goes a long way towards establishing the material edited text as a valid simulacrum of the (immaterial) work. Taking the invariance as given, what the editorial gaze will fasten on as matter for editorial concern is the variation distinguishing the individual instantiations from one another. It is here, indeed, that linguistics, hermeneutics and theory impinge on editorial procedure and editorial decisions. Is a reading possible in terms of the lexis, grammar or rules of syntax of the language employed to text the work? Is a word or phrase, a grammatical or syntactic construction meaningful in itself, and in immediate or wider contexts of the work's material instantiations under scrutiny, as well as of the edited text under construction? Are, moreover, textual alternatives (variants) to be adjudicated as mutually exclusive, or complementary to one another? It is under this latter question, especially, that heterogeneous positions of literary and text theory get adduced, precisely for their divergence on principles, to support and justify even opposing stances and solutions of editorial pragmatics. Orthodox editing aimed at eliminating error, on the one hand, will produce edited texts as stable and closed. Modes of editing, on the other hand, developed from a notion that variants are integral to a work's textual spectrum will be geared to accommodating this perception and endeavour to represent texts as by nature progressive and open.

It is perfectly true that scholarly editing happens, and is enacted, or should happen and be enacted, in awareness of its wider critical and theoretical implications. Yet at the same time there is of course no escaping the fact that scholarly editing is a pragmatic endeavour. We maintained above that editing works (of art) in language cannot be accomplished without (first) going behind the extant textual materials, and we have shown how this may be understood, and has in fact been realised throughout the history of editing. At the level of strict editorial pragmatics, however, it is a work's irreducibly material text(s) that become tangibly and inescapably the practicing editor's concern. This is where editorial adjudication and decisions are called for. How comprehensively these are guided, let alone determined, by the broad approaches of hermeneutics, philosophy, or stances of theory, to the work, is a moot question. Or how they could be so determined or guided, considering the vast predominance of invariance over variation in the extant instan-

tiations of material text for the work. At the pragmatic level, the scholarly editor can do no more towards securing the past for works (of art) in language through his craft than to mend, or touch up, or lay open the work's extant textual record at its every point of indeterminacy – meaning simply, its every point of non-identity in the total compass of that record. (Jerome J. McGann once pointed out very perceptively that the textual record extant for a work will always frame such indeterminacy within its own material determinacy.[3]) We should also recognise that every textual instantiation of a work as edited text distinctly involves, too, a modicum of critical, and therefore creative input on the part of the scholarly editor. An edited text, while it is a material instantiation of the work, is at the same time decidedly the editor's text, which confers a responsibility the editor need neither shirk, nor hide by denying it.

In a curious way, though, as it happens, the Anglo-American rulings in the editorial field have, since the second half of the 20th century, made it incumbent on editors to hide behind the author. The golden rule for scholarly editing since the 1950s has been to fulfil the author's intention. The rule's essential implication is that the editor is empowered not just, as by an older dispensation of textual editing, to adjudicate from specialised skill the readings from the extant material record of texts for a given work. The editor is now invested, too, with a hermeneutic dominance over the work. To determine teleologically the meaning of the work – the author's final intentions determining ultimate meaning – is defined as an obligation to be fulfilled in the establishing itself of the work's single instantiation as edited text.

When and how this assimilation of hermeneutics to the very practice and acts of textual editing happened, marks an interesting moment in the development of literary studies and theory, and therefore, too, in the intellectual history of the 20th century; and it is fascinating to observe both how the assimilation was decreed, and how in the aftermath oblivion set in that a momentous shift had indeed occurred. The rule in question proceeded, as is well known, to become the foundation of the Anglo-American 'theory of copy-text editing', or the 'Greg-Bowers theory of copy-text editing', as it is commonly designated. Greg and Bowers, however, should be kept strictly apart in the matter, for it is precisely at the point of transition from Greg to Bowers that the shift occurred.

[3] Jerome J. McGann, «*Ulysses* as a Postmodern Text: The Gabler Edition», *Criticism*, XXVII (1984–85), pp. 283–306; «Coda».

W.W. Greg was a textual scholar rooted in classical and medievalist methodologies of textual criticism. He saw the extant earliest printings of Shakespeare's texts as derivative of lost manuscripts (which of course they are). Perceiving them thus analogously to the late derivations, as they survive in scribal manuscripts, of long-lost original text inscriptions of works from Classical Antiquity or the Middle Ages, he recognised at the same time that, in contrast, the manuscript originals of Shakespeare lay buried very closely under the surface of the first edition printings. Additionally familiar with Elizabethan printing practices, Greg fused his expertise into a pragmatic ruling by which edited texts from the first editions as copy-texts could be achieved that would approximate closely the inscription in the manuscript printer's copies for those editions, or with luck lay bare (namely where play texts could be assumed to have been printed directly from autograph) the material substance of Shakespeare's own penning of his texts. In brief: W.W. Greg's rationale of copy-text was substantively text-directed, and only accidentally geared towards the author. It was aimed at achieving the most authentic edited text from the extant first-edition records whose textual authority was materially evidenced or inferable. But it was not intention-directed. It was Fredson Bowers who not only saw, but capitalised on the intentionalist implications of Greg's recommendations for attaining authentic edited texts. The admirably creative as well as power-conscious critic, textual scholar and editor that Bowers was, his was something of a *coup-d'êtat*. At the intellectual moment when New Criticism culminated in literary theory of the Wellek-Warren persuasion which resoundingly proclaimed the intentional fallacy, Bowers defined the fulfilling of the author's intention as the finest flower of scholarly editing.

This lode-star conception remains apparently unquestioned to this day in main-stream Anglo-American textual criticism and editing. Methodologically, Paul Eggert certainly seems thoroughly imbued with it; which may be succinctly illustrated. In discussing (in chapter 9) «The German Encounter», he cites *literatim* Hans Zeller's stand on the question of intention: «A principle such as authorial intention cannot serve as a central criterion for the constitution of text [because it] remains a mere idea of the author on the part of the editor, and as such cannot be established reliably.» (206-7) Amazingly, and to me amusingly, Eggert makes no connection when pronouncing, with respect to «Gabler's *Ulysses*»: «Gabler's reading text aimed to capture the novel, as he stated, at its highest point of compositional development. This was not the tra-

ditional way of expressing the idea of a text of final authorial intention, but in truth the aim was deeply traditional.» (173) The first sentence I fully subscribe to: I did indeed so wish to capture the novel, or more precisely: the novel's text. But the second sentence, while I do not object to the label of 'traditional' it confers, is yet an assessment prejudiced by the conception that copy-text editing cannot but imply realising «a text of final authorial intention».

It is true that the *Ulysses* edition, through its phase of becoming a critical reading text, was established from a copy-text. This copy-text however was, in the first place, a virtual construct. It was and is not a text to be found inscribed throughout in one material document. Rather, it was constituted as the aggregate of James Joyce's scripted text for the novel as it progressed materially through a sequence of documents of drafting, fair-copying, additional composition and successive revision. This copy-text, therefore, while assembled from multiple documents, was and is yet in its entirety without a direct material document basis of its own. (Be it also mentioned in passing that it thus applies, in its way, the strategy of logically divorcing text and document that Fredson Bowers was the first [to my knowledge] to devise and practice in his editing of Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones*.) Leaving aside further detailing of the nature of the copy-text for the reading text of *Ulysses*, the operations through which it came about, and the manner of its heuristic deployment, what simply needs to be emphasized is that Eggert is mistaken in assuming the copy-text editing phase for *Ulysses* to have been a moment of realising «the idea of a text of final authorial intention», let alone one of constructing an edited text that would fulfil that intention. All that the *Ulysses* edition claims for its (right-hand page) reading text is that it represents the work, as a text, in as close an editorial approximation as possible to what James Joyce wrote. The copy-text editing invoked and practised in establishing the edited text was therefore decidedly of the Gregian persuasion. It followed Greg's pragmatic, text-directed recommendations and rules as they antedated their being re-interpreted as foundation for an intentionalist methodology, devised and decreed by Fredson Bowers, and dogmatised by Thomas Tanselle.

Thus: to posit, as Eggert does, an editorial gaze taking in all the complexities and depths of meaning of a work so as to accomplish the editing of one specific textual instantiation of it, appears both to over-estimate and over-tax the editorial role. Admittedly, the editor as editor, when setting out to engage with the work in the tangible material-

ity of its text(s), must make sense of it, and so read the work across the range of textual representations available to be considered as basis for the editing. To such a degree, the editor does engage as a reader with the meaning of the work. But even if this is so: the editor's engagement with the meaning of the work has nevertheless only a minor, if not indeed a marginal, effect on the editorial engagement with, and the establishing of, an envisaged edition's edited text. The proof of editorial skill arises only rarely from interpretation. What editing requires in bulk is adjudicating and adjusting minutiae in the material textual record under scrutiny – minutiae, that is, in terms of a work's over-all complexities of meaning.

Beyond the editor as editor and reader, however, there is the reader as reader of the work and the edition – or indeed: of the work through the edition – to be considered. It is here that all questions and problems of meaning come fully into their own. For that product of criticism and humanities scholarship, the scholarly edition, the central question arises how it could, or should, relate to the reader's quest for the meaning of a work in and through a text. The questions and problems of meaning, it is true, are adumbrated throughout Eggert's tenth and final chapter. Positing that there is a relationship between the scholarly edition and the reader's quest, the chapter goes to great lengths to discourse, in impressive diversity, how a work's meaning(s) might be construed for an edition's, or an editor's, or a reader's benefit. But the survey disposition of the argument turns out, in the end, to have little bearing on the specifics of conceptualising as well as of practising scholarly editing. What the chapter does not truly face, let alone solve, is the problem of how the search for, and the construction of meaning can, or might, be built and structured into a scholarly edition. The simple reason for this lack is that the chapter, as well as the book in its entirety, does not conceive the scholarly edition otherwise than as a text edition. Its all but unreserved adherence to the postulate of fulfilling authorial intention, notably, carries with it, as we have seen, the implication that such fulfilling supposedly also fulfils every hermeneutic requirement to be made of a scholarly edition.

Yet to secure a work (of art) in language as the inheritance from the past that it is, it is not enough to establish for it an edited text. A text edition only does not suffice to satisfy the needs of readers and users that it has been traditional to expect editions to meet and to fulfil. Over and above seeing editions as critically considered instantiations of the text of given works, it has therefore in our culture also been customary

to regard them as the proper scholarly tools for mediating works of the past in terms of their content and meaning to the present of the editions' own time. This used to be accomplished through annotation and commentary. Such discoursing of the work in natural language within the edition centered on the work's text fell progressively into disuse, however, in the course of the 20th century. The rigors of formalisation of the textual apparatus won absolute ascendancy over the natural-language mode of the commentary discourses. The shadow of New Criticism, too, descended on the products of textual scholarship. The edited text standing in for the work gained absolute self-sufficiency over against all manner of historical or biographical or political or social ramifications that might be adduced to explore its meanings and interpret it – authorial intention excepted; for, as said above, even while the author's intention was new-critically banned as a fallacy, it was simultaneously rescued for editorial scholarship by becoming text-itself.

Hence: where thus the real-world referents fell by the wayside that had been customarily resorted to for elucidating a work, or that, reciprocally, the work had contributed to shedding light on, the significance of the commentary as one set of the traditional scholarly edition's discourses dwindled. Clinching with apparent finality the argument for marginalising, if not outright eliminating, the discoursing of editions through annotation and commentary, moreover, was the belief, seriously and optimistically held, that the critical texts realised by modern textual scholarship were definitive, and would never need to be done again. (As time went by, the optimism was somewhat dampened: perhaps, one distant day, texts might, after all, need to be re-edited. The modern scholarly editions however would definitely as editions remain definitive: for did they not assemble all material evidence required to establish critical texts?) Commentaries, on the other hand (so it was held), were inevitably short-lived; as ephemera of editorial scholarship, they would need to be redone at briefest intervals.

With so much said, it still remains true, as Paul Eggert's book *Securing the Past* posits, that to secure the past for a work (of art) in language – for a work of literature – scholarly editing is the cultural technique required. Yet the technique should be deployed comprehensively. It is not sufficient to realise it only in part by establishing a critical edition text alone. Admittedly, the range the monograph has set itself, encompassing art, architecture and literature, goes some way towards justifying that, in terms of literature, it largely confines its discussion to aspects of

text editing. From the complexity of components making up the scholarly edition, it is texts that are directly bound to agency and materials, and it is foremost on their grounds that the conservation and restoration of works of art and architecture, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the securing and bringing to life of the cultural heritage in language, and of works of literature specifically, are compatible for comparison at all. To have attempted the comparison has brought out the compatibilities as well as the incompatibilities. As we have seen, Eggert has in his concluding chapters guided us towards considering, or reconsidering, that, or whether, beyond fulfilling its task of establishing an edition text, a scholarly edition could, or should, mediate (as scholarly editions did of old) the content and meaning of a work of literature, and thus engage hermeneutically with it.

This question opens vistas distinctly beyond the limits of Eggert's monograph. We can here no more than hint at some perspectives implied. As a matter of fact, though, *Securing the Past* itself hides in its bibliography the link to a key term by which the scholarly edition of the future might find its bearings for a return to the depth and scope of its own ancestry in the realm of humanities scholarship. It lists Peter Shillingsburg, *From Gutenberg to Google: Electronic Representations of Literary Texts*, of 2006. Understandably, the potential of electronic representations of literary texts is not developed in Eggert's argument, so predicated as it is on the materiality of the past-to-be-secured, including that of literary works perceived materially, since perceived as texts in documents. However, if we accept the contention developed above, namely that texts in their multiplicity (and variance) are but instantiations, materially documented representations, of the work that, as a work (of art) in language, stands outside the realm of the material, then to conceive of texts as equally, or alternatively, instantiated materially or electronically should present no difficulty. Every instantiation, whether on paper or as a digitized record, implies conceptually, as well as materially and in terms of agency, the divorcing of a text from one (antecedent) text carrier, followed by its inscription on a succeeding one. A text, if so re-inscribed digitally, may hence become, and be editorially formed as, the nucleus of a scholarly edition living no longer on paper, as all its ancestry of text instantiations of the work of necessity did, but in the digital medium. This I have argued before, and drawn conclusions from, elsewhere.[4] The buzz-word

[4] Hans Walter Gabler, «Theorizing the Digital Scholarly Edition», *Literature Compass*, VII/2 (2010), (special issue *Scholarly Editing in the Twenty-First Century*), pp. 43-56.

for how to build around a digital edition text a digital scholarly edition genuinely answering to the demands to be made of the scholarly edition (as a genre of humanities scholarship) comes from Peter Shillingsburg. The term he has given currency to in *From Gutenberg to Google* (having, importantly, observed since around the beginning of the new millennium, both in the US and in Europe, the envisioning and incipient emergence of digital research sites for the future) is the «knowledge site». The bearing this has on the scholarly edition is that it provides an opening for re-conceptualising and innovatively re-shaping the erstwhile unity of text edition, apparatus, annotations, and commentary.

Since at least the 18th century, securing the past for works of literature through scholarly editions has been most comprehensively accomplished by means of the so-called Variorum Edition (*editio cum notis variorum*: «edition with the notes of many»). In the New Variorum Shakespeare, for instance, initiated in the latter half of the 19th century and still in progress, the tradition, amazingly, is still going strong. The format is compilational. Reference information collected from a wide variety of sources (lexical, linguistic, critical, historical, and in all other manner of ways factual) is gathered and linked by lemma reference to the text, say, of a given Shakespearean play as it advances as a text through its speech directions and speeches, scenes, and acts. Indexes will of course help users to find their way about and across the information material gathered; but the backbone along which the materials are principally organised is still the text's consecutive seriality – which, within the material two-dimensionality between the covers of a book, could hardly be otherwise. By and large, such is the matrix throughout of orthodox commentary. Positivist by conception, in the first place, commentaries of the traditional school might be termed «information sites».

There can be no belittling the usefulness of the information sites we are familiar with, and rely on, in books. However, the digital medium opens up the possibility, by contrast, of building knowledge sites. What, as we would suggest, here distinguishes 'knowledge' from 'information' is that knowledge, and the building of knowledge, grows out of, as well as initiates, creatively participatory intelligence. In simple terms, the combining of information with information, and/or with content and perceived meaning of a text instantiating a work (in the case, that is, of knowledge sites organised around the hub of text editions of works

of literature), heightens the level and increases the range of knowledge. A knowledge site is thus relational, whereas information sites – even with indexes to offset the handicap – are by nature, and cannot mutate beyond being, serially arranged compilations.

The distinction is at bottom also a medial one. While what exists between the covers of books are information sites, the digital medium provides structural design potential and scope to accommodate knowledge sites. This, from the technical point of view, is simply because the digital medium can be programmed to organise, and to allow access to, its contents relationally. Given a technical infrastructuring (a software design) that permits data input as well as data access by relational patterns, new-generation digital scholarly editions may again be realised as akin to their erstwhile ancestors in books, and be offered as unified wholes of text edition, apparatus, annotations, and commentary. Relational by conception, they will, in terms of organisation, have shed the fetters of their positivist heritage. They ought, moreover, not be given to the world as finished products. The relational combination of their text-and-information content should provide nodes of knowledge to engage with. But then, the engagement cannot but generate enhanced knowledge. The knowledge site must consequently open up to enlargements of content and a deepening of hermeneutic understanding. That is, it should mutate further so as to become a genuine research site. Here, as we may recognise in conclusion, the scholarly edition, as a technique to secure from the past essentially immaterial works of literature, becomes (in the most positive way) thoroughly incompatible with anything one could even imagine being undertaken and achieved to secure from the past works of fine art or of architecture through conserving and restoring them in their irreducible materiality.

Across the disciplines, however, that *Securing the Past* brackets, it can still appropriately be said, as Paul Eggert does in summing up the vision that led him to write the book, that «the work ... , as being constantly involved in a negative dialectic of material medium ... and meaningful experience ... , and as being constituted by an unrolling semiosis across time, [is] necessarily interwoven in the lives of all who create it, gaze at it or read it ... .» (237) It has for me, as these pages testify, been stimulating to engage with the book's ideas and contentions, and to allow them to trigger insight and to generate understanding that, even while diverging time and again from Eggert's argument, would without this reading experience have remained elusive.[5]

[5] This essay was first published in JLTOnline http://www.jltonline.de/ (2011).